Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-CV-814
August 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Dana Morse, instituted this action on February 12, 2003 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1437 against defendants the Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA"), Tracy Gaddy, Tom Ransome, Stanley Galbreth, and Carl Greene for declaratory and injunctive relief. She contends that defendants unlawfully evicted her without due process from the public housing facilities in which she was living. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and equitable relief. In addition, plaintiff asserts that defendants violated Pennsylvania's Landlord Tenant Act. See 68 P.S. § 250.501.
Plaintiff complains that PHA violated state law by failing to use proper procedures to evict Dana Morse. Plaintiff notes that under 68 P.S. § 250.01, a landlord must serve notice to quit before terminating a lease. See id. However, because I find that this state procedural safeguard is duplicative of plaintiff's federal right to due process, I will not consider her state claim.
The parties agreed to have an expedited hearing for a final injunction on this matter instead of pursuing the motion for preliminary injunction. The hearing for final injunction was held on March 24 and 25, 2003. Because I conclude that plaintiff was a "remaining family member," she was entitled to the procedural due process safeguard of a grievance hearing before being evicted by defendants. Therefore, I find in favor of plaintiff and will grant the injunction in so far as plaintiff will receive a grievance hearing to determine if she is entitled to a PHA residence.
Plaintiff requests that she be reinstated in a PHA residence or given alternative equitable relief that may be just and proper. Federal courts, however, are not well-suited for making the difficult determination of who is entitled PHA residences. Rather, our function in such cases is to insure that such determinations comport with procedural due process. See In re Adams, 94 B.R. 838, 849 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989),citing Melton v. New York City Housing Authority, C.A. No. 79 C 1015 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 1979).
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff lived with her grandmother, Eleanor Morse, in a public housing apartment owned and operated by PHA at 1515 Hemberger Way, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for over four years. The lease listed Eleanor Morse as the tenant and plaintiff was added to the household composition as a family member in 1997.On June 17, 2001, Eleanor Morse wrote a letter to PHA requesting a transfer to a different PHA unit to accommodate her serious medical impairments. Eleanor Morse suffers, inter alia, from cancer, emphysema, COPD, hypertension, heart problems and diabetes. At the hearing, she testified that she had trouble breathing in her sixth-floor apartment and needed a transfer to a ground-floor apartment. Eleanor Morse testified that PHA never responded to her letter, and that she subsequently sought an emergency transfer on medical grounds on June 29, 2001. However, PHA did not grant a transfer to Eleanor Morse until August of 2002.
In addition to her medical ailments, Eleanor Morse testified that she needed to move because she could no longer stand living with plaintiff and hoped to obtain a Split Family Transfer from PHA that would have allowed her granddaughter to obtain a separate PHA residence. In April of 2002, Dana Morse gave birth to a baby boy and Eleanor Morse testified that by the summer of 2002 she was desperate to move out of the apartment that she shared with Dana and plaintiff's newborn.
On July 16, 2002, Eleanor Morse visited defendant Gaddy, who in the autumn of 2001 became the manager of the PHA development in which Eleanor Morse and plaintiff lived, to ask for a transfer to a PHA building set aside for single senior citizens. Defendant Gaddy told Eleanor that she most likely did not qualify for a Split Family Transfer. Gaddy explained that if Eleanor moved to the senior citizen building Dana would have to find her own place to live outside the public housing system. Eleanor signed a statement requesting immediate transfer and additionally provided: "I am fully aware and it has been explained to me that PHA has no obligation to my granddaughter, now living with me. I fully accept these terms." It is clear from her testimony that Eleanor Morse was under the impression that if she did not remove Dana Morse from the lease she would not qualify for a transfer to PHA's senior community. On August 6, 2002, Dana Morse was removed from the family composition portion of the lease. On August 9, 2002, Eleanor Morse moved to her new apartment.
In her post-trial brief, plaintiff contends that defendant Gaddy "no longer wanted Dana Morse to be a PHA tenant," and "began a duplicitous campaign to kick Dana Morse out of public housing." Plaintiff suggests that Gaddy blocked Eleanor Morse's attempts to move in an effort to force Dana Morse off of the lease as a quid pro quo for receiving a ground-floor apartment.
