MOORE v. BACA

Full title: L.B. Moore, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Le Roy Baca, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, C.D. California

Date published: Dec 11, 2002

CV 01-03552 FMC (RCx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2002)

Opinion

CV 01-03552 FMC (RCx)

December 11, 2002

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS;

FLORENCE-MARIE COOPER, Judge, United States District Court.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (docket #262). The Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons and in the manner set forth below, the Court hereby grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants move to dismiss a number of claims. Defendants move to dismiss the federal claims of seventeen of the remaining twenty-three Plaintiffs, arguing that these seventeen Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs' racial conspiracy claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), for failure to adequately plead specific facts in support of this claim.

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims due to their failure in allege compliance with the procedural requirements of the California Tort Claims Act,¹ and on the basis of state law immunity.

1 Because the Court holds that state law immunity precludes Plaintiffs' state law claims, the Court does not consider Defendants' arguments regarding the procedural requirements of the California Tort Claims Act.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The PLRA does not impose a pleading requirement on plaintiffs. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 305 F.3d 1033, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e do not believe the PLRA imposes a pleading requirement."). Rather, it is in the nature of an affirmative defense that may be asserted by a defendant. Id. The issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies that is not jurisdictional in nature is brought through an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than a motion for summary judgment. Id. 1044-45. In deciding such a motion, the Court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. If the court determines that a prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Id.

The PLRA requires that prison litigants exhaust all of their administrative remedies prior to seeking relief under any federal statute:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Defendants have submitted evidence regarding the administrative remedy procedure for inmates at the Los Angeles County Jails. Inmate Complaint Forms are available to inmates, and may be used to address any number of issues, including personnel conduct, medical care, classification actions, and conditions of confinement. Written complaints are left in a complaint box (which is checked a number of times per day) or given directly to any staff employee. The complaints are logged, given a reference number, and assigned an investigator. The investigator contacts the inmate and attempts to resolve the complaint. If the complaint is resolved, the inmate acknowledges as much on the back of the Inmate Complaint Form. If the complaint is not resolved, the Building Sargeant conducts an investigation and prepares a memorandum to the Captain regarding the nature of the incident, the action taken, and whether the complaint was founded or unfounded. The Building Sargeant also prepares a written response to the inmate regarding the disposition of the complaint. These documents are routed to the shift Watch Commander, who forwards them to the Operations Lieutenant or Captain for approval. The complaint is then sent to the Inmate Services Sargeant for filing, and the inmate receives a written response from the Captain. Investigations of complaints are to be completed within 10 days. An inmate can appeal to a higher level if the complaint is denied. All written complaints and related documents are maintained for three years.

In order to prove that Plaintiffs are subject to the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA, Defendants must show that they were "prisoners" at the time of the filing of this action.² Defendants have submitted evidence that fifteen of the seventeen Plaintiffs were in custody as of the date of the filing of this action, April 18, 2001. ( See Chart prepared by Defendants, attached as Exh. A to the Reply, and evidence cited therein). Those fifteen Plaintiffs are: Tony Bayone, Nardell Carter, Curtis Clayton, Larry Douglas, Dale Edmondson, Paul Finner, Charles Gaston, Randy Higgins, George Jacobs, Kenneth Johnson, Willie McGee, Larry Moore, Lawrence Taylor, Eric Traylor, and Donzell Wharry. ( Id.). Defendants have failed to establish that the following individuals were incarcerated on that date: Juan Wiginton and Michael Foster. ( Id.)

2 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants must establish that each Plaintiff was continuously incarcerated at the same facility from April 24, 2000, to April 18, 2001. Plaintiffs argue that the exhaustion requirement is location specific — i.e., that unless a plaintiff is incarcerated in the same location at the time of the filing of his action as he was at the time of the events of which he complains, the exhaustion requirements do not apply. This argument is not without its appeal. If the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to permit the prison to resolve complaints prior the filing of a lawsuit, this purpose would not be served by filing a complaint at Prison B that complained of the conditions of confinement at Prison A. However, the exhaustion requirement is a strict procedural requirement that is not excused in all instances where following the procedure would be futile. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001).
Plaintiffs cite Page v. Torry, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), in support of their argument. However, Page held that a detainee who was civilly committed to a state hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act was not a "prisoner" within the meaning of the PLRA, and was therefore not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Plaintiffs have cited no persuasive authority that establishes that continuous incarceration at the same facility is a prerequisite to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, and the Court rejects this argument.

