Opinion
Civil Action File No. 1:04-CV-3717-TWT.
May 6, 2005
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). It is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 6] and the Defendants' Request for Oral Argument [Doc. 12]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and DENIES the Defendants' Request for Oral Argument.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff V. Stephen Moore is an employee of Defendant Accenture, L.L.P. ("Accenture"), formerly Andersen Consulting. As an employee, the Plaintiff is a participant in and/or beneficiary of the following employer-sponsored welfare benefit plans: Defendant Accenture United States Group Medical Plan, Defendant Accenture United States Group Dental Plan, Defendant Accenture United States Basic Life/Accidental Death Dismemberment Insurance Plan, Defendant Accenture United States Optional Life Insurance Plan, and Defendant Accenture United States Optional Accidental Death Dismemberment Insurance Plan ("Benefit Plans"). Accenture is the Plan Administrator for each of the Benefit Plans.
The Plaintiff is on a disability leave of absence without pay. In December of 2002, Accenture announced to its employees that it was changing its leave of absence policy, and the related provisions of its Benefit Plans, with regard to the length of time employees would be permitted to remain in a leave of absence status. Under the new policy, employees who had fewer than ten years of service when they began a leave of absence would be limited to three years leave. After that time, employees would be required to return to work or would have their employment terminated. Terminated employees would no longer be eligible to receive benefits under the Benefit Plans. For those employees who were already on leave at the time of the announcement, Accenture agreed to delay the effective date of the new policy so that no employee would be terminated before January 1, 2005, regardless of the length of time they had already been on leave. These employees were effectively grandfathered under the old system for an additional two years.
The Plaintiff began working for Accenture on August 3, 1987. He began his disability leave of absence on October 15, 1992, after approximately five years of active service. He remained on disability leave in 2002, when the new policy was announced. Because the Plaintiff had worked for Accenture for fewer than 10 years at the time he went on leave, under the new policy he would have been ineligible to remain on leave beyond December 31, 2004. Thus, his employment would have terminated on January 1, 2005, unless he had returned to work by that date.
On October 25, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Accenture and the Benefit Plans, alleging that the new leave of absence policy violated sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 510 of ERISA. On December 8, 2004, before formally serving the Defendants with the complaint, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit. On December 9, 2004, Accenture began notifying the grandfathered employees that it had decided not to apply the new policy to them. Accordingly, these employees, including the Plaintiff, would not be terminated on January 1, 2005. Nevertheless, on December 21, 2004, the Plaintiff refiled this action against Accenture and the Benefit Plans, seeking class certification and a declaratory judgment that the leave of absence policy, as formerly applied, violates sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 510 of ERISA. However, in doing so, the Plaintiff expressly acknowledged that the "underlying issues in this matter have been resolved by Defendant. . . ." (Compl. § I.) Accordingly, his stated purpose in filing this action is "to obtain attorney fees from Defendant based upon [the class action Plaintiffs] obtaining substantial equitable relief." (Id.) The Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that any claims asserted by the Plaintiff are moot.
II. DISCUSSION
The Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's ERISA claims because they are moot. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A moot case is nonjusticiable, and federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain such a case. Therefore, mootness is a threshold question for the Court. A case becomes moot if events occurring subsequent to the initiation of the lawsuit create a situation where the court is no longer able to provide the plaintiff with meaningful relief. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach, Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2001). The Defendants contend that this case is moot because Accenture decided not to apply the new leave of absence policy to the previously grandfathered employees. The Court notes, however, that this decision was made on December 9, 2004, almost two weeks before the Plaintiff filed this complaint. In fact, the Plaintiff noted in his complaint that he and the putative class had already received the relief sought, specifically the continuation of all employee benefits. (See Compl. ¶ 16.) Thus, this case is not moot because the decision which eliminated the alleged ERISA violations occurred before, not after, the filing of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the Defendants' argument regarding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is more properly cast as a lack of standing argument. See Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
Standing, like mootness, is a threshold jurisdictional question for a federal court. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); see also Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 779314, *7 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2005) ("Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims."). A plaintiff must establish standing in order to satisfy the Article III "case or controversy" requirement. The fact that the Defendants did not raise the issue does not preclude the Court from addressing whether the Plaintiff has standing to assert his claims. Rather, "federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional doctrines." Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. E.P.A., 386 F.3d 1070, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004). Therefore, when doubt arises regarding the existence of standing, the Court must address the issue sua sponte. See Bochese, 2005 WL 779314, at *7 ("[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking . . . Accordingly, we are obliged to consider questions of standing regardless of whether the parties have raised them."); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Longstanding principles of federal law oblige us to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.").
The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" consists of three requirements. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102-03 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). In order for a plaintiff to have standing, he must show that: (1) he has suffered an "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the complained of conduct of the defendant; and (3) it is likely that the requested relief will redress or remedy the alleged injury.Id. at 103; Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004). Standing must be determined as of time the plaintiff's complaint is filed. See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of each of the three elements at that time. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; Koziara, 392 F.3d at 1305. When standing is being evaluated at the pleading stage, "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Although his complaint characterizes this suit as one filed to obtain attorney's fees, the Plaintiff also requests "[d]eclaratory relief relating to amendments to Accenture's disability leave policy." (Compl. § VI.) Thus, the Plaintiff argues that he seeks a declaratory judgment that the challenged change to the leave of absence policy, which has since been rescinded by Accenture, violates ERISA and, therefore, cannot be reintroduced in the future. (See Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 5.) In order to establish the "injury in fact" requirement of standing, a plaintiff seeking prospective relief in the form of an injunction or declaratory judgment must prove not only an injury, but also a "real and immediate," not conjectural or hypothetical, threat of future injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983); Koziara, 392 F.3d at 1305; Focus on the Family, 344 F.3d at 1274. Thus, a plaintiff must "allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future."Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1265 ("[T]o have standing to obtain forward-looking relief, a plaintiff must show a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.") (quoting Wooden v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)).
At the motion to dismiss stage, standing is evaluated based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and the court may not "speculate concerning the existence of standing or piece together support for the plaintiff." Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cone Corp. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1210 (11th Cir. 1991)). The Plaintiff's complaint contains only allegations of past injury caused by the imposition of the leave of absence policy, injuries which have since been resolved by Accenture's decision not to apply the policy to the employees at issue. However, even if this alleged injury had not been remedied, "[i]njury in the past . . . does not support a finding of an Article III case or controversy when the only relief sought is a declaratory judgment." Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1348; see Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 ("Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.") (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). The only allegation regarding the potential for future injury is the assertion that "[n]othing prevents Accenture from changing [its leave of absence] policy again." (Compl. ¶ 16.) At most, this is an allegation that there is a chance that Accenture could change its mind in the future and decide to apply the policy to the Plaintiff and those similarly situated. This is simply conjecture and is not sufficient to establish a "real and immediate" threat of future injury. See Bowen, 233 F.3d at 1340; Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985). Therefore, the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit for prospective relief and dismissal is warranted.
As noted, the Plaintiff's stated main purpose in filing this action was to recover attorney's fees. However, as the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the litigation itself. An interest in attorney's fees is . . . insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (internal citation and punctuation omitted); see also Community Stabilization Project v. Cuomo, 199 F.R.D. 327, 332 (D. Minn. 2001). Thus, the Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees is insufficient to establish an Article III case or controversy. Absent a showing that the Plaintiff has standing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and dismissal is required.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 6] is GRANTED, and the Defendants' Request for Oral Argument [Doc. 12] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.