Opinion
2012-03-16
In the Matter of JUSTAIN R. and Shane R.Monroe County Department of Human Services, Petitioner–Respondent;Juan F., Respondent–Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (Joseph G. Nesser, J.), entered September 28, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b. The order, among other things, adjudged that the subject children were permanently neglected by respondent and committed the guardianship and custody of the subject children to petitioner.Fares A. Rumi, Rochester, for Respondent–Appellant. David Van Varick, County Attorney, Rochester (Carol L. Eisenman of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (Joseph G. Nesser, J.), entered September 28, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b. The order, among other things, adjudged that the subject children were permanently neglected by respondent and committed the guardianship and custody of the subject children to petitioner.Fares A. Rumi, Rochester, for Respondent–Appellant. David Van Varick, County Attorney, Rochester (Carol L. Eisenman of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Respondent father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b on the ground of permanent neglect. We affirm. Petitioner met its burden of proving “by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between [the father] and the child[ren]” ( Matter of Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894; see § 384–b [7][a]; Matter of Rachael N., 70 A.D.3d 1374, 894 N.Y.S.2d 265, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 708, 909 N.Y.S.2d 22, 935 N.E.2d 814). Contrary to the contention of the father, the evidence at the hearing establishes that, despite petitioner's diligent efforts to reunite him with the children, he continued to use drugs; lived in numerous temporary or rundown rooms or apartments that were unsuitable for children; continued to demonstrate problems with aggression in general and domestic violence against the children's mother in particular; and refused to participate in counseling of any kind until either immediately before or immediately after the termination petition was filed. Thus, petitioner established that the father “failed to address successfully the problems that led to the removal of the child[ren] and continued to prevent the child[ren]'s safe return” ( Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894; see Matter of Brittany K., 59 A.D.3d 952, 953, 872 N.Y.S.2d 817, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 709, 881 N.Y.S.2d 18, 908 N.E.2d 926).
We reject the father's contention that termination of his parental rights was not in the best interests of the children. The minimal “ ‘progress made by [the father] in the months preceding the dispositional determination was not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child[ren]'s unsettled familial status' ” ( Matter of Roystar T., 72 A.D.3d 1569, 1569, 899 N.Y.S.2d 508, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 707, 2010 WL 3546278; see Matter of Sean W., 87 A.D.3d 1318, 1319, 930 N.Y.S.2d 700, lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 802, 2011 WL 6223145). Finally, we conclude that Family Court properly refused to allow any post-termination contact between the father and the children ( see Matter of Atreyu G., 91 A.D.3d 1342, 938 N.Y.S.2d 686; Matter of Cayden L.R., 83 A.D.3d 1550, 1551, 921 N.Y.S.2d 605; Matter of Christopher J., 60 A.D.3d 1402, 1403, 876 N.Y.S.2d 275).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.