Opinion
B320516
12-05-2023
CAMILLE MOSELEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
McCathern, Evan Selik, and Christine Zaouk for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &Stewart, Jack S. Sholkoff, Vince M. Verde, and Mark F. Lovell for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20STCV06095, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge.
McCathern, Evan Selik, and Christine Zaouk for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &Stewart, Jack S. Sholkoff, Vince M. Verde, and Mark F. Lovell for Defendant and Respondent.
LAVIN, ACTING P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Camille Moseley (plaintiff) appeals from a summary judgment in favor of her former employer, General Motors, a Limited Liability Company (GM). Plaintiff alleges that GM terminated her employment due to racial discrimination. Plaintiff is an African American woman.
GM brought a motion for summary judgment disputing plaintiff's claims and offering substantial evidence that it terminated her employment after multiple dealers reported to plaintiff's supervisor that they had reported a serious issue regarding a neighboring dealership to plaintiff, but she had done nothing about it. GM conducted an internal investigation and concluded that plaintiff knew or should have known about the dealership's misconduct and that her failure to investigate or report the issue constituted a serious violation of its core policies. On that basis, GM terminated plaintiff's employment. This evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to offer evidence that GM's explanation was a pretext designed to conceal its true motive, racial animus. Plaintiff failed to meet that burden. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiff's Employment with GM
Plaintiff is an African American woman who worked for GM in various capacities for approximately 28 years. From September 2017 to January 9, 2019, plaintiff worked as a Cadillac Northstar District Sales Manager. In that capacity, plaintiff was the main point of contact between GM and the Cadillac dealerships assigned to her. As pertinent here, plaintiff's assigned dealerships included Crestview Cadillac (Crestview dealership), Dutton Motor Company (Dutton dealership), and Martin Cadillac (Martin dealership). Among other things, plaintiff was responsible for supporting her assigned dealerships by answering questions from the dealers and handling any concerns generally relating to auto sales.
For the sake of clarity, we use "dealership" to refer to a company or other entity, and "dealer" or "dealers" to refer to the owners or employees of those entities.
Plaintiff was required to and did know the current sales incentive rules applicable to Cadillac dealerships, including a program called Pinnacle. Under Pinnacle, dealers would provide GM with information and a specific code relating to each vehicle sale. GM used that information, along with a dealership's sales volume, to calculate the amount of a dealership's incentive payments. Dealerships are required to comply with GM's sales incentive rules.
Beginning in September 2018, plaintiff reported to Grant Lindsay, a regional sales manager. Lindsay reported to a regional director, Mahmoud Samara.
2. Martin Cadillac's Auction Sales
In April 2017, Roundtree Group purchased the Martin dealership and, with GM's agreement, put Lonnie Bennett in charge of the dealership. Lonnie Bennett is an African American man.
In November 2018, Woody Dutton and Dave Crain, both dealers at the Dutton dealership, learned that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction. In fact, the Dutton dealership had purchased some of those vehicles. As competitors of the Martin dealership, Dutton and Crain were concerned that the Martin dealership might be using the auction sales to qualify for Pinnacle incentive payments-a practice they believed was not allowed. During the last week of November 2018, Dutton and Crain separately contacted plaintiff to discuss the issue. Plaintiff responded that the dealers should focus on their own dealership and, if they wanted more information about the Martin dealership's sales, they could contact Bennett directly. Plaintiff did not inquire into the Martin dealership's auction practice, nor did she report Dutton's and Crain's concerns to anyone at GM.
Ted Hwang, a dealer at the Crestview dealership, later learned that the Dutton dealership had purchased new cars from the Martin dealership at auction. Like Crain and Dutton, Hwang believed the sale of new cars at auction was prohibited by GM. Hwang called plaintiff and insinuated that there was "a situation" with a dealer that he could report to GM auditors, Samara, and the DMV. Plaintiff did not advise anyone at GM about Hwang's phone call.