I do not find this speculative version of the facts convincing. Plaintiff has offered no persuasive motivation for Gaddy's supposed campaign against Dana Morse. Moreover, it is uncontested that Eleanor Morse's request for a new apartment pre-dated Gaddy's tenure as manager by three months.
After Eleanor Morse moved out of the apartment, plaintiff went to defendant Gaddy's office and asked if she could apply for a Split Family Transfer or if there was anything that could be done to allow her to stay in the family's current apartment, such as becoming the head of the household. Defendant Gaddy informed plaintiff that because she was not a tenant there was nothing that could be done and she would have two weeks to vacate the apartment.
Around September 3, 2002, plaintiff received a squatter's notice from defendant Gaddy instructing her to leave the premises. The squatter's notice also provided that any items left in the apartment would be locked in storage for thirty days and that plaintiff could pay to have them released. Over the course of the next two weeks plaintiff received repeated visits from PHA police officers threatening to arrest her is she did not vacate the premises. On September 17, 2002, defendant vacated the apartment and moved around among various family members' residences. Plaintiff left a number of pieces of furniture in the apartment that she lacked to the means to move with her. Plaintiff never recovered the belongings that she left behind.
Defendants assert that plaintiff was not evicted but, instead, abandoned the apartment on her own volition. Although plaintiff was not physically dragged out of the apartment, it is clear that the squatter notice and repeated visits from PHA police officers threatening arrest if she did not leave at least constituted a constructive eviction. See Lindstrom v. Pennswood Village, 612 A.2d 1048, 1052 ( Pa. Super. 1985) ("To constitute a constructive eviction, the interference by a landlord with the possession of his tenant or with the tenant's enjoyment of the demised premises must be of a substantial nature and so injurious to the tenant as to deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises, to which the tenant yields, abandoning possession within a reasonable time."), citing Kuriger v. Cramer, 498 A.2d 1331, 1336 (Pa.Super. 1985).
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated federal housing regulations by evicting her without a grievance hearing. Plaintiff is entitled to bring a § 1983 action to enforce her federal rights provided by the Constitution, the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq., and the supporting regulations. See Farley v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 698 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Morris v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 95-CV-6650, 1996 WL 167615, at *3 n. 2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1996) ("Regulations are specifically included within the scope of rights enforceable under § 1983."). Section 1437d(k) of the Housing Act provides that each public housing agency receiving federal funds is required:
to establish and implement an administrative grievance procedure under which tenants will —
(1) be advised of the specific grounds of any proposed adverse public housing agency action;
(2) have an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period applicable under subsection (1) of this section;
(3) have an opportunity to examine any documents or records or regulations related to the proposed action;
(4) be entitled to be represented by another person of their choice at any hearing;
(5) be entitled to ask questions of witnesses and have others make statements on their behalf; and
(6) be entitled to receive a written decision by the public housing agency on the proposed action.
Moreover, 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 requires public housing agencies to provide a grievance procedure "to assure that a PHA tenant is afforded an opportunity for a hearing if the tenant disputes within a reasonable time any PHA action or failure to act involving the tenant's lease with the PHA or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual tenant's rights, duties, welfare or status." Similarly, procedural due process rights attach to alleged remaining family members. See Adams, 94 B.R. at 849 ("[W]e conclude, with all of the other courts that have considered the issue, that alleged remainders are entitled to an opportunity for a grievance hearing and the entry of a court order against them, after notice and litigation of a landlord-tenant possessory action, before they can be evicted."). Moreover, PHA policy specifically provides that if an individual is a remaining family member he or she is entitled to a grievance hearing before being denied public housing:
If the PHA determines that a remaining member claimant qualifies for remaining member status but is not "otherwise eligible" for public housing, then the claimant shall be advised of his/her right to initiate a grievance proceeding as specified in PHA's Grievance Procedure.Policy Governing Admissions and Continued Occupancy for the HUD-Aided Low Rent Housing Program Operated by the Philadelphia Housing Authority, 46 (2001) [hereinafter PHA Policy].
Similarly, when PHA denies an occupant's assertion that he or she is a remaining family member that person is entitled to a grievance hearing if the occupant constitutes a reasonable remainder:
Any person who claims to be a remaining family member . . . but is nevertheless denied a public housing lease on the grounds that s/he is not a remaining member, shall be entitled to a grievance hearing to review that denial IF s/he makes a reasonable showing to management to substantiate the claim.Id.
