Opinion
No. 05-09-01172-CR
01-05-2012
CORTEZ RAYMOND MOSLEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion issued January 5, 2012
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-59509-WN
OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Murphy, and Myers
Opinion By Justice FitzGerald
A jury convicted appellant Cortez Raymond Mosley of murder, sentenced him to life in prison, and imposed a $10,000 fine. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the trial judge erred by overruling three of his Batson challenges. Second, he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Background
The victim, Bobby Washington, was shot and killed the night of November 23, 2007. He was working at a party being held in an office building at 1700 Commerce St. in downtown Dallas. The event was sponsored by Freddie Jackson and his company, WCB Entertainment. Washington arrived at the building at around 9 p.m. He helped move some equipment, handed out some flyers on the street outside, and then stayed at a security booth or concierge station in the lobby of the building. Shortly before midnight, Travis Ross, came down from the party and saw Washington sitting at the concierge station. At first Ross thought Washington was asleep. Then Ross realized that Washington had blood coming out of his neck, and he called 911. Police officers and an ambulance arrived within a few minutes. According to the autopsy report, Washington died shortly after midnight on November 24 from a gunshot wound to the neck.
Investigators discovered a hole in the wall near the chair where Washington had been sitting, and they found a single bullet in a restaurant on the other side of the wall. The bullet was damaged, and it could not be determined exactly what kind of gun had fired the bullet. No fingerprint or DNA evidence was recovered from the scene to link anyone in particular to the crime. None of the witnesses who testified at trial saw the shooting. After an investigation, appellant was identified as a suspect and eventually apprehended in Wichita, Kansas. He was indicted for Washington's murder in February 2008.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue on appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was the person who shot Washington.
A.Standard of review
We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 683-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd, untimely filed). "We defer to the jury's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters." Bell, 326 S.W.3d at 720. Likewise, reconciliation of any conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury. Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd).
B.Review of the evidence
The State called all the witnesses who testified during the first phase of the trial. None of the witnesses saw the shooting.
1.Testimony of Jeremiah Jones
Witness Jeremiah Jones supplied the most complete version of the events in question and also provided the strongest support for appellant's identity as the shooter. He testified to the following facts. Appellant was a longtime friend of Jones. In the fall of 2007, Jones was living in DeSoto and trying to start a record label. He had some office and studio space on the 15th floor of the building where the murder took place. One of his recording artists was Anthony Jackson, also known as Mr. Fire. We will refer to Anthony Jackson as "Anthony" to distinguish him from Freddie Jackson, who was hosting a party on the 18th floor of the building the night of the murder. In the fall of 2007, both Anthony and appellant were staying with Jones at least some of the time.
On November 23, 2007, Jones arranged to meet an engineer named William at Jones's office so that William could "put some sounds" in Jones's computer. Jones drove his Suburban to the office that night, taking with him Anthony, appellant, a woman named Ashley, and Jones's two children. On the way to the office, they stopped at a McDonald's, where Anthony and appellant met some women and invited them to come to the studio too. The whole group proceeded to the building, arrived there close to 11 p.m., and went up to the 15th floor. Jones knew that something was going on on the 18th floor of the building that same night.
While the group was at Jones's studio, some of the members of the group were getting loud and "out of control." Jones, Anthony, and appellant had been "drinking a little bit." At one point, appellant "flashed [a] gun," which Jones identified as a revolver. Jones took the gun away from appellant, put it down, and told him to "chill." Jones then suggested that the group should go upstairs to the party or go downstairs and chill, because he was wanting to work on his computer with William. Anthony, appellant, and the women from McDonald's left and did not come back to Jones's office space.
Later, Jones got a phone call from Anthony, who said something like, "Bro, you need to come down here." Then appellant got on the phone and said, "Come on, Bro, you got to get down here. I shot somebody." Jones, William, Ashley, and Jones's children took the elevator down to the lobby. When they got out, Jones saw a person "sitting there bleeding," and he saw appellant "with the gun." William left in his own car. Jones panicked, got the rest of the group into his Suburban, and drove away. Jones had the idea to take appellant to the Greyhound bus station, and he proceeded to do so. He pulled up to the Greyhound station and told appellant he had to go. Appellant got out of the Suburban, and Jones drove away.
Early the next morning, Jones got a call from a police detective, and he submitted to an interview that was video-recorded. On cross-examination, appellant's counsel played parts of Jones's interview with the detective and developed testimony from Jones showing that Jones's interview statements were not completely consistent with his testimony in court. For example, in the interview, Jones did not mention that appellant had talked to him on the phone that night and told Jones that he had shot somebody.