Defendants have also presented evidence that those fifteen Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them prior to filing the present action. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence that their counsel sent a letter to Sheriff Baca, and that the letter generated no response.³ Plaintiffs argue that this constitutes exhaustion of available remedies. However, where there is in place a detailed system for the receipt, investigation, resolution, and appeal regarding inmate complaints, a letter from counsel to the Sheriff does not suffice to exhaust administrative remedies. See Lavista v. Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that letter sent to Americans with Disabilities Board constituted exhaustion of remedies and noting "Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to apply to the prison's grievance procedures, regardless of what other administrative remedies might also be available.").

3 Defendants have expressed their doubt regarding the existence of such a letter, because it was neither filed with the Court or produced to Defendants in discovery. Because the Court holds that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies even if such a letter was sent, the Court does not decide the probative value of counsel's report of this letter.

Accordingly, Defendants have established that fifteen Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. For that reason, the Court hereby dismisses the federal claims of the following Plaintiffs: Tony Bayone, Nardell Carter, Curtis Clayton, Larry Douglas, Dale Edmondson, Paul Finner, Charles Gaston, Randy Higgins, George Jacobs, Kenneth Johnson, Willie McGee, Larry Moore, Lawrence Taylor, Eric Traylor, and Donzell Wharry.

Defendants have failed to establish that Juan Wiginton and Michael Foster are subject to the PLRA, and therefore Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the federal claims of these two Plaintiffs is hereby denied.

III. Section 1985(3) Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claim is inadequately pleaded. Section 1985(3) prohibits race-based conspiracies:

If two or more persons in any State . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . [and] if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3).

The Complaint alleges that the Defendants understood that the Saugas Jail was overcrowded, that the African-American inmates were outnumbered three to one by Hispanic inmates, that there were ongoing hostilities between these two groups, that the groups were not segregated, and that segregation was necessary to prevent physical violence to the African-American inmates. The Complaint meets the pleading standard.

IV. Immunities Under California Law

Defendants correctly argue that the California Government Code provides immunities to public entities and public employees that preclude Plaintiffs' state law claims. Specifically, a public entity may not be held liable under state law for injury caused by any prisoner or injury caused to any prisoner. See Cal. Gov't Code § 844.6. Neither public entities nor public employees are liable under state law for failure to provide a prison or jail with sufficient equipment, personnel, or facilities. See Cal. Gov't Code § 845.2. Public employees are not liable under state law for injuries resulting from their acts or omissions where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the employees' discretion. See Cal. Gov't Code 820.2.

In response to Defendants' argument, Plaintiffs argue only that their Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is not precluded. The Court is persuaded by Gates v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 (1995). In Gates, the court held that the immunity provided by Cal. Gov't Code § 845 ⁴ precluded a plaintiff's Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not based on the failure of police to protect. However, Plaintiffs claims are based on the alleged failure of their jailers to protect them by segregating them racially. In light of Gates, the Court concludes that the immunities cited by Defendants preclude Plaintiffs' Unruh Civil Rights claims.

4 Section 845 provides immunity for claims based on the failure to provide police protection services.

The Court hereby grants the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims.

V. Conclusion

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted in part and denied in part.

The Court hereby dismisses without prejudice the federal law claims of the following Plaintiffs: Tony Bayone, Nardell Carter, Curtis Clayton, Larry Douglas, Dale Edmondson, Paul Finner, Charles Gaston, Randy Higgins, George Jacobs, Kenneth Johnson, Willie McGee, Larry Moore, Lawrence Taylor, Eric Traylor, and Donzell Wharry.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the federal law claims of Juan Wiginton and Michael Foster is hereby denied.

The Court hereby dismisses with prejudice all Plaintiffs' state law claims.

Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application, asking the Court to consider additional evidence in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (docket #279). The Court hereby grants the ex parte application, and has considered Plaintiffs' additional evidence.