Opinion
C.A. No. 03L-05-011.
Submitted: July 2, 2007.
Decided: September 25, 2007.
On Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument. Denied.
Neil F. Dignon, Esquire, Thomas D.H. Barnett, Esquire, Draper Goldberg, PLLC, Georgetown, DE.
Ms. Donna Johnson, c/o Claudia Johnson, Dover, DE.
Ms. Donna Johnson, Dover, DE.
Ms. Donna Johnson, Dover, DE.
Dear Counsel and Ms. Johnson:
Pending before the Court is Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff") motion seeking reargument of the Court's ruling following the inquisition hearing held on June 15, 2007 ("Motion") which disallowed prior foreclosure litigation fees and costs. This is my decision denying that Motion.
Plaintiff has asserted that the Court inappropriately addressed issues not fit for judicial review. Plaintiff further asserts that the Court improperly performed such analysis notwithstanding the fact that Defendant, Donna R. Johnson, was absent from the hearing. The June 15, 2007 inquisition hearing arose from a motion to stay the foreclosure of a home. That motion was denied but the Court retained jurisdiction to consider charges asserted through the judgment execution process.
Motions for reargument are appropriate where principles or authorities were overlooked and such points would have changed an outcome had they been addressed. Baltimore Trust Co. v. McGee, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 325, at *3 (Del.Super. Aug. 21, 2001). Should the law or facts have been misunderstood, relief is readily granted. Id. Inquiry is directed at the relevant facts and law as they were at the time of the decision. Id. The procedure is not available merely to revisit previously rejected positions. Id.
Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) states that "[a] motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 5 days after the filing of the Court's opinion or decision." Under Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a), the computation of any period of time under the Rules shall not include the day of the act, event or default after which the period of time begins to run. "When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and other legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." Super. Ct. Civil R. 6(a).
On Friday, June 15, 2007 the Court ruled on this matter. On Monday, June 25, 2007 Plaintiff filed its Motion. In order to meet the deadline, Plaintiff's Motion should have been filed by the end of the day on Friday, June 22, 2007. Plaintiff was late, and, consequently, the present Motion is untimely.
In addition to the procedural bar, the Motion is meritless as explained below.
The Supreme Court dealt with issues similar to those asserted sub judice in the matter of Burge v. Fidelity Bond Mortgage Co., 648 A.2d 414 (Del. 1994). More specifically, in Burge the Supreme Court addressed the Superior Court's authority to set aside a sheriff's sale. The broad discretion of the Superior Court to confirm or set aside a sheriff's sale was affirmed. Burge, 648 A.2d at 420. In so holding the Court stated that "[t]his equitable power derives from the inherent control of the court over its own process `for the correction of abuses or the prevention of injury.'" Id. (citing Petition of Seaford Hardware Co., 132 A. 737 (Del. 1926)).
The Court in Burge also addressed, in a cross-appeal, whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by imposing costs and counsel fees. The Superior Court had reasoned that the award was necessary so that the party could be "made whole." Id. at 421. The Supreme Court agreed. In reaching this conclusion the Court stated as follows:
The Court's decision stated as follows:
It is beyond dispute that litigants in Delaware are generally responsible for paying their own counsel fees in the absence of either statutory authority or a contractual undertaking. A limited exception to this general rule applies when the circumstances of an individual case mandate that the court, in its discretion, assess counsel fees "where equity requires." Whereas the exception has been most often applied in the Court of Chancery, it has equal viability in any situation in which a court is obliged to apply equitable principles.Burge, 648 A.2d at 421-22 (citation omitted).
Although the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Chancery to foreclose on a mortgage, such proceedings are historically and remain inherently equitable. In setting aside the sheriff's sale, the court below exercised its inherent equitable authority to "control its own process." The court likewise applied its equitable power when it awarded costs and counsel fees to the Intervenors because "equity required."Id. at 422 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
As seen in Burge, The Court has an active role in mortgage foreclosure actions. The "equitable authority" given to the Court permits it to control its own processes. See Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. McCabe, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 501 (Del.Super. Nov. 27, 2006) ("This equitable power [the power to set aside a sheriff's sale] derives from the inherent control of the court over its own process `for the correction of abuses or the prevention of injury.'"); Central Nat'l Bank v. Industrial Trust Co., 51 A.2d 854 (Del.Super. 1947) ("The Court's jurisdiction rests upon its authority to supervise and control the carrying out of its own process."); McGee, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 325.
Likewise, the Court has additional inherent jurisdiction to grant relief from judgment or order for good cause. State v. Gutman, 619 A.2d 1175 (Del. 1973). Here, the Court exercised its broad jurisdiction when it reviewed the amounts which should not be collected through this execution. In so doing, the Court dealt with matters properly before it and proceeded in the interest of justice. It has an independent responsibility to assure that the Court's processes are not abused, as shown by its power to disallow unreasonable attorneys' fees and costs requests that are patently excessive or improper. As discussed below, on its face, the execution process at issue was not just and fair, and there was obviously good cause for relief.
In this regard, when the Court was presented with this matter, there had been three prior foreclosures on the same property, one of which was dismissed under Rule 41(e). The amounts disallowed were from those prior foreclosure actions; totaling more than the five percent (5%) attorney's fees that were authorized and awarded in the judgment. See Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v. Waples, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 274 (Del.Super. July 3, 2006) (reasonable fees in foreclosure cannot exceed authorized percentage limit by stacking prior litigation fees). As ruled by this Court on June 15, 2007, those expenses should have been collected earlier and were inappropriate for collection under the fourth and last foreclosure.
Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the complaint on two prior occasions. The first occurred on April 12, 2002 and the second occurred on January 21, 2003. The third foreclosure was dismissed by the Court on October 1, 2003. Plaintiff did not seek nor did the Court grant prior approval for the filing of another foreclosure after the Rule 41(e) dismissal. The docket entries are attached.
Considering the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for reargument is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.