Opinion
21-2770
12-15-2022
Victor Monteagudo, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-Appellee. [*]
For Plaintiff-Appellant: BRIAN J. ISAAC (Michael H. Zhu, on the brief), Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY. For Defendant-Appellee: MEGAN FREISMUTH (Varuni Nelson, Rachel G. Balaban, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Central Islip, NY.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of December, two thousand twenty-two.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Diane Gujarati, Judge).
For Plaintiff-Appellant: BRIAN J. ISAAC (Michael H. Zhu, on the brief), Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: MEGAN FREISMUTH (Varuni Nelson, Rachel G. Balaban, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Central Islip, NY.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Victor Monteagudo appeals from the district court's judgment, entered after a bench trial, on his claim of negligence brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2671 et seq., stemming from a motor-vehicle accident in which a United States Postal Service ("USPS") truck rear-ended the car that he was driving. At the conclusion of the parties' presentation of evidence, the district court entered judgment for the United States, finding that Monteagudo failed to establish that his asserted injuries were caused by the accident. This appeal followed. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
In an appeal from the district court's decision in a bench trial, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Coppola, 85 F.3d 1015, 1019 (2d Cir. 1996). Under the clear-error standard, "there is a strong presumption in favor of a trial court's findings of fact," which we "will not upset . . . unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Travellers Int'l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 41 F.3d 1570, 1574 (2d Cir. 1994) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1574-75 ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In particular, we owe "considerable deference to the district court's credibility assessments." Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health &Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6) ("[T]he reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."). Thus, when a district court's "[factual] finding is based on [its] decision to credit the testimony of [a witness who] . . . has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
Here, the district court found that Monteagudo failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries were proximately caused by his collision with the USPS truck. Although Monteagudo disagrees with that finding, it was wholly supported by the testimony of the government's medical expert, Dr. Mark Creighton, who unequivocally stated that the "injuries that [Monteagudo] claims to have . . . [in his knees] are in no way causally related to th[e] accident." App'x at 981:18-982:1. Dr. Creighton gave similar testimony with respect to the asserted injuries to Monteagudo's wrist and back. See id. at 981:23-24, 982:2-3 (opining that any injury to "Monteagudo's right wrist" was in "no way casually related" to the accident); id. at 1093:22-1094:19 (opining that X-rays of Monteagudo's lumbar spine were not "consistent with an acute traumatic injury" such as a motor-vehicle collision). In addition to being "coherent," "plausible," and "internally []consistent," Dr. Creighton's testimony was supported by the objective medical evidence introduced at trial. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. For all these reasons, the district court "fully credit[ed] Dr. Creighton's expert opinion as to causation, as it was based on his interpretation of [Monteagudo's] X-ray [and] MRI films, which he methodically walked the [district] [c]ourt through, and a thorough review and methodical explanation of relevant medical records." App'x at 1401:7-11.
Monteagudo insists that Dr. Creighton's testimony was refuted and contradicted by the testimony of his own experts - Dr. James Pugh, Dr. Aron Rovner, and Dr. Sun Jin Kim. But the district court expressly found, with ample support in the record, that those witnesses were not credible. As the district court observed, Monteagudo's accident-reconstruction expert, Dr. Pugh, testified in a conclusory manner; "came across as evasive and intractable," id. at 1385:3; submitted an expert report containing basic errors about the accident; and gave an opinion inconsistent with evidence in the record. With respect to Monteagudo's two treating physicians, Dr. Rovner and Dr. Kim, the district court found it significant that neither one observed any signs of an acute traumatic injury while they were treating Monteagudo, as one would expect after a motor-vehicle accident. The district court also questioned the veracity of Dr. Rovner's testimony, given that he had formed his impression before reviewing Monteagudo's prior medical records. Similarly, the district court found Dr. Kim's opinion that the accident caused Monteagudo's injuries "difficult to square" with the fact that Monteagudo himself responded "No" to a question on Dr. Kim's patient-intake form that asked, "Is this injury from a motor[-]vehicle accident?" App'x at 1391:22-1392:4. In light of these findings, it cannot be said that the district court's credibility determinations were unreasonable. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74 ("If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it."). Indeed, given that Monteagudo had the burden of proving causation at trial, the district court's adverse-credibility findings concerning the testimony of Drs. Pugh, Rovner, and Kim were enough by themselves to support the verdict in this case. See, e.g., Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that under New York law, a "tort plaintiff seeking to prove a defendant's negligence" bears the burden of proving causation); see also Perez v. United States, 8 Fed.Appx. 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that, since the government has "no burden to provide alternative proof of causation" in defending a negligence claim brought pursuant to the FTCA, it can "simply rely on plaintiffs' failure of proof" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We have considered Monteagudo's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
[*] The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.