2.Testimony of Jevin Bell and Natasha Price
Other witnesses testified that they saw appellant with a gun the evening of November 23, 2007. One such witness was Jevin Bell, who testified as follows. He was the brother of Freddie Jackson, who was hosting the party on the 18th floor that night. Bell testified that when he first arrived at the building that evening, appellant "confronted" him as he got out of his car. Bell did not know appellant, but appellant stepped up to him and got in his personal space. Freddie Jackson defused the situation by telling appellant to "chill out." Bell remembered that his brother called appellant "Cortez." Later that evening, Bell went from the 18th floor down to the 15th floor and was listening to some music with the other people who were there. After he had been there about fifteen minutes, a black man in a gray hoodie pulled a silver revolver from his waistband and pointed it directly at Bell's face. The man who pulled the gun on him was the same person who had confronted him outside earlier. Then Bell left and went back to the 18th floor. Shortly after that, Bell's car alarm went off, which caused his pager to go off. When he went downstairs to go to his car, he saw there were police officers present and a lot of blood on the floor. He went to the police station for questioning. The evening of November 24, someone went to Bell's house, and he picked appellant out of a photo lineup as the person who pointed a silver revolver at him.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Bell some questions about the written statement he gave a few hours after the incident. There were some discrepancies between his written statement and his courtroom testimony. For example, in court, Bell testified that appellant simply confronted him in the front of the building, but in his written statement he said that his brother introduced him to a man in a gray, hooded sweatshirt. In his statement, Bell said that the person in a hoodie was waving a silver revolver, not that he put the gun in Bell's face. And in his statement, Bell said that the man put the gun on a table, and a lighter-skinned man with braids, whom Bell did not know, picked it up and put it in his waistband. That was the last person he saw with the gun.
The other principal witness who identified appellant as having a gun that evening was Natasha Price, who testified as follows. She lives in Tulsa, Oklahoma. She was one of the women that Jones's group met at the McDonald's earlier that evening and invited to Jones's office and recording studio. Two of the men in Jones's group were wearing gray hoodies and jeans. Jones's group and the four women went up to Jones's office on the 15th floor for a while. Then the four women and the two men wearing hoodies went downstairs in the elevator. Two women and one man went outside to smoke. The other three people, including Price, rode the elevator back up. The man who rode back up the elevator with Price and her friend Darlene tried to flirt with them, but they were not receptive to his advances. Then the man lifted his sweater and showed Price a silver gun that looked like a revolver in his waistband. Price told him it didn't scare her, and when they reached the 15th floor they went to the studio. Eventually all four women went up to the 18th floor, and then one of the women, Lashea Brown, went downstairs to change her clothes. While she was gone, the police came to the building. Price and the other two women went downstairs to look for Brown, and the police were there investigating the shooting. In Tulsa, about two weeks after the incident, Price was shown an array of six photographs and picked appellant out as someone she recognized. During the trial, Price identified appellant as the man with the gray hoodie and the revolver.
On cross-examination, Price testified that she also saw a second gun in the possession of a different man at the gathering on the 15th floor of the building. Price testified that the man was drunk and waving a gun around. He was not one of the two men wearing a gray hoodie, and Price was unable to describe him. Defense counsel also cross-examined Price about the statement she gave shortly after the incident, which differed from her courtroom testimony in some respects. For example, in her statement Price said that appellant pulled a silver handgun from his waistband and showed it off in front of her, while in court she testified that he only showed it to her by lifting his sweater and revealing the gun in his waistband. In her statement, she said he showed the gun on the 15th floor, but in court she testified that he showed it to her on the elevator.
C.Application of the law to the facts
The evidence described above is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant was the person who shot and killed Washington. Jones, Bell, and Price all testified that they saw appellant with a gun that evening before the murder. Jones also testified that he got a telephone call right around the time the murder occurred in which appellant told Jones that appellant had shot someone and Jones needed to come downstairs. When Jones got downstairs, he saw Washington bleeding and appellant with a gun in his hand. When Jones took appellant to the Greyhound bus station and told him he had to go, appellant got out of the car, and Jones left him there. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the person who shot Washington. See Bell, 326 S.W.3d at 720 (in legal-sufficiency review, question is "whether, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
Appellant points out that appellant's DNA and fingerprints were not found at the crime scene, the murder weapon was never found, and the caliber of the bullet that killed Washington could not even be identified with certainty. But these facts do not render the evidence legally insufficient. See Tijerino v. State, No. 14-06-01012-CR, 2008 WL 509880, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 26, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("[T]he State need not offer a murder weapon into evidence to establish the essential elements of murder."); Tinker v. State, 148 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (upholding conviction for aggravated sexual assault despite lack of DNA evidence).
