Opinion
No. AAN CV06 500 52 61S
November 6, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #114
This is a motion for summary judgment in which defendant, Nancy Ligi, contests her ownership of the vehicle her daughter was operating when she collided with the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff, Jennifer Molnar, has brought this suit against the defendants, Courtney Ligi and Nancy Ligi, for injuries she sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident which occurred on July 27, 2004.
In her amended complaint of March 22, 2006, the plaintiff alleges two counts of negligence: the first count is against Courtney Ligi for the alleged negligent operation of her vehicle. The second count of negligence is alleged against Nancy Ligi, Courtney's mother, as the putative owner under § 52-182 of the vehicle that Courtney was driving at the time of the accident. Although it is undisputed that Courtney Ligi was driving the car that struck the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle and that Nancy Ligi was not in the car at the time of the accident, the parties disagree as to whether Nancy Ligi was the owner of the car that Courtney was driving.
General Statutes § 52-182 states: "Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the co-owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption."
Nancy Ligi (hereafter the defendant) filed this motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2008, arguing that she was not the owner of the vehicle that Courtney was driving for purposes of § 52-182, and that, consequently, she does not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. The defendant supported her motion with a memorandum of law and submitted the following exhibits: (1) a certified affidavit by Nancy Ligi stating that, at the time of the accident, she was neither the owner nor operator of the car involved in the July 27, 2004 accident; (2) an uncertified copy of a Connecticut uniform police accident report listing Courtney Ligi as the registered owner of the car she was driving at the time of accident; and (3) an uncertified copy of a certificate of search by the Connecticut department of motor vehicles stating that Courtney Ligi was the title owner of the car she was driving at the time of this accident.
While both Courtney and Nancy Ligi are named defendants in this suit, Nancy Ligi alone will be referred to as the defendant in this memorandum of decision because it is her motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the motion seeks summary judgment for Nancy Ligi only.
Although "[o]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment . . . [which contemplates] that supporting documents to a motion for summary judgment be made under oath or be otherwise reliable"; (internal citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 678, 874 A.2d 849 (2005); uncertified documents can be "admitted at trial without objection to create an evidentiary foundation for the determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists, particularly where both parties submitted uncertified [documents]." Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006); see also Daniels v. Ericson, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 06 5001423 (July 17, 2007, Hurley, J.T.R.) (noting the court has discretion to admit evidence that has not been authenticated or certified if the opposing party does not object). Accordingly, because neither party has objected to the other's use of these documents, the court relies upon them for the limited purpose of determining the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.
After receiving an extension of time, the plaintiff filed her objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2008, supported by a memorandum of law. Arguing that insurance documents confirm the defendant to be the owner of the subject vehicle, the plaintiff maintains that there is a question of material fact in dispute between the parties. In support of this argument, the plaintiff proffered an uncertified copy of the defendant's automobile declarations summary, which lists the subject vehicle as an insured automobile. Oral argument on this motion was heard by the court on September 15, 2008.
Accordingly, the question presented by this motion for summary judgment is whether the definition of the word "owner," as used in General Statutes § 52-182, is broad enough to encompass a parent whose only imprimatur of vehicle ownership is to have her daughter's automobile listed on their automobile insurance policy.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to the merits, the court first considers the relevant standard of review. "Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Atkinson, 283 Conn. 243, 253, 926 A.2d 656 (2007). In seeking summary judgment, "[t]he courts are in entire agreement that the moving party . . . has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). Accordingly, the court must initially resolve whether there is a disputed material fact, and if not, then decide whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
While the plaintiff argues that the issue of vehicle ownership is a disputed question of fact, the case law makes clear that it is a question of law. See Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 579, 316 A.2d 407 (1972) (issue of ownership of motor vehicle is question of law). Moreover, it bears emphasis that the question of vehicle ownership in this case is also considered a question of law because the court must interpret the word "owner" in § 52-182. See Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) ("[t]he interpretation of a statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts and circumstances, involves a question of law") (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because the question of vehicle ownership under § 52-182 does not involve a disputed material fact, the court is obliged to resolve only whether the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The parties do not disagree either that defendant Courtney Ligi was the registered and titled owner of the subject vehicle at the time of the accident nor that the defendant Nancy Ligi insured the subject vehicle through her automobile insurance policy during that period time. Thus, because the parties do not dispute the facts related to ownership; cf. Budris v. Allstate Insurance Company, 44 Conn.App. 53, 59, 686 A.2d 533 (1996) (ownership of vehicle was issue of fact because accuracy of vehicle's title and registration, as well as facts related to its control and possession were disputed by parties); the ownership issue in this case is properly addressed as a matter of law.
To that end, the court begins by noting that the plaintiff's claim of liability against the defendant is predicated upon the agency relationship presumed by § 52-182. See Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986) (explaining that under § 52-182, "when a car is maintained by its owner for the general use and convenience of his or her family, the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the question of the defendant's ownership of the subject vehicle is the lynchpin of the plaintiff's case, both because § 52-182 requires ownership to trigger its agency presumption and because ownership would need to be established for the defendant to owe any duty to the plaintiff. See Hunt v. Richter, 163 Conn. 84, 91, 302 A.2d 117 (1972) (case need not go to trial if, as a matter of law, elements of doctrine cannot be proven); see also Cook v. Nye, supra, 9 Conn.App. 226 ("[a]pplicability of the family car doctrine is dependent upon the connection that the member of the household has with the car. He or she must own, maintain, or furnish the car, and have or exercise some degree of control over its use"). Accordingly, whether the defendant was the owner of the subject vehicle at the time of the accident is relevant and must be addressed.
Although the statute itself does not define the term "owner," our appellate courts have acknowledged its nebulous meaning in the context of motor vehicle statutes and have offered various guideposts to properly analyze the contours of its meaning. Thus, while acceding that "[t]he word `owner' has no fixed meaning but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Bauer v. Pounds, 61 Conn.App. 29, 43, 762 A.2d 499 (2000); our courts have explained that "[t]he term `owner' is one of general application and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title . . . The word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right . . . It is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined to a person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has possession and control thereof." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hope v. Cavallo, supra, 163 Conn. 580-81.
While it is true that General Statutes § 14-1(64) does define the "owner" of a motor vehicle, that provision does not control the definition of "owner" in § 52-182. Significantly, 14-1(a)(61) limits its applicability to the "[t]erms used in this chapter," which does not include § 52-182. Indeed, § 14-1 is contained in chapter 246, while General Statutes § 52-182 is contained in chapter 899. Consequently, the definition of "owner" in § 14-1(61) does not necessarily apply to the word as used in § 52-182.
In the context of vehicle ownership, our courts have noted that while vehicle registration and title are the clearest indica of ownership; see Budris v. Allstate Insurance Company, supra, 44 Conn.App. 58 (noting persuasive evidentiary value of vehicle registration and title records in establishing ownership); they are by no means conclusive. See Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102 A. 573 (1917) ("one may be the `owner' of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has strict legal title; and that the word `owner' in the motor vehicle law in effect at the time, which provided that no suit could be had for injuries to a car unless the owner registered it, referred to any person having an interest in the property even under a special title"). Indeed, our courts have held that the word "owner" "includes both the legal and equitable owner and anyone having an interest in the automobile under a special title"; see Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A.16 (1923); and further includes "the person in control of the vehicle at the time and not necessarily the actual owner." See Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298 (1887). Thus, a court's understanding of the term "owner" in a motor vehicle statute is properly informed by knowledge of the vehicle's registered and titled owner, by other legal or equitable interests in the vehicle, and by considering who has possession and control over the vehicle.
In this case, the parties do not dispute that Courtney Ligi was both the registered and titled owner of the subject vehicle at the time of the accident, nor do they dispute that she was in possession of, and had full control over, the subject vehicle at that time. Moreover, no evidence has been submitted to suggest that the defendant held a lien on the vehicle, was in possession of the car during the accident, or enjoyed any control over the car. Consequently, the court concludes as a matter of law that the defendant was not an owner of the subject vehicle at the time of the accident because she did not "own, maintain, or furnish the car, and [did not] have or exercise some degree of control over its use." Cook v. Nye, supra, 9 Conn.App. 226.
It bears emphasis that the presumption in § 52-182 is one of agency and not of ownership. Thus, while the burden would be on the defendant to meaningfully rebut evidence of an agency relationship once the elements of the statute were satisfied, the plaintiff does not enjoy the benefit of any presumption in establishing that the elements of ownership have been met. See Cook v. Nye, supra, 9 Conn.App. 225 ("the right of the plaintiffs to recover rests on their ability to establish facts which render the family car doctrine applicable, and consequently, the defendant presumptively liable as the owner of such a family car"). Accordingly, the court does not presume vehicle ownership unless clearly rebutted by the defendant.
Notwithstanding the abundance of undisputed facts to the contrary, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant enjoyed an ownership interest in the vehicle, which she predicates solely on the defendant having insured the vehicle. That argument, however, does not withstand meaningful scrutiny. In the first instance, the plaintiff offers no case law to support the proposition that payment of an insurance premium is an indication of ownership. Moreover, those cases discussing vehicle ownership have not routinely considered insurance policies as a meaningful imprimatur of vehicle ownership. By way of example, in Hope v. Cavallo, supra, the court considered the defendant's vehicle insurance only because it was required by the statute then under consideration. In that case, the State of Connecticut disputed its ownership under General Statute § 52-556 of a National Guard truck that was involved in an accident. Unlike the statute at issue in this case, however, § 52-556 required that the vehicle driven by a state employee had to be "a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state" for the presumption of liability to attach. By contrast, there is no similar requirement in § 52-182. This distinction is striking both because it suggests that a similar analysis of the insurance policy in this case is not required and because the conjunctive relationship between own and insure in § 52-556 suggests that insuring a car is not necessarily an attribute of ownership.
General Statutes § 52-556 states: "Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury."
Furthermore, even if an insurance policy were a valid indication of vehicle ownership for purposes of § 52-182, the copy of the defendant's automobile declarations summary submitted by the plaintiff does not list the subject vehicle as being "owned" by the defendant; it merely lists the drivers and vehicles "covered" by the policy. By contrast, the insurance policy under consideration in Hope v. Cavallo, supra, described the National Guard truck as an "owned automobile" of the State of Connecticut. Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 584. Consequently, the court does not view the subject vehicle in this case being listed as an insured vehicle on the defendant's insurance policy as being indicative of ownership. This is especially true in view of the fact that the registration and title to the subject vehicle were in Courtney Ligi's name and it was Courtney Ligi who was in possession and control of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.