Opinion
No. C 01-01767 CRB
August 2, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this employment discrimination lawsuit plaintiff alleges defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for her racial discrimination complaint to the EEOC. Plaintiff is proceeding in pro per, and on April 26, 2002, the Court issued plaintiff a summary judgment warning. Despite the Court's warning, plaintiff did not file an opposition to defendant's motion, nor did she appear at oral argument. After carefully considering defendant's moving papers, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion on the ground that no reasonable trier of fact could find for plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
A. Undisputed Facts In The Record
In September 1998, plaintiff became employed by defendant as an encoder in its Spear Street check processing center. Plaintiff worked the midnight shift According to plaintiff's EEOC complaint out of approximately 20 employees working that shift plaintiff was the only Black.
In February 1999, plaintiff complained that her supervisor, Connie Dy, had subjected plaintiff to a racial slur. Defendant immediately investigated plaintiffs allegation and concluded that it was unfounded. The investigation and its findings are supported by contemporaneous notes and memoranda prepared by those responsible for the investigation.
At the same time plaintiff complained about her supervior's alleged comment, she also complained that Ms. Dy was tampering with plaintiff's computer keyboard by changing the "tension" and causing plaintiff difficulty with punching the keys, hurting her hand and arm. In response plaintiff's complaints, defendant consulted with various computer programmers and the companies who manufacture the computers used by plaintiff and the other employees. All those consulted confirmed that the tension on the keyboard could not be altered, and, in particular, it could not be altered "remotely" from another computer, as plaintiff had alleged. Defendant shared the written opinions of these experts with plaintiff, but she continued to insist that other employees were remotely tampering with the tension on her keyboard.
Plaintiff also alleged that Ms. Dy was manipulating defendant's computer system to operate a "device" that shocked or sent radiation through various parts of plaintiffs body via her computer. Although defendant explained to plaintiff that the computers did not contain any such device, plaintiff persisted in her belief, even after she was diagnose with carpal tunnel syndrome and took medical leave in June, July and August 1999.
In July 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC, repeat her accusation about the alleged February 1999 racial slur. She also repeated her accusation that Ms. Dy "locked" her keyboard, causing plaintiff to "sustain an industrial injury to her arm" On September 30, 1999, the EEOC determined that it could not conclude that defendant had violated any statutes. Plaintiff continued to accuse her coworkers of doing something with their computers which was remotely tampering with plaintiffs computer and also causing her chest pain. In September 1999, in front of several of defendant's employees, she threatened to call the police if the employees did not stop hurting her. The next day she did in fact call the police. During this period plaintiff received performance evaluations documenting the problems with her work performance. Plaintiff blamed her performance problems on employees tampering with her computer. In the meantime, plaintiffs co-workers continued to complain to defendant that plaintiff was harassing them and bothering them during work hours.
On November 4, 1999, plaintiff called several of her co-workers "stupid" and was observed carrying a long metal pipe. Ms. Dy called her supervisor, Lori Rana, who immediately came to the office. Upon her arrival, she met with 10 employees who had gathered in a conference room to talk to Ms. Rana about plaintiff. The employees reported that plaintiff had declared that certain of her co-workers are her "enemy." Another reported that plaintiff had said that she was going to "loose it one day," and that the employee "better hold [her] back from them." Still another said that approximately one month earlier plaintiff had said that she was tired of her co-workers messing with her computer and that "one of these days she was going to shoot them all." The next day she told the employee it was just a joke. The employees generally said plaintiff is a bully, is always complaining that they are doing things to her computer, and has a hot temper.
Another employee reported that night plaintiff was standing with a mean and threatening posture near the employees she had been accusing of remotely tampering with her computer. The employees advised defendant that they felt like plaintiff was going to jump on them any minute. One employee said she felt uncomfortable about returning to work as she had children and a family to think about. Defendant concluded that several, if not all, of plaintiff's co-workers felt threatened and feared what would happen next
The next day defendant terminated plaintiffs employment because of her disruptive behavior.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") in January 2000. She alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a race discrimination complaint with the EEOC in July 1999. One year later the DFEH found no probable cause to support plaintiffs allegations. plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit in pro per. She alleges defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaint to the EEOC and she again accuses Ms. Dy of injuring plaintiff. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs entire complaint on the ground that no reasonable jury could find defendant liable.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is "material" only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec, Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). However, an inference may be drawn in favor of the non-moving party only if the inference is "rational" or "reasonable" under the governing substantive law. See Matsushita, 477 U.S. at 588.
The Ninth Circuit "has set a high standard for the granting of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases." Schnidrig v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). When a plaintiff "seeks to establish a prima facie case [of discrimination] through the submission of actual evidence, very little such evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive . . . may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder." Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
A. The Burdens of Proof
To make a prima facie claim of retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) she opposed unlawful or discriminatory employment practices; (2) that she thereafter was subjected to "adverse employment action"; and (3) that there was a causal link between the two. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 (1989).
With respect to the third element, the Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]o show the requisite causal link the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. . . . Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity." Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). "Absent direct evidence of retaliation, . . . a causal link may be established by showing that the adverse employment decision occurred proximate in time to the protected activity, and that the person who made the adverse employment decision knew of the protected activity." Maurey v. University of So. Cal., 87 F. Supp.2d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); See also Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc. 150 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[b]ecause California law under the FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal cases are instructive").
Once a plaintiff has met her prima facie burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. See Brooks v. San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). "Once the employer carries this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by the employer was a pretext. Only then does the case proceed beyond the summary judgment stage." Id. (noting that courts apply the same burden-shifting analysis in Title VII and FEHA retaliation cases). "`the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" St. Marys Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliation. While she complained about what she perceived to be discriminatory conduct, and she certainly suffered an adverse employment action, she has not alleged facts that support an inference that her termination was related to her complaint about a racial slur.
Even if plaintiff had made out a prima facie case, however, defendant has presented evidence of a legitimate reason for its decision to terminate plaintiffs behavior, namely, her volatile and threatening behavior. The record is replete with documentary evidence demonstrating defendant's patient and repeated attempts to address plaintiff's fantastic allegations of computer tampering. It was only after plaintiff persisted in her complaints after being presented with evidence that her beliefs were unfounded, and created a disruptive and threatening work environment, that defendant terminated her employment Plaintiff offers no evidence that in any way disputes defendant's legitimate explanation for its employment decision. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that defendant retaliated against plaintiff for filing an EEOC complaint
Nor could a reasonable jury find that plaintiffs supervisor, Ms. Dy, injured plaintiff by tampering with plaintiff's computer. Plaintiff's sincerely held belief is insufficient to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Dy remotely tampered with the plaintiffs keyboard and used some unspecified device to send "shocks" through plaintiffs body.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.