Appellant also argues that the evidence contains several inconsistencies. For example, Detective Steve David testified about certain videos that were taken by the building's surveillance cameras the night of the murder. He testified that, based on his investigation, he concluded that appellant was recognizable in the videos because he was wearing dark shoes while Anthony, who was wearing a similar gray hoodie, was wearing shoes with white on them. But one of the witnesses testified that Anthony was wearing black and red Jordan tennis shoes, which is inconsistent with David's testimony about the color of Anthony's shoes. We reject appellant's argument. It was the jury's prerogative to weigh the evidence and resolve any inconsistencies in it. See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 773.
Appellant also argues that Price's testimony that appellant showed her a gun on the elevator is contradicted by her own testimony that the surveillance videos showed that neither man in a gray hoodie was in the elevator with her and Darlene. We have reviewed the record and disagree with appellant's assessment. Considering Price's testimony as a whole, the jury could have reasonably concluded that she testified about two different elevator rides: one in which she rode with Darlene and appellant, and during which appellant showed her a gun, and a separate elevator ride involving only Price and her three female friends.
Appellant also raises some arguments regarding the witnesses who identified him after the fact. He complains that the photo lineup that was shown to witnesses Bell and Price included appellant but did not include Anthony, even though Anthony was dressed the same as appellant on the night in question. And he argues that Price's identification of appellant is suspect because she indicated that she saw his photograph on television at some point after the murder. Again, it was the jury's prerogative to weigh the evidence and give it the weight it deemed appropriate. See id.
D.Conclusion
The evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction. III. Batson
In his first issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial judge committed Batson error during jury selection.
A.Applicable law and standard of review
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a prosecutor may not exercise a peremptory strike against a veniremember solely on account of his or her race. Grant v. State, 325 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Batson objections entail a three-step process in the trial court. First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must object and make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Greer v. State, 310 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.). If this burden is met, the burden shifts to the other party to articulate a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011). If the striking party proffers a race-neutral reason, the trial court must then decide as a question of fact whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Grant, 325 S.W.3d at 657. The opponent of the strike bears the burden of proving that the race- neutral reason is a pretext by a preponderance of the evidence. Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 13. If the striking party articulates reasons for the strike and the trial court rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the first step of the analysis is moot. Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 815.
We sustain the trial judge's ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 13. A ruling is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. We review the record of the voir dire and the Batson hearing in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling. Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 815. Because the evaluation of the credibility of the striking party and the veniremembers lies peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, we defer to the trial judge in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Grant, 325 S.W.3d at 657. If the trial judge erroneously overruled even a single Batson challenge, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 14.
Courts have identified a number of factors to be considered in weighing Batson challenges:
*Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 14-15. We further note that proof that the striking party gave a factually incorrect reason for a peremptory strike is not sufficient to show that the reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. See Grant, 325 S.W.3d at 660 & n.23.
whether the striking party used a jury shuffle in a racially discriminatory manner;
*whether the party used strikes to eliminate a far greater proportion of African- Americans from the venire as compared to non-African-Americans;
*whether the party failed to question the struck veniremember;
*whether the party disproportionately singled out African-American veniremembers for questioning in a way designed to elicit grounds for peremptory strikes;
*whether the party gave reasons for striking African-American veniremembers that applied equally to non-African-American verniremember that were not struck; and
*whether the party relied on reasons not related to the facts of the case.
B.Application of the law to the facts
The record shows that forty-five veniremembers were in the "strike zone," of whom twelve were African-Americans. Eight were struck for cause, leaving four African-American veniremembers. Both sides had ten peremptory strikes, and the State attempted to use peremptory strikes against all four of the remaining African-Americans within the strike zone, Jurors 9, 10, 26, and 27. The trial judge sustained appellant's Batson objection to the strike of Juror No. 10, so Juror No. 10 actually served on the jury. We consider the State's attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to use peremptory strikes against all of the African-Americans within the strike zone to be a factor tending to show racial motivation for the strikes. See Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 15 (concluding that State's use of 100% of its strikes against African-Americans, who constituted only 27% of venire, weighed heavily in favor of defendant in Batson analysis). The fact that the trial judge sustained one of appellant's Batson objections and seated Juror No. 10 over the State's peremptory strike also weighs in favor of a finding of racial motivation for all the challenged strikes. See Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 454-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). With this background, we proceed to analyze appellant's arguments as to each of three African-American veniremembers that the trial judge permitted the State to strike.
