Opinion
Argued March 7, 2000.
April 17, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (R. Goldberg, J.), dated March 25, 1999, which granted the respective motions of the third-party defendants for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Norman Volk Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael I. Josephs of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs-appellants.
Carman, Callahan Ingham, LLP, Farmingdale, N.Y. (Stephanie L. Stein of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent Harl Prescod.
Diamond, Paino, Cardo, King, Peters Fodera, Brooklyn, N Y (Deborah F. Peters of counsel), for third-party defendants-respondents Lois E. Harry and Raymond P. Harry.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The instant action arose from a motor vehicle accident involving four vehicles in a chain-reaction collision. The respondents, who are the third-party defendants, owned or operated the first and second cars in the chain and moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. The respondents' affidavits submitted in support of their respective motions stated that they were stopped at a light when they were hit from behind. Consequently, the respondents established a prima facie case of liability with respect to the appellants, the owner and operator of the moving vehicle. The appellants failed to submit a non-negligent explanation for the rear-end collision to rebut the inference of negligence (see, Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392 ; Parise v. Meltzer, 204 A.D.2d 295 ; see also, Artis v. Jamaica Buses, Inc., 262 A.D.2d 511 ; Pares v. LaPrade, 266 A.D.2d 852 [4th Dept., Nov. 12, 1999]). The affidavit of the appellants' attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the facts, together with an unsworn accident report signed by the appellant operator were insufficient to defeat the motions for summary judgment (see, Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269 ).
We reject the appellants' argument that summary judgment was granted prematurely. The belief that additional discovery might reveal something helpful to their case does not provide a basis pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) for postponing a determination of summary judgment (see, Cooper v. Milton Paper Co., 258 A.D.2d 614 ).