Opinion
No. 724 C.D. 2012
01-10-2013
Donna Lou Moore, Walter L. Moore, Randall L. Hollis, Lori J. Hollis, Dean McMaster and Linda McMaster, Appellants v. County of Clarion Planning Commission
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge (P.) HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Donna Lou Moore and Walter L. Moore (Moores), Randall L. Hollis and Lori J. Hollis, and Dean McMaster and Linda McMaster (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the March 19, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County (trial court), which affirmed the decision of the Clarion County Planning Commission (Commission) granting Vincent DiStefano's (DiStefano) request for a modification of the requirements of Section 404 A. 1 of the Clarion County Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (Ordinance) and approving DiStefano's land development plan. We affirm.
DiStefano is the owner of a two-acre parcel of land in Farmington Township, Clarion County. On June 8, 1983, DiStefano acquired a 20-foot-wide right-of-way from Donna Lou Moore's parents across the Moores' property. The deed indicates that the:
right of ingress, egress and regress over and across an existing 20 foot right-of-way from Pa. Route 66 to the subject property, together with the right to extend the said existing right-of-way the distance required to reach the said property . . . . The said right-of-way shall be deemed appurtenant to the above-described tract of land and shall run with the land.(R.R. at 30a-31a.)
On January 11, 2011, DiStefano applied to the Commission for approval to subdivide his property into four lots for use as a mobile home park. DiStefano further filed a modification application, requesting the Commission grant him a waiver from the width requirement in Section 404 A. 1 of the Ordinance for an access road. DiStefano asked to use the 20-foot-wide right-of-way to construct an 18-foot-wide cartway for ingress and egress from his real property. Section 404 A. 1 of the Ordinance requires a minor street to have a 50-foot-wide right-of-way and 22-foot-wide cartway. DiStefano claimed a hardship because he did not have enough land to meet the Ordinance's requirements and the Moores declined to sell or grant him any more land to widen his current right-of-way.
Appellants, who are neighboring property owners, opposed the modification of the width requirement and the development plan in general because it is too close to their homes and incompatible with the single-family neighborhood. Appellants also maintained that the intended purpose of the right-of-way was only to give DiStefano access to the septic system.
We note, however, that there were no restrictions in the deed, and there is no zoning in Farmington Township.
The Commission held a hearing and, thereafter, granted a waiver of the road width requirement and approved the subdivision plan for the four lot mobile home park. Appellants appealed to the trial court, which made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirmed. Appellants now appeal to this court.
Our review, where the trial court takes no additional evidence but makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Koutrakos v. Zoning Hearing Board of Newtown Township, 685 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); Section 1005-A of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §11005-A, added by Section 101 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.
Initially, Appellants contend that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in affirming the Commission's approval of DiStefano's request for modification of the road width requirement because DiStefano did not demonstrate an undue hardship. Specifically, Appellants contend that DiStefano's inability to secure more land for his right-of-way was not a hardship unique and peculiar to his property.
We have combined all of Appellants issues pertaining to undue hardship. However, we note that DiStefano was not seeking a variance, but was seeking a modification of the Ordinance requirements. The requirements for proving a hardship are stricter when seeking a variance. Compare Hill District Project Area Committee, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 638 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (sets forth requirements for proving a hardship when seeking a variance), with Monroe Meadows Housing Partnership, LP v. Municipal Council of the Municipality of Monroeville, 926 A.2d 548, 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (sets forth requirements for proving a hardship when seeking a modification). Because DiStefano was seeking a modification, we do not address Appellants' arguments relating to proving a hardship under a variance request.
Section 903 A. of the Ordinance requires the following for a modification:
The Planning Commission may grant a modification of the requirements of one or more provisions of this Ordinance if the literal enforcement will exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the land in question, provided that such modification will not be contrary to the public interest and that the purpose and intent of the Ordinance is observed. (Emphasis added.)This court has stated that "a waiver [is] proper where a development offers a substantial equivalent to a subdivision requirement, where an additional requirement would offer little or no additional benefit, and where literal enforcement of a requirement would frustrate the effect of improvements." Monroe Meadows Housing Partnership, LP v. Municipal Council of the Municipality of Monroeville, 926 A.2d 548, 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); see also Levin v. Township of Radnor, 681 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
In Monroe, this court found that requiring the addition of the cul-de-sac would result in undue hardship because the landowner did not own the land where the cul-de-sac would sit. 926 A.2d at 553. We further held that the modification would not be contrary to the public interest because: the denial of the modification would frustrate the development; a substantial equivalent was proposed by adding an easement access to the road; and no additional benefit would result from additional requirements. Id.