PHA appears to define a "reasonable remainder" as someone who has been denied remaining family member status, but can at least make a reasonable argument that she is entitled to continued tenancy. See PHA Policy, at 46. Defendants note that the case law refers to "colorable remainders" and that the current applicable standard is "reasonable remainder." See, e.g., Adams, 94 B.R. at 84 ("[F]orcible eviction of parties who are colorably remainders is violative of these parties' rights to due process of law and consistent pertinent federal Regulations."). However, defendants concede in their brief that such notation is a "distinction without a difference."
Defendants contend that plaintiff was not entitled to a grievance hearing, asserting that she was neither a reasonable remainder nor a remaining family member because Eleanor Morse had removed plaintiff from the family composition portion of the lease prior to Eleanor's move to the senior community. PHA claims that plaintiff cannot plausibly maintain that she was a reasonable remainder because Gaddy witnessed Dana's removal from the lease.
It is apparent that plaintiff, at the very least, was a reasonable remainder entitled to the due process of a grievance hearing. See In re Fonseca, 110 B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990). In Fonseca, a bankruptcy decision, a debtor and her two children moved into a PHA residence that was lawfully leased to a friend. Id. at 193. The debtor's friend contacted PHA to add the debtor and her children to the residence's continued occupation form. Id. A PHA official, however, informed the debtor's friend that the debtor and her children could not stay at the residence because the addition would render the premises overcrowded. Id. At some point, the lawful tenant chose to vacate the premises, leaving debtor and her children as the sole residents. Thereafter, a PHA employee visited the debtor and informed her that she was not the legal tenant and would be evicted. Id. PHA denied the debtor a grievance hearing because the agency believed her to be a squatter with no colorable right to the premises. Id. at 194. The Fonseca Court determined that although the debtor was not a lawful tenant she constituted a colorable remainder and was therefore entitled to a hearing because she had "resided in the unit for a considerable period, with the express permission of the legal tenant and with the knowledge of her presence by the PHA. . . ." Id.
Plaintiff's position in the present case is much stronger that the debtor's in Fonseca. Here, plaintiff is the granddaughter of the legal tenant. Plaintiff lived in the PHA unit with her grandmother for over four years. Throughout that time, plaintiff was properly listed in the lease as part of the family. Defendant Gaddy removed plaintiff from the lease only three days before Eleanor Morse vacated the premises and moved to her new apartment. Additionally, plaintiff's name remained on some PHA documents, listing her as a family member.
Plaintiff was a remaining member of the tenant family, regardless of whom was listed on the family composition form. Plaintiff meets PHA's own definition of a remaining family member:
4. Remaining family member status applies to occupants who were members of the original tenant family OR who became permanent member(s) of the household subsequent to move-in with the written approval of management and who thereafter, remain in continuous occupancy up to and including the time the tenant of record departs or dies.PHA Policy, at 25 (emphasis in original) see also Winn Management Co. v. Szyjka, No. SPNH 960546856, 1996 WL 727332, *4 (Conn.Super. Oct. 30, 1996) (concluding that deceased tenant's son constituted "remaining family member," despite never appearing on lease or recertification documents). In the present case, plaintiff was a properly-documented permanent family member for over four years and remained in continuous occupancy even after her grandmother departed the premises.
Moreover, defendants' argument that plaintiff is not a remaining family member because defendant Gaddy removed her from the family composition form puts the proverbial cart before the horse. It is apparent from PHA's policy statement that the listing of family members on a lease serves as a reporting mechanism, which is supposed to reflect the reality of who is occupying the premises:
3. Changes in family composition — All changes in family composition must be reported in writing by the tenant. The addition or deletion of household member(s) named on the lease shall be reported to PHA within 15 days of occurrence. Except for natural birth, adoption, or kinship care placement, PHA reserves the right to approve additions to household. Failure to report changes in household composition will result in a retroactive rent charge and may result in eviction.Id., 54 (emphasis in original). Although PHA removed plaintiff's name from the lease, in reality she and her child never vacated the premises or stopped being members of the tenant family. The testimony of Gaddy and Eleanor Morse reveals that defendants were aware of this fact.
