Opinion
46226 Record No. 890277
March 2, 1990
Present: All the Justices
A second motion for judgment, filed before a non-suit was taken in an action previously filed, was not foreclosed and the trial court's ruling to the contrary is reversed.
Practice and Procedure — Non-suit — Torts — Negligence — Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) — Statutory Construction
Plaintiff was injured while an inmate in a correctional center and filed a motion for judgment against the defendant, alleging that she had negligently caused an electronically operated door to slam against him. Before the first motion for judgment was transferred from the court in which it had been filed, plaintiff filed another motion for judgment on the same claim in the first court. Nearly a year later the plaintiff nonsuited the first action. The original court, acting on its own motion, held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 'new' proceeding and dismissed plaintiff's second action. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the statutory limitation contained in Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) does not apply to cases where two lawsuits are pending simultaneously and one is subsequently nonsuited.
1. If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it.
2. When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules of construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply.
3. Here, the statutory language is not of doubtful meaning but is clear and unambiguous. In plain terms, the limitation contained in Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) is made to apply only where a new proceeding is brought after a nonsuit is taken in an action previously filed.
4. The second proceeding was an existing proceeding rather than a new one, brought before, not after the nonsuit was taken in the action previously filed and the limitation in question was not intended to apply to the situation presented here.
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. Hon. Randall G. Johnson, judge presiding.
Reversed and remanded.
Walter H. Emroch (William P. Hanson, Jr., on brief), for appellant.
Caroline Lowdon Lockerby, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General; Gail Starting Marshall, Deputy Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) contains a limitation which provides that "[a]fter a nonsuit no new proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same party shall be had in any court other than that in which the nonsuit was taken." The question for decision in this case is whether the limitation applies to a second proceeding brought in another court prior to the time the first proceeding is nonsuited. The trial court held that the limitation does apply and dismissed the second proceeding. We granted an appeal to review the trial court's action.
The record shows that on April 18, 1985, the plaintiff, Clarence C. Moore, was an inmate at the Brunswick Correctional Center in Brunswick County and that the defendant, Elvertha D. Gillis, was a corrections officer employed at the same facility. On that date, Moore was injured when an electronically operated door through which he was passing slammed against him.
On March 11, 1987, Moore filed a motion for judgment against Gillis in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. In the motion, Moore alleged that Gillis negligently caused the door to slam against him and, accordingly, that she was liable to him in damages.
On April 6, 1987, Gillis filed a motion to transfer venue of the action to the Circuit Court of Brunswick County. Moore agreed to the transfer, but, on April 16, 1987, before the transfer order was entered, filed another motion for judgment on the same claim in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. By order dated May 18, 1987, the Richmond court transferred venue of the first action to Brunswick County. Nearly a year later, on April 18, 1988, Moore nonsuited the first action, which was then pending in the Circuit Court of Brunswick County.
On December 7, 1988, acting on its own motion, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond held that it lacked jurisdiction to "hear the 'new' proceeding." On December 29, 1988, the court dismissed Moore's second action.
Moore contends that the statutory limitation contained in Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) "does not apply to cases where two lawsuits are pending simultaneously and one is subsequently nonsuited." A defendant's only option in such a situation, Moore says, is to "make a motion to require the plaintiff to elect which suit he will pursue."
Gillis contends that the limitation in question "is intended to prevent a plaintiff from 'forum-shopping' by instituting his suit in a new court after encountering difficulties in his original suit." Gillis maintains that to "allow a plaintiff to circumvent the statute in this way would lead to an absurd result — a plaintiff who desires to nonsuit and refile in a new court need only file in the new court the day before he nonsuits." (Emphasis in original.)
Gillis says that this Court has "the duty to construe the statute so as to avoid [an absurd] result, and to adopt a reasonable construction within the legislative intent and purpose." And we must adopt that interpretation "which is consistent with the legislature's intention," Gillis opines, "even though such interpretation may not be in conformity with the strict letter of the law."
We do not disagree with Gillis's contention that it is this Court's duty to give effect to legislative intent. Neither do we doubt the accuracy of Gillis's assertion that a purpose of the limitation contained in Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) was to prevent a plaintiff from "forum-shopping."
The narrow question in this case, however, is whether the General Assembly intended the limitation to be so sweeping in effect that it would prohibit the prosecution of a proceeding pled before a nonsuit is taken in a pending action covering the same claim. And in resolving that question, a well-established rule controls.
[1-2] If statutory language "is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court: the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it." Brown v. Lukhard. 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). "When all enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules of construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply." Id.
Here, the statutory language is not of doubtful meaning but is clear and unambiguous. In plain terms, the limitation contained in Code Sec. 8.01-380(A) is made to apply only where a new proceeding is brought after a nonsuit is taken in an action previously filed.
In this case, the second proceeding was an existing proceeding, not a new one, brought before, not after, the nonsuit was taken in the action previously filed. Hence, disagreeing with Gillis's contention that a result contrary to her view would be absurd, we hold that the limitation in question was not intended to apply to the sort of situation presented here.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate Moore's second motion for judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.