1.Juror No. 9
The prosecutor asserted that she struck Juror No. 9 because she had a prior conviction for unlawful carrying of a weapon in 1980. The prosecutor said that she also struck Jurors 13 and 26 because of their criminal histories, and that she would have struck Juror No. 48, a Hispanic man, because of his criminal history if he had been within the strike zone. The record does not indicate Juror No. 13's race except that he or she was not African-American; as previously noted, Juror No. 26 was African-American. The record does not indicate that the prosecutor asked Juror No. 9 any questions about arrests or convictions during voir dire, but it shows that the prosecutor was aware of Juror No. 9's criminal case from 1980, including its case number and the fact that Juror No. 9 pleaded guilty to the charge. During the Batson hearing, Juror No. 9 said that she could be fair to both sides and that she failed to reveal her 1980 arrest during voir dire because she had forgotten about it. She also said that she was fined for the offense but was not jailed or put on probation. The trial judge sustained the State's peremptory strike.
"A prior arrest or criminal history can be a race-neutral explanation for striking a prospective juror." Zuniga v. State, No. 05-05-01300-CR, 2006 WL 1624448, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 13, 2006, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Appellant argues that the State's reliance on Juror No. 9's criminal history was a pretext because Juror No. 9 said nothing during voir dire that would disqualify her from jury service and because the State put on no evidence that it struck all the veniremembers who had criminal records. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. The fact that Juror No. 9 said nothing objectionable during voir dire is not determinative. The question is whether the State's reasons for the strike are pretexts for purposeful racial discrimination. Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 13. So the fact that Juror No. 9 said nothing that would disqualify her from jury service does not show clear error by the trial judge in accepting the State's race-neutral reason for striking her.
As for appellant's argument that the State engaged in racially disparate treatment of veniremembers who had criminal records, appellant bore the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the State's reason for striking Juror No. 9 was a pretext for race discrimination. See id. Appellant adduced no evidence that the State refrained from striking any veniremembers with criminal records. We will not speculate that other veniremembers might have had criminal records and yet were not struck by the State. The record does contain the prosecutor's statements that Jurors 13, 26, and 48 also had criminal records, and that the State struck Juror No. 13 and Juror No. 26 and would have struck Juror No. 48 if he had been within the strike zone, all because of their criminal records. On this record, appellant has not shown the State's reason for striking Juror No. 9 was a pretext for race discrimination.
Appellant also argues that the State's strike of Juror No. 9 was clearly pretextual because the State engaged in individual questioning of only two potential jurors about their criminal histories, and they were both African-Americans (Jurors 9 and 26). We disagree. The individual questioning of Juror No. 9 and Juror No. 26 about their criminal histories took place only during the Batson hearing, not during voir dire, so appellant is factually incorrect to the extent he contends that the State engaged in selective questioning about criminal histories during voir dire in order to target African-Americans. The record does not show that the State singled Juror No. 9 out for special questioning during voir dire in order to develop a reason for striking her.
2.Juror No. 26
The prosecutor asserted that she struck Juror No. 26 because he wore sunglasses during voir dire and because of his criminal record. During individual questioning during the Batson hearing, Juror No. 26 said that he wore glasses to correct his astigmatism, and that his glasses were tinted.
Juror No. 26's criminal record was a valid, race-neutral reason for the State's strike. See Zuniga, 2006 WL 1624448, at *1. As he does in connection with Juror No. 9, appellant argues that the trial judge erred because the State did not prove that it struck all veniremembers with criminal records. We reject that argument for the reasons stated above. Appellant also repeats his argument that the State selectively questioned African-American veniremembers about their criminal histories. We reject that argument for the reasons stated above.
3.Juror No. 27
The prosecutor asserted that she struck Juror No. 27 because she said that she "had somebody that had contact with the criminal system" that was not treated fairly. The prosecutor further said that she struck Juror No. 14, a white woman; Juror No. 15, a Hispanic man; and Juror No. 26, an African-American man, for the same reason. She added that she would have struck Juror No. 3, a white woman, for the same reason if the parties had not mutually agreed to strike that potential juror. Finally, the prosecutor said that when she asked Juror No. 27 during voir dire whether she could consider the full range of punishment, Juror No. 27 said, "the low range," which might have indicated that she was starting to "close her mind off."
It is a race-neutral reason to strike a veniremember because he or she knows someone who was treated unfairly by the criminal-justice system. See Garcia v. State, 833 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992) ("Strikes of prospective jurors because they had relatives or friends who had been arrested, charged, or convicted of a crime have been held to be race-neutral."), aff'd, 868 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). It is also a race-neutral reason to strike someone because of his or her unwillingness to consider the full range of punishment available for an offense. Leadon v. State, 332 S.W.3d 600, 614 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Appellant argues that the record does not support the State's stated reasons for striking Juror No. 27. He also argues that the State did not strike other veniremembers who said that they were close to people who had been treated unfairly by the criminal-justice system, which shows disparate treatment of Juror No. 27.