Defendants contend that Eleanor Morse, as the lawful tenant, had the prerogative to exclude individuals from the family and the leased premises without a hearing or due process. As an example, defendants cite to 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(5) (vii) (C), which provides that PHA may require a tenant to exclude a household member when that household member participated in an action that would terminate the lease, such as criminal activity. Defendants are correct in so far as the lawful tenant may exclude household members from the family and physically exclude him or her from the premises. However, because the family composition form is only a reporting mechanism for communicating to PHA that the family member has left a household, it should not be construed as a means for excluding such members. It is apparent from the testimony of Eleanor Morse that she viewed removal of plaintiff's name from the family composition as necessary to secure her own move to the senior community. It is equally clear that Eleanor Morse never intended to move plaintiff and child out of the household and on to the street. Therefore, I conclude that plaintiff was a remaining family member and shall receive a grievance hearing to determine whether she is entitled to lease a PHA property.
B. Damages
Plaintiff asserts that she should receive $2,844.00 in compensatory damages and $25,000.00 in punitive damages. I conclude that plaintiff has not proven that she is entitled to any compensatory or punitive damages. However, because I find that defendants violated her right to a grievance hearing, I will award $1.00 in nominal damages. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir.2003) (recognizing that even if litigant is unable to establish right to compensatory damages, he may be entitled to nominal damages for violation of federal rights).
First, plaintiff contends that defendants are responsible for missing furniture that she left in the PHA apartment after she moved out. Plaintiff claims that she left these possessions on the premises in reliance on a provision in the squatter notice she received from defendants, which provided:
After twenty-four (24) hours, you may be moved by PHA, and you will be charged for moving expenses.
Your furniture, clothing, and other household items will be placed in storage by a bonded, insured mover AT YOUR EXPENSE.
To get your goods back, you must come in person to 2012 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, you must have $425.00 in the form of a money order or certified check, and you must make arrangements to have your goods moved from storage. Goods left in storage for more than thirty (30) days from this date may be disposed of by the storage company.
Pl.'s Ex. 11 (emphasis in original).
Assuming this language constitutes a contract for bailment, plaintiff produced no evidence that she fulfilled the explicit terms of the contract by attempting to recover her possessions from storage at 2012 Chestnut Street within the allotted thirty days with the appropriate amount of money. See Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Pa. 1996) ("A bailment is a delivery of personalty for the accomplishment of some purpose upon a contract, express or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled, it shall be redelivered to the person who delivered it, otherwise dealt with it according to his directions or kept until he reclaims it."). At trial, when asked if she had attempted to recover her possessions, plaintiff responded, "I asked around . . . did anyone see — hear anything about my things." Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for her missing belongings.
In addition, plaintiff argues that she should be able to recover welfare benefits that she was denied during her period of homelessness, because she no longer had an address at which she could receive her checks. In the present case, however, I have not held that plaintiff was entitled to receive public housing following her grandmother's departure from the premises. Rather, I have determined that she was entitled to a grievance hearing. It is unclear whether she would have been successful in obtaining continued housing from PHA. I do not decide whether plaintiff should be able to recover welfare benefits if it is determined that she is entitled to PHA housing.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that she should receive punitive damages for what she perceives as defendant Gaddy's reckless disregard for her federal housing rights. The standard by which punitive damages are awarded in a § 1983 suit is clearly defined:
Punitive damages are available against a defendant in his individual capacity. Agresta v. Good, 797 F. Supp. 399, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). However, punitive damages must be reserved for cases in which the defendant's conduct amounts to something more than a violation justifying compensatory damages or injunctive relief. Keenan v. Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 470 (3d Cir. 1992); Couchette v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1973). Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 case only in special circumstances, such as when the defendant's conduct amounts to reckless or callous disregard of the federally guaranteed rights of others. Savages v. Aggress, 883 F.2d 1194, 1203-05 (3d Cir. 1989). It is not necessary that the conduct be intentional or motivated by an evil motive. Id. at 1204.Leipziger v. Township of Falls, No. CIV. A. 00-1147, 2001 WL 111611, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2001) (Bechtle, J.).
I conclude that plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages because defendant Gaddy did not act with reckless disregard for plaintiff's federal housing rights. Although plaintiff should have received a grievance hearing because she was a remaining family member, defendant Gaddy had a plausible reason for believing that plaintiff would be unlikely to continue to receive housing from PHA. Therefore, I do not find that defendant Gaddy acted with reckless disregard for plaintiff's federal housing rights.