Opinion
June 29, 1961
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court in Albany County entered upon verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in a negligence action arising out of a collision of automobiles at a street intersection in the City of Albany. The parties were the only witnesses. The jury could find that plaintiff operator, proceeding south, stopped at the intersection with a red traffic light against her, activated her directional signal light to indicate a left turn and left it on, and when the light turned to green did turn left, as the northbound cars in two or three of the four lanes for northbound traffic waited for her to do so; that after she passed in front of them and had completed her turn and was proceeding east at 10 to 12 miles per hour, defendant approached at excessive speed in the fourth northbound lane (in which she had previously observed no traffic) and after sudden application of brakes struck the right door of her car. In a charge to which no exception was taken, the court read section 1140 Veh. Traf. of the Vehicle and Traffic Law governing left turns at intersections and later, at the jury's request, reread it; and it is clear that the jury could and did properly find that plaintiff operator complied with section 1140 and that defendant's operation was in violation of it. Citing Weigand v. United Traction Co. ( 221 N.Y. 39), and upon the basis of defendant's estimate of 300 feet as the length of the inclined bridge exit ramp upon which he was proceeding, defendant argues contributory negligence as a matter of law in plaintiff operator's failure to see defendant's car until it was quite close and thereupon seeks dismissal of the complaint. The question of plaintiff operator's negligence was for the jury. We find in the factual situation here little that is comparable to Weigand. As the jury could find, plaintiff operator stopped and then turned, at a complex intersection governed by multiple signals, operating, as she did so, in complete obedience to the signals and to the applicable right of way statute, but was struck nevertheless by a negligently operated car. In contrast, the plaintiff in Weigand was a pedestrian and was struck by the defendant street railroad's trolley car as she was about to step upon the track; and she testified that she could see 135 feet in the direction from which the car came, "that she stopped and looked in that direction; that she kept looking until she was struck, and that she saw no approaching car" (p. 41). Judgment affirmed, with costs. Bergan, P.J., Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ., concur.