In this case, the trial court determined that DiStefano showed undue hardship:
DiStefano's development offers a substantial equivalent to the subdivision requirement, an additional requirement would offer little or no additional benefit, and literal enforcement of a requirement would frustrate the effect of improvements. In particular, a cartway of 18 feet in width is only four feet narrower than the minimum width of 22 feet set by the Ordinance. DiStefano has a 20 foot wide right of way and there would be one foot additional width on each side of the cartway, so vehicles traveling in opposite directions would still be able to pass each other.(Trial Ct. Op., 3/19/12, at 7.)
If Mr. DiStefano would be required to have a 50 foot wide right of way, 28 feet of it would be unused. There would be no need to use the remaining land for utility lines since he has another right of way for that purpose. There is no indication that any additional width would be needed for other uses, such as drainage or curbing.
DiStefano has two acres of ground and only a 20-foot-wide right-of-way for access to the property but needs to obtain additional land or an addition to his current right-of-way to comply with the Ordinance. The Moores refused to sell or grant DiStefano additional land. The trial court found a hardship because DiStefano did not have access to his land that was wide enough to comply with the Ordinance. Access to land is a factor that pertains to the land. Further, as the trial court found, DiStefano offered a substantial equivalent to the subdivision requirement and any additional requirement would offer little or no added benefit. DiStefano had another right-of-way in which to bring in his utilities and there was no indication that additional space was needed for any other uses, i.e., drainage or curbing. The trial court did not err in determining that DiStefano faced an undue hardship given the inadequate road width and his inability to comply with the Ordinance.
Next, Appellants argue that DiStefano failed to demonstrate how permitting his request would not be contrary to public interest. Appellants contend that the modification frustrates public interest because a mobile home park is incompatible with a single-family residential neighborhood.
Pursuant to section 903 A. of the Ordinance, the characteristics of the neighborhood are not a factor in the public interest analysis. In fact, harmonious development criteria in a subdivision and land development ordinance are unenforceable. Blue Mountain Preservation Association v. Township of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 700-01 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). As long as the proposed development "offers a substantial equivalent to the subdivision requirement," the development is not contrary to the public interest. Monroe, 926 A.2d at 553. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to consider whether all of the homes were single-family.
Next, Appellants contend that the proposed subdivision lot sizes do not meet the requirements of the Ordinance and, therefore, the Commission should have rejected DiStefano's development plan. Specifically, Appellants contend that the front lot lines are shorter than those required by the Ordinance. This issue was not raised at the Commission meeting in February 2011; however, the trial court did address it.
The Commission agrees that the proposed subdivision front lot lines are shorter than the 60- and 80-foot distances required in the Ordinance. However, the lots are not of uniform width, and the rear lines are considerably longer. The Commission sent information regarding the development to the Township officials and received no adverse comment. The Commission approved the plan and had no concern about the length of the front lot lines. The trial court noted that the total square footage of each lot is approximately double that required by the Ordinance. The Commission decided that DiStefano's plan was well conceived, that he needed a modification of the Ordinance for a right-of-way into the property, but that he did not need a waiver of the lot size requirements.
Section 410 B. A of the Ordinance requires a minimum lot size of 7,500 square feet and 60-foot-wide interior lots and 80-foot-wide corner lots. --------
In Blue Mountain, this court determined that the trial court and the local officials:
were free to look at the record as a whole to determine whether [developer] had substantively provided the information necessary to determine whether its plan complied with the [Ordinance]. In this regard, we decline to micromanage the [Commission's] process for reviewing and approving development plans.867 A.2d at 701. Here, DiStefano supplied the necessary information to ascertain whether the plan complied with the Ordinance and the Commission approved the plan. The trial court did not err in determining that the Commission correctly found that a waiver of the lot size requirements was unnecessary.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2013, the March 19, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge