Opinion
7:24-CV-4141 (CS)
08-21-2024
GERMAINE MONTES, Plaintiff, v. MARK MILLER SUPERINTENDENT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE
CATHY SEIBEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Germaine Montes, who is appearing pro se and is currently incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility (“GHCF”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. Plaintiff sues GHCF Superintendent Mark Miller, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), as well as other defendants, including “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants, and other unidentified defendants, alleged to be employed at the GHCF.
By order dated July 12, 2024, the court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses Plaintiff's claims against DOCCS; (2) directs the Clerk of Court to add as defendants to the caption of this action those individuals whom Plaintiff refers to as unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants but identifies them by name and/or position; (3) directs service on all of the individual identified defendants; and (4) directs the Attorney General of the State of New York to provide the Court and Plaintiff with the identities (and, if appropriate, shield numbers) as well as service addresses of those defendants who are not otherwise identified.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
DISCUSSION
A. Claims against DOCCS
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). Congress has not abrogated the States' immunity for claims under Section 1983, see Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990), and the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). DOCCS is an agency of the State of New York; it is, thus, an arm of that State and enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. E.g., Gibson v. Pasta City, No. 1:23-CV-9112 (LTS), 2023 WL 8188431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023).
The Eleventh Amendment therefore precludes Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New York waived its immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”); Atl. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although the parties do not address the Eleventh Amendment in their briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject matter jurisdiction.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2(B)(iii).
B. Identified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants
Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 21”), the Court, on its own motion, “may[,] at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; see Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 118 F.Supp.3d 591, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Rule 21 “afford[s] courts discretion to shape litigation in the interests of efficiency and justice.”). Under this rule, courts have added an individual as a defendant in an action, though that individual is not named as a defendant in the complaint, because he or she is mentioned “throughout the body of the [c]omplaint” as involved in the underlying alleged events. George v. Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Corr., No. 20-CV-1723 (KMK), 2020 WL 1922691, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020); see Adams v.NYC Dep't of Corrs., No. 19-CV-5909 (VSB), 2019 WL 2544249, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2019).
Plaintiff refers to many of the individual defendants, in the caption of his complaint, as unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” GHCF staff members, but then identifies them by name and/or position within the text of the complaint; they include: (1) “PH Ashonda”; (2) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Health Services; (3) Correctional Officer Celice; (4) Correctional Officer Pellot; (5) Correctional Sergeant Fox; (6) Correctional Sergeant Laino; (7) Correctional Officer Jackson; (8) Correctional Sergeant Cahon; (9) Correctional Officer Williams; and (10) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Security. (ECF 1, at 3-5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and his allegations, the Court understands Plaintiff's complaint as asserting additional claims against those individuals. Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to add those individuals as defendants in this action, under Rule 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses those individuals may wish to assert.
C. Service on the identified defendants
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on assistance from the Court and the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP).
Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have effected service until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that any summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date that any summonses issue.
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on (1) GHCF Superintendent Mark Miller; (2) PH Ashonda; (3) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Health Services; (4) Correctional Officer Celice; (5) Correctional Officer Pellot: (6) Correctional Sergeant Fox; (7) Correctional Sergeant Laino; (8) Correctional Officer Jackson; (9) Correctional Sergeant Cahon; (10) Correctional Officer Williams; and (11) the CHCF Deputy Superintendent of Security, through the USMS, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out USMS Process Receipt and Return forms (“USM-285 forms”) for those defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses for those defendants, and deliver to the USMS all the paperwork necessary for the USMS to effect service upon those defendants.
If the complaint is not served on those defendants within 90 days after the date that summonses for those defendants have issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service).
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
D. The unidentified defendants
Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the Court in ascertaining an unidentified defendant's identity and a defendant's proper service address. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit DOCCS to provide the identities (and, if appropriate, shield numbers) as well as service addresses of those defendants not otherwise identified; they include: (1) “the person Plaintiff [saw] at the emergency clinic in [the GHCF], when officers finally permitted [him] to see emergency assistance after . . . two days”; (2) a nurse described as “an older Muslim [w]oman [who] dispensed . . . medication during the [GHCF] [l]ockdown, [at] G-Block (3-company) on or around October 8, 2023[,] at approximately 7:45 pm”; (3) “the [C]orrectional [O]fficer . . . that worked [the GHCF] G-Block (3-company) on October 4, 2023, [during the] 7 am to 3 pm shift”'; (4) the DOCCS “Deputy Commissioner . . . who took control of [GHCF] after it [was] put on ‘Facility Lockdown' [s]tatus on October 4, 2023”; (5) the GHCF Correctional Sergeant assigned to the GHCF's “G-Block” on October 5, 2023, during the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift; and (6) the GHCF African-American Correctional Sergeant who, though present on the GHCF “G-Block” on October 5, 2023, was not the Correctional Sergeant assigned to that block on that date. (ECF 1, 3-4.) It is therefore ordered that the Attorney General of the State of New York, who is the attorney for and agent of DOCCS, must ascertain the identities (and, if appropriate, shield numbers) of those unidentified defendants, as well as their service addresses. The Attorney General must provide this information to the Court and to Plaintiff within 60 days of the date of this order.
Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the newly identified individuals as defendants and providing their service addresses. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen it and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly identified defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail an information package to Plaintiff.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court: (1) dismisses Plaintiff's claims against DOCCS; (2) also directs the Clerk of Court to add as defendants to the caption of this action, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, those individuals whom Plaintiff refers to as unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants but identifies them by name and/or position, including: (a) “PH Ashonda,” (b) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Health Services, (c) Correctional Officer Celice, (d) Correctional Officer Pellot, (e) Correctional Sergeant Fox, (f) Correctional Sergeant Laino, (g) Correctional Officer Jackson, (h) Correctional Sergeant Cahon, (i) Correctional Officer Williams, and (j) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Security; (3) directs service on all of the individual identified defendants; and (4) directs the Attorney General of the State of New York to provide the Court and Plaintiff with the identities (and, if appropriate, shield numbers), as well as service addresses of those defendants who are not otherwise identified.
The Court further directs the Clerk of Court to: (1) issue summonses for (a) GHCF Superintendent Mark Miller, (b) “PH Ashonda,” (c) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Health Services, (d) Correctional Officer Celice, (e) Correctional Officer Pellot, (f) Correctional Sergeant Fox, (g) Correctional Sergeant Laino, (h) Correctional Officer Jackson, (i) Correctional Sergeant Cahon, (j) Correctional Officer Williams, and (k) the GHCF Deputy Superintendent of Security; (2) complete USM-285 forms with the service addresses for those defendants, and; (3) deliver all documents necessary to effect service on those defendants to the USMS.
The Court additionally directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order and a copy of the complaint to the Attorney General of the State of New York, at 28 Liberty Street, New York, New York 10005.
An amended complaint form is attached to this order.
The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.