In December 2018, Crain called Lindsay, plaintiff's direct supervisor, and reported that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction, he had reported this activity to plaintiff, and plaintiff told him to mind his own business. Neither Crain nor Lindsay mentioned age, race, or gender as part of the discussion. And neither Crain nor Dutton believed that plaintiff was involved with the Martin dealership auction sales or was intentionally covering them up. At Lindsay's request, Crain emailed Lindsay and summarized the concerns he expressed during their telephone call. Lindsay's supervisor, Samara, was also contacted about the auction sales. Samara received a letter from Hwang, of the Crestview dealership, and Peter Ngo, a member of the national dealer council, requesting that Samara investigate the alleged new car auction sales by the Martin dealership. Samara assured the dealers he would do so.
3. Investigation; Plaintiff's Employment Termination
GM initiated an investigation into the allegations. The investigation confirmed that the Martin dealership had sold new vehicles at auction, which was a violation of its sales agreement with GM. Crain told Lindsay that both he and Dutton had informed plaintiff of that fact. Crain provided the vehicle identification numbers of some of the vehicles sold at auction by the Martin dealership and Lindsay's initial investigation revealed that there was a problem. Samara contacted Bennett, of the Martin dealership, regarding the transactions. Bennett denied knowing of any wrongdoing by the Martin dealership. He also indicated that another member of his team had made plaintiff aware of the vehicle sales.
Based on the investigation, GM concluded that plaintiff had been, or should have been, aware that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction in violation of GM policy and that she had failed to report the matter to anyone at GM. GM further concluded that plaintiff's failure to report the complaints from Dutton and Crain regarding those auction sales constituted a violation of GM's "Code of Conduct" and "Winning with Integrity" policies and warranted the termination of her employment. Accordingly, on January 9, 2019, GM fired plaintiff.
Pursuant to GM policy, plaintiff appealed GM's decision to a third party called JustUs. At that time, plaintiff for the first time expressed concern that her employment termination might be due to her race, age, or gender. JustUs conducted an investigation and was unable to find sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's contention that her employment was terminated due to race or other unlawful criteria. Rather, JustUs concluded GM management had acted appropriately. Plaintiff later agreed that she could not recall that anyone at GM made derogatory comments regarding either her race or gender.
GM subsequently audited the Martin dealership's sales records to assess compliance with GM's policies and procedures. The audit confirmed the dealership had sold new vehicles through auctions and other unauthorized channels but reported those sales as legitimate sales that qualified for dealer incentive payments. In all, GM concluded that the Martin dealership received more than $225,000 in unwarranted incentive payments.
4. Complaint
Plaintiff filed a complaint against GM, the Dutton dealership, and the Crestview dealership in February 2020. As pertinent here, the complaint includes three causes of actionagainst GM based on racial discrimination: employment termination, harassment/hostile work environment, and failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (h), (j) &(k).)
An additional cause of action against GM for discrimination on the basis of gender was apparently resolved at the demurrer stage. Neither the Crestview dealership nor the Dutton dealership is a party to this appeal.
Unspecified section references are to the Government Code.
Generally, plaintiff alleges the existence of racism in the auto sales industry at large and, more particularly, on the part of several non-minority dealers to whom she had been assigned. According to plaintiff, GM had developed programs to enhance dealership opportunities for minority-owned dealerships in response to racial discrimination litigation in the 1980's and nonminority dealers harbored resentment against both GM and minority dealers as a result. Plaintiff further alleges that nonminority dealers perceived her, as an African American woman, as allied with minority dealers based on a stereotype that minorities will favor and be loyal to each other.
The Martin dealership was managed by Bennett, an African American man. Plaintiff alleges that non-minority dealers-specifically, Crain and Dutton-conspired to have her employment terminated by complaining to her about the Martin dealership's sale of vehicles at auction and then further complaining to her supervisor, Lindsay. She alleges she was unaware new vehicles were being sold at auction but that GM, in an effort to appease Crain and Dutton, unreasonably concluded she was aware of such sales and on that basis terminated her employment. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that white male employees of GM who engaged in misconduct were not disciplined.
Plaintiff's complaint seeks damages, reinstatement to a comparable position at GM, costs, attorney's fees, and punitive damages.
5. Summary Judgment
5.1. GM's Motion
GM moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of plaintiff's three causes of action. With respect to the employment termination claim, GM asserted both that plaintiff could not establish any racial animus on the part of GM and that, even if she could do so, GM had a legitimate and non-pretextual reason for terminating plaintiff's employment. First, GM noted that plaintiff's complaint does not allege racial animus on the part of GM. Instead, she alleges that GM "adopted" the racial animus of non-minority dealers. But plaintiff conceded during her deposition that there is no evidence of racial animus on the part of the dealers who complained and admitted she inferred that those dealers used a racial stereotype. And, as GM noted, the complaining dealers conveyed legitimate complaints about an improper business practice by the Martin dealership.
Further, and in any event, even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, GM asserted that it offered substantial evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's employment termination-namely, that plaintiff knew about the Martin dealership's sale of new cars at auction in violation of GM policy but did not report it to anyone, which was also in violation of GM policy. Although plaintiff maintained she did not know the auctioned cars were new, GM had evidence to the contrary from Crain and was entitled to believe that evidence. GM's good faith belief that plaintiff violated core GM policies was sufficient to support its decision to terminate her employment and defeat plaintiff's claims. GM argued further that plaintiff would be unable to show the reasons given for her employment termination were pretextual.
As to the hostile work environment claim, GM noted that plaintiff admitted she was unable to identify a single instance in which anyone at GM made a disparaging comment based on her race or engaged in other racist conduct. Accordingly, that claim, as well as her claim for failure to prevent workplace harassment, failed as a matter of law.
5.2. Plaintiff's Opposition
Plaintiff opposed GM's motion for summary judgment. She asserted, as to her prima facie case for racial discrimination, that several triable issues of fact existed. First, and as to racial animus by GM, plaintiff noted that she had complained only six months before the auction issue arose that her colleagues treated her like "an angry Black woman," but GM's response was to send plaintiff, rather than her colleagues, to a communications class. Second, and with respect to GM's proffered reason for her employment termination, plaintiff claimed the investigation did not show that plaintiff knew the cars being sold at auction were new, rather than used. Plaintiff's additional arguments related to disparate treatment of non-minority employees. Plaintiff asserted that Jennifer Blackburn, who is White and held a position similar to plaintiff's with respect to GMC and Buick dealerships, was never investigated, despite the fact that 10 of the 11 new cars sold at auction were GMC's, not Cadillacs. Also, plaintiff's supervisor, Samara, was purportedly aware of a fraudulent scheme relating to kickbacks to dealers from a marketing company but did not report it. He was not disciplined. Finally, as to disparate treatment, plaintiff asserted that she was replaced by a White man.
Additionally, and with respect to GM's proffered reason for terminating her employment, plaintiff argued that the stated reason was a pretext. Specifically, plaintiff considered GM's investigation to bear "all the hallmarks of weakness, implausibility, and contradictions" that create triable issues of fact. Plaintiff maintained she knew nothing of the Martin dealership's fraudulent activities, yet her knowledge of the scheme and failure to report it were the grounds upon which GM fired her. And, again, plaintiff asserted she was singled out for investigation while others at GM (Samara and Blackburn) were not treated similarly.
With respect to the hostile workplace and failure to prevent harassment claims, plaintiff cited her complaint that colleagues treated her like "an angry Black woman" and asserts GM's investigation and resolution of that issue were inadequate.
In a supplemental opposition, submitted after additional discovery took place, plaintiff offered testimony from the general manager at the Martin dealership stating he never told plaintiff that the cars sold at auction were new. In addition, Bennett testified to the sort of racial animus he experienced in the auto sales business. This evidence, plaintiff urged, showed that GM's explanation for her employment termination was pretextual.
5.3. GM's Reply
In reply, GM asserted that plaintiff's evidence did not demonstrate any racial animus on the part of GM. As for the harassment claim, the incident cited by plaintiff involved two coworkers dismissing her ideas and suggestions. The only suggestion of racial bias in relation to those actions was an inference by plaintiff, who conceded that no one at GM made any derogatory comments to or about her.
5.4. Trial Court Ruling
The court heard argument on March 2, 2022, and issued its written ruling granting GM's motion for summary judgment on March 7, 2022.
As an initial matter, the court agreed with GM that plaintiff failed to offer any evidence suggesting that GM or the dealers who contacted plaintiff's supervisor harbored any racial animus. Plaintiff alleged that GM "adopted" the racial stereotyping (i.e., African Americans will be loyal and cover for each other) of dealers Dutton and Crain. Both those dealers testified, however, that they did not think plaintiff was involved in the Martin dealership's misconduct nor did they believe she was covering for the dealership. In addition, Dutton, Crain, and the two dealers from Crestview who had contacted Samara, Hwang and Ngo, all testified that they were not motivated by plaintiff's race and instead had legitimate, fact-based concerns about the Martin dealership's business practices-concerns that were later proven to be well founded. In other words, the court concluded, the only evidence is that the dealers were concerned about the Martin dealership's business practices. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments that racial animus could be inferred from the disparate treatment of non-minority employees, finding that the other employees plaintiff identified were not similarly situated to plaintiff.
Assuming plaintiff could establish some discriminatory animus on GM's part, however, the court found that GM had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff's employment and that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary adjudication of her employment termination claim. Specifically, GM had conducted an investigation regarding the Martin dealership's vehicle sales and determined that it had improperly sold new vehicles at auction. Further, GM had been informed by at least one dealer that the dealer made plaintiff aware of the situation. It was undisputed that plaintiff did not report any concerns about the auction issue to anyone at GM. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the investigation was "a sham" as unsupported by any evidence. As to plaintiff's claim that she did not actually know new cars had been sold at auction by the Martin dealership, the court noted GM had a good faith belief that she did, as it had been advised by Crain that he told her about it. And a good faith basis for plaintiff's employment termination is sufficient to avoid liability. Finally, and with respect to plaintiff's claims for harassment and failure to prevent harassment, the court again found no evidence of any racial animus on the part of anyone at GM. Accordingly, those claims failed as a matter of law.
5.5. Entry of Judgment and Appeal
The court entered judgment in favor of GM on April 1, 2022. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
"The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The moving party "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The pleadings determine the issues to be addressed by a summary judgment motion. (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 885, reversed on other grounds by Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490; Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life &Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74.)
On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record de novo and independently determine whether triable issues of material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) We resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Saelzler, at p. 768.) "In performing an independent review of the granting of summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving party's favor, and (3) the opposition-assuming movant has met its initial burden-to 'decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue.'" (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) "We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale." (Ibid.)
The appellant has the burden to show error, even if the appellant did not bear the burden in the trial court, and" 'to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record and any supporting authority.'" (Claudio v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230.)
2. The court properly granted GM's motion for summary judgment.
2.1. Legal Analysis of Workplace Discrimination Claims
" 'In California, courts employ at trial the three-stage test that was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, to resolve discrimination claims .... [Citation.] At trial, the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, showing"' "actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were 'based on a [prohibited] discriminatory criterion ....'" '"' (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2.) A prima facie claim arises 'when the employee shows (1) at the time of the adverse action [he was a member of a protected class], (2) an adverse employment action was taken against the employee, (3) at the time of the adverse action the employee was satisfactorily performing his or her job' (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003, fn. omitted (Hersant)), and (4) the adverse action occurred 'under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.' (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 253.) 'Once the employee satisfies this burden, there is a presumption of discrimination, and the burden then shifts to the employer to show that its action was motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. [Citation.] A reason is" 'legitimate'" if it is "facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination." [Citation.] If the employer meets this burden, the employee then must show that the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination, or produce other evidence of intentional discrimination.' (Reid, at p. 520, fn. 2, italics omitted.)
"In the context of a defense motion for summary judgment, '[a]ssuming the complaint alleges facts establishing a prima facie case that unlawful disparate treatment occurred, the initial burden rests on the employer (moving party) to produce substantial evidence (1) negating an essential element of plaintiff's case or (2) (more commonly) showing one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action against the plaintiff employee ... . [¶] ... The burden then shifts to the plaintiff employee (opposing party) to rebut defendant's showing by producing substantial evidence that raises a rational inference that discrimination occurred; i.e., that the employer's stated neutral legitimate reasons for its actions are each a "pretext" or cover-up for unlawful discrimination, or other action contrary to law or contractual obligation.' [Citation.] By applying McDonnell Douglas's shifting burdens of production in the context of a motion for summary judgment,' "the judge [will] determine whether the litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by the jury."' [Citation.]" (Nakai v. Friendship House Assn. of American Indians, Inc. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 32, 38-39 (Nakai).)
2.2. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a dispute of material fact regarding her wrongful employment termination claim.
Plaintiff asserts the court erred in summarily adjudicating her employment termination claim. To evaluate this argument, we consider each of the three burden-shifting stages of the McDonnell Douglas test discussed above: whether plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of discrimination, whether GM produced substantial evidence that it terminated plaintiff's employment for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and whether plaintiff presented substantial evidence that the stated reason for her employment termination was pretextual and intended to conceal a discriminatory motive.
2.2.1. Plaintiff's complaint states a prima facie case for wrongful employment termination.
Plaintiff alleges a prima facie case of discrimination under section 12940, which prohibits an employer from discharging a person from employment because of race. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) Plaintiff alleges (1) she is a member of a protected class based on her race, (2) GM terminated her employment, (3) she was performing her job adequately, and (4) GM's explanation for her employment termination is pretextual.
2.2.2. Evidence of Discrimination
GM contends plaintiff cannot establish the fourth element of her claim, i.e., that her employment termination occurred" 'under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.'" (Nakai, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 38.)" 'These circumstances generally fall into two categories: either [the plaintiff] was replaced by a nonminority member no more qualified than he [or she] [citations], or [the plaintiff] was fired when nonminority coworkers similarly situated were not fired. [Citations.]'" (Mixon v. Fair Employment &Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1308.)
Although plaintiff does not argue that she presented direct evidence of racial discrimination, she asserts she provided substantial evidence to support an inference of racial discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that her White counterpart for GMC/Buick dealerships, Jennifer Blackburn, was never investigated, even though 10 of the 11 new cars sold at auction by the Martin dealership were GMC's, not Cadillacs. GM responds that plaintiff and Blackburn are not similarly situated, as is required to support an inference of discrimination. Specifically, GM notes that it investigated plaintiff not because of the Martin dealership's auction sales, but because GM was aware that plaintiff had received information from several dealers about those sales and failed to report that information to anyone at GM. By contrast, GM received no information that any of its dealers informed Blackburn of their concerns. Thus, GM asserts, it had no reason to investigate Blackburn.
Plaintiff also claims she was replaced by a White man, John Anastos, but she fails to cite to any evidence in the clerk's transcript of his race. We acknowledge, however, that when asked at her deposition if Anastos appears to "look white" Blackburn responded, "Yes."
We will assume for the sake of argument that plaintiff satisfied her initial burden to make a prima facie case regarding disparate treatment. Accordingly, we address GM's assertion that it terminated plaintiff's employment for a lawful and nondiscriminatory reason.
2.2.3. GM produced substantial evidence that it terminated plaintiff's employment for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
When an employee satisfies his or her initial burden to make a prima facie case," 'the burden then shifts to the employer to show that its action was motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. [Citation.] A reason is" 'legitimate'" if it is "facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination." [Citation.] If the employer meets this burden, the employee then must show that the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination, or produce other evidence of intentional discrimination.' [Citation.]" (Nakai, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38-39.)
In support of its motion, GM proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff's employment, namely, that plaintiff knew or should have known about the Martin dealership's sale of new cars at auction in violation of GM policy but did not report it to anyone, which was also in violation of GM policy. Substantial evidence supports GM's position. As noted, in November 2018, Dutton and Crain, at the Dutton dealership, learned that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction. As competitors of the Martin dealership, Dutton and Crain were concerned that the Martin dealership might be using the auction sales to qualify for Pinnacle incentive payments-a practice they believed was not allowed. During the last week of November 2018, Dutton and Crain separately contacted plaintiff to discuss the issue. Plaintiff responded that the dealers should focus on their own dealership and, if they wanted more information about the Martin dealership's sales, they could contact Bennett directly. Plaintiff did not inquire into the Martin dealership's auction practice nor did she report Dutton's and Crain's concerns to anyone at GM.
Hwang, at the Crestview dealership, later learned that the Dutton dealership had purchased new cars from the Martin dealership at auction. Like Crain and Dutton, Hwang believed the sale of new cars at auction was prohibited by GM. Hwang called plaintiff and insinuated that there was "a situation" with a dealer that he could report to GM auditors, Samara, and the DMV. Plaintiff did not advise anyone at GM about Hwang's phone call.
