Opinion
No. 05-17-00186-CV
06-27-2017
GREGORY C. MORSE, Appellant v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 004-00127-2017
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart
Opinion by Chief Justice Wright
After reviewing the clerk's record, the Court questioned its jurisdiction over this appeal as there did not appear to be a final judgment or other appealable order. We instructed appellant to file a letter brief addressing the jurisdictional issue with an opportunity for appellee to file a response. The parties complied.
Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments and certain interlocutory orders as permitted by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A final judgment is one that disposes of all pending parties and claims. See id.
Appellant appeals from the trial court's February 17, 2017 order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. This order is not a final judgment as it does not dispose of all claims and parties.
In his letter brief, appellant asserts this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 51.014(a)(7) of the civil practice and remedies code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2016). That section permits an interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or denies a special appearance of a defendant pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a. See id; TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.
A special appearance is the means by which a defendant can object to the trial court's jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts in this state. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a; BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (special appearance vehicle to challenge trial court's personal jurisdiction where party is nonresident who is not amenable to process under Texas Long-Arm Statute and federal constitutional limits). A special appearance may not be used to challenge subject matter jurisdiction. See Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).
Appellant filed "Defendant's Original Answer, Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction." The nature of a pleading is not determined by its title or individual words it contains, but by reviewing the pleading as a whole. See Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 616-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Appellant asserted in his pleading that appellee lacked standing and also that principles of federal preemption applied. Both matters concern subject matter jurisdiction, not whether a party is amenable to service of process. See Stiles v. Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 213 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 392, (1986)) (claim of federal preemption is a challenge to a state court's subject matter jurisdiction); RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins, 499 S.W.3d 423, 429 (Tex. 2016) (standing is element of subject matter jurisdiction). Although appellant cited to rule 120a in his pleading, the substance of his complaint is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellant did not allege in his motion that he was not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court's order does not constitute the denial of a special appearance subject to an interlocutory appeal. For this reason, this Court lacks jurisdiction. We dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
/Carolyn Wright/
CAROLYN WRIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE 170186F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 004-00127-2017.
Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED.
It is ORDERED that appellee FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION recover its costs of this appeal from appellant GREGORY C. MORSE. Judgment entered June 27, 2017.