We conclude that the record supports the State's position that Juror No. 27 said she knew someone who was treated unfairly by the criminal-justice system. The prosecutor posed a twofold question and then sought answers from a long series of veniremembers. The first question was whether the veniremembers or someone they were close to had ever been arrested, charged, or convicted of an offense "higher than a speeding ticket." The second question was whether that person was treated fairly. Juror No. 27 answered, "Yes and no." The prosecutor followed up with Juror No. 27 by stating, "They were not treated fairly." Juror No. 27 responded, "No." This exchange supports the prosecutor's later assertion that she struck Juror No. 27 because that veniremember said that she "had somebody" that had contact with the criminal-justice system and was not treated fairly. Although, as appellant points out, Juror No. 27 went on to say that these background facts and opinion would not weigh on her mind or come into her deliberations, these assurances did not change the existence of the background facts and her opinion that she or someone she knew had not been treated fairly. Again, the State did not bear the burden of showing that it had grounds to strike Juror No. 27 for cause; appellant bore the burden of proving that the State's proffered race-neutral reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. The trial judge did not clearly err in concluding that appellant failed to carry his burden.
We conclude the record also adequately supports the State's other proffered reason for striking Juror No. 27. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked a number of veniremembers whether they could consider the full range of potential punishments, that range being imprisonment from five to ninety-nine years or life. The colloquy went as follows. First, the prosecutor, Ms. Madson, asked an unidentified veniremember, "Can you consider the full range?" The veniremember responded, "Yes." Then Ms. Madson addressed Juror No. 27 by name: Ms. Madson:
[Juror No. 27].
[Juror No. 27]:Yes.
Ms. Madson:You could consider the full range.
[Juror No. 27]:The low range.
Ms. Madson:You could consider the low range.
[Juror No. 27]:Is that what your question is; the low range is from five to 99, you could consider both depending on the evidence?
Ms. Madson:Yes.
[Juror No. 27]:Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Madson:So you can consider five?
[Juror No. 27]:Yes.
Ms. Madson:You can consider and give life.
[Juror No. 27]:Yes, or 99.
So the record supports the State's asserted reason that at first, Juror No. 27 "said the low range," which the prosecutor interpreted to mean that Juror No. 27 wouldn't consider the high end of the range or at least was starting to "close her mind off." The trial judge had the benefit of viewing the veniremembers' voir-dire responses firsthand, as well as observing the prosecutor's demeanor when she gave and defended her reasons for her strikes. He was in the best position to determine whether her reasons for striking Juror No. 27 were credible. We cannot second-guess him on this record. See Grant, 325 S.W.3d at 657 ("Because the trial court's ruling requires an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of prosecutors and venire members . . . we defer to the trial court in the absence of exceptional circumstances.").
Appellant also complains about disparate treatment of Juror No. 27. He argues that the State did not strike five other veniremembers who, like Juror No. 27, said that they were close to someone who was treated unfairly by the criminal-justice system and that this would not affect their deliberations. But he acknowledges that the State did strike four veniremembers based on the same reason, and that the prosecutor said she would have struck a fifth veniremember for that reason if that veniremember had not been struck by agreement. Although the State did not strike every non- African-American veniremember who shared this characteristic, it did strike some, which weighs against a conclusion that the trial judge clearly erred. Moreover, Juror No. 27 was unique because she not only was close to someone she thought had been treated unfairly by the criminal-justice system but also gave the unclear answer about "the low range" of punishment. This factual distinction undermines appellant's disparate-treatment argument. See Whitaker v. State, 977 S.W.2d 869, 874-75 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. ref'd) (holding that there was no disparate treatment when State struck a veniremember with three relatives in trouble with the law and did not strike veniremembers with only one relative in trouble with the law).
C.Conclusion
We conclude that, in light of all the foregoing, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial judge made a mistake when he overruled three of appellant's Batson challenges. Greer, 310 S.W.3d at 13. The State furnished plausible, race-neutral reasons for striking three African-American veniremembers. The trial judge had the benefit of observing the demeanor of the veniremembers and the prosecutor when he decided whether the prosecutor's real reasons for the strikes were grounded in race discrimination. He concluded that they were not. We hold that, on this record, the trial judge's decisions were not clearly erroneous.
IV. Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
KERRY P. FITZGERALD
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
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