Opinion
No. 7:01-CV-117-R
May 31, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This is an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Iowa Park, Texas. Moore claims that, on March 20, 2000, he was placed in a cell that was splattered with blood and had no bedding. Complaint ¶ V. He requested his bedding and cleaning supplies but claims that Defendants deliberately ignored his requests in violation of his civil rights. Id. Plaintiff then proceeded to flood his cell which resulted in his water being shut off. Id. Plaintiff then forced the food slot on his cell door open and asked for a supervisor. Id; Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Questions No. 1. He was ordered to turn around and submit to handcuffs at which time a chemical agent was used against him by Defendant Proffitt. Complaint ¶ V; Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Questions No. 1. Plaintiff argues that this use of force under the circumstances was excessive. He now seeks monetary damages. Complaint ¶ VI.
When an inmate forces the food door open on his cell door and refuses to remove his hand or arm, it is commonly known as "jacking the bean slot" See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 1.
"To prevail on an eighth amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that force was not `applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, [but] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm' and that he suffered an injury." Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992)).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff states no facts which would establish that the chemical agent was used by Defendant Proffitt maliciously and sadistically in an effort to cause harm. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 3 9. Assuming the truth of Plaintiff's factual allegations, the use of more, applied only after Plaintiff flooded his cell, forced open his food slot and failed to submit to handcuffs, was clearly justified. In situations such as this, "[prison officials] are entitled to wide-ranging deference." See Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the use of mace to quell a disturbance caused by inmates on a bus did not constitute excessive force). "The amount of force that is constitutionally permissible . . . must be judged by the context in which that force is deployed." Id. (quoting Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). The use of mace or tear gas does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when reasonably necessary to subdue a recalcitrant prisoner. Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 360 (1975); see Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 1530 (1978) (affirming jury verdict for the defendants where evidence was sufficient to show that mace was used only for the control of unruly prisoners and was, therefore, not excessive). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim with regard to the use of force.
Plaintiff complains that he was subjected to unsanitary and inhumane conditions because Defendants failed to deliver his bedding and cleaning supplies upon request. Complaint ¶ V.
Prisoners are entitled to the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991). This includes the basic elements of hygiene. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1301 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, this has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean physically barbarous punishments, punishments which involve "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain," or those which are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981).
Plaintiff concedes that his bedding and cleaning supplies were delivered approximately ten hours after he was first placed in the cell. Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 7 8. Such a delay in providing bedding and cleaning supplies simply does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, especially in light of Plaintiff's own behavior when placed in the cell. The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. To the extent that conditions for prisoners in the Allred Unit are "restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Although Plaintiff may have suffered some temporary discomfort without his bedding and cleaning supplies, he has failed to show that this temporary deprivation involved the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or that his discomfort was grossly disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted. "[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of confinement claim." Hudson v. McMillian, 503. U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000 (1992).
Compare Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1988) and Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1987), in which alleged conditions were found sufficient state a cause of action. In Beck, the windows of the prisoners' cell were broken and not replaced during the winter. The prisoners were "exposed to the elements, including during the winter months, bitter cold, wind, and rain. Rainwater allegedly collected and remained in puddles on the floor." The prisoners were not given coats or blankets to cope with "subfreezing temperatures." Beck; 842 F.2d at 760. In Foulds, a prisoner in solitary confinement was kept in a cell which was "extremely cold" and forced to sleep on the floor where rats crawled over him. Foulds, 833 F.2d at 54.
To the extent, if any, that Plaintiff is asserting a claim based upon negligence, relief is unavailable wider § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).
A district court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 183b32 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). A complaint is without an arguable basis in law if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. The claims set forth in the case at bar have no arguable basis in law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complaint is hereby dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).