Opinion
December 15, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.).
The authority conferred upon respondent Commissioner pursuant to section 1802 (6) (d) of the New York City Charter, and section 32 Priv. Hous. Fin. of the Private Housing Finance Law, is sufficiently broad to encompass the limited pre-eviction review proceedings at issue in this case (see, Matter of Campagna v Shaffer, 73 N.Y.2d 237, 242-243; Starrett City v Jace, 137 Misc.2d 328, 329-330), and the procedures actually employed provided petitioner with the full panoply of due process rights in this administrative proceeding (see, Matter of Williams v White Plains Hous. Auth., 35 A.D.2d 965). By stipulation dated November 14, 1990, petitioner waived any objection to the adequacy of either the notice to cure or the notice of petition served by the housing cooperative, which we find, in any event, adequately advised petitioner of the charges. The agency's determination is supported by substantial evidence, and petitioner failed to demonstrate that the continuous flow of unseemly, disorderly and at times, menacing individuals in and out of her apartment at all hours of the day and night was related to or caused by her psychiatric disability. Accordingly, there is no basis for petitioner's claim pursuant to section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ( 29 U.S.C. § 794), that the respondent limited profit housing corporation sought to evict her "solely by reason of her * * * disability". Nor would the mere fact of petitioner's mental illness require respondent Lindsay Park to make any additional "accommodation", in light of the severity and continuing nature of petitioner's nuisance (see, Frank v Park Summit Realty Corp., 175 A.D.2d 33, mod on other grounds 79 N.Y.2d 789).
We have reviewed petitioner's additional arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Wallach and Asch, JJ.