In December 2018, Crain called Lindsay, plaintiff's direct supervisor, and reported that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction and that he had reported this activity to plaintiff, who said he should mind his own business. At Lindsay's request, Crain emailed Lindsay and summarized the concerns he expressed during their telephone call. Lindsay's supervisor, Samara, was also contacted about the auction sales. Samara received a letter from Hwang and Ngo, a member of the national dealer counsel, requesting that Samara investigate the alleged new car auction sales by the Martin dealership.
GM initiated an investigation into the allegations. The investigation confirmed that the Martin dealership had sold new vehicles at auction, which was a violation of its sales agreement with GM. Crain told Lindsay that both he and Dutton had informed plaintiff of that fact. Crain provided the vehicle identification numbers of some of the vehicles sold at auction by the Martin dealership and Lindsay's initial investigation revealed that there was a problem. Samara contacted Bennett, of the Martin dealership, regarding the transactions. Bennett indicated that another member of his team had made plaintiff aware of the vehicle sales.
Based on the investigation, GM concluded that plaintiff had been, or should have been, aware that the Martin dealership was selling new vehicles at auction in violation of GM policy. GM further concluded that plaintiff's failure to report the complaints from Dutton and Crain regarding those auction sales constituted a violation of GM's "Code of Conduct" and "Winning with Integrity" policies and warranted the termination of her employment. And on January 9, 2019, GM terminated plaintiff's employment.
This evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff.
2.2.4. Plaintiff failed to offer substantial evidence of falsity or pretext.
In light of GM's evidence, plaintiff could avoid summary adjudication only by offering substantial evidence that GM's stated reasons for her employment termination were untrue or pretextual, or that it acted with a discriminatory animus, or both, "such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination." (Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1004-1005; Foroudi v. Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1008 (Foroudi).)
Plaintiff offers myriad arguments supporting her claim that GM's explanation for her employment termination is a pretext. Most of her assertions, however, are unsupported by citations to the appellate record, cogent legal argument, or both. We disregard these assertions without further discussion. (E.g., Parker v. Schwarcz (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 418, 431 [" 'To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, "it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court."' "]; Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655-656 [noting matters not properly raised or that lack adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407 [noting "[w]hen an appellant's brief makes no reference to the pages of the record where a point can be found, an appellate court need not search through the record in an effort to discover the point purportedly made. [Citations.] We can simply deem the contention to lack foundation and, thus, to be forfeited. [Citations.]"].)
In any event, plaintiff's primary argument below, and here, is that she did not know the Martin dealership was selling new (as opposed to used) cars at auction. Because she did not know about the fraudulent activity, plaintiff suggests, GM's decision to fire her was baseless. As GM points out, however, the issue is not whether plaintiff actually engaged in the misconduct at issue. Rather, the issue is whether GM concluded honestly, and after an appropriate investigation, that plaintiff engaged in that conduct. (See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93, 107.) And in this case, as already explained, GM offered evidence that it conducted an internal investigation in response to its dealers' complaints. Further, and contrary to plaintiff's repeated assertions, GM did have evidence from Crain that plaintiff knew the Martin dealership was selling new cars at auction. GM was entitled to credit that information and there is no evidence to suggest that it had a discriminatory motive in doing so. Rather, the evidence supports the inference that GM was responding to serious allegations by several dealers regarding the Martin dealership's misconduct and plaintiff's failure to make any sort of inquiry or to pass along information to others at GM.
Given the strength of GM's evidence, plaintiff's burden to demonstrate a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive is particularly high. (See, e.g., Foroudi, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1007-1008 [noting the" 'stronger the employer's showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff's evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive' "].) Plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact on this point. Accordingly, the court did not err in summarily adjudicating plaintiff's wrongful employment termination claim in favor of GM.
Although the court also summarily adjudicated plaintiff's claims for harassment and failure to prevent harassment, she has not discussed those rulings in her appellate briefing. As such, she has abandoned any challenge to those claims.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent General Motors, LLC, shall recover its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: EGERTON, J. ADAMS, J.