Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-CV-00038
11-02-2022
MIGUEL MOLINA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. K. KAUFFMAN, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a motion for extension of time to file a fourth amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Angel Irizarry. (Doc. 217). On January 8, 2021, pro se-prisoner Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Jason Cisne,Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Miguel Molina (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this civil rights action by filing a complaint seeking the implementation of various measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to address the movement and housing of inmates, the infrastructure of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”), and the sanitary conditions of the facility. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiffs name Defendants Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; Jill Spyker, Deputy Superintendent for Decentralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; Scott Walters, former Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; G. Ralston, Unit Manager of certain housing units (B and C Blocks) at SCI-Huntingdon; John E. Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Tabb Bickell, Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); and Erin Brown, Director of the Office of Population Management (“OPM”) of the DOC (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). On August 30, 2022, the Court adopted the undersigned's recommendation to grant Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' individual complaints, and the Court directed Plaintiffs to “file a single, all-inclusive fourth amended complaint that seeks to cure the deficiencies outlined in the undersigned's recommendation.” (Doc. 213).
On February 16, 2022, Cisne filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, informing the Court that matters between Defendants and Cisne have been adjusted, compromised, and settled. (Doc. 169). Therefore, the Court dismissed Cisne's action with prejudice as to Defendants on February 24, 2022. (Doc. 177).
For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that Irizarry's motion for extension of time to file a fourth amended complaint (Doc. 217) be DENIED, Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief be DISMISSED as MOOT, and new and separate individual matters be opened for each Plaintiff.
I. Background and Procedural History
On January 8, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for constitutional violations caused by the deterioration of the SCI-Huntingdon facility and by employee misconduct. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed an amended complaint on March 21, 2021, and a motion to certify the class and appoint class counsel on March 29, 2021. (Doc. 35; Doc. 43; Doc. 44). On September 28, 2021, the District Court adopted the undersigned's report and recommendation to deny Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel. (Doc. 67; Doc. 84). On October 1, 2021, the undersigned granted counsel for Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw as counsel. (Doc. 86; Doc. 88).
On October 19, 2021, the undersigned granted Plaintiffs leave to file individual amended complaints. (Doc. 91; Doc. 100). Plaintiffs filed third amended complaints on the following dates: Irizarry filed a complaint on November 12, 2021 (Doc. 101); Maldanado filed a complaint on November 16, 2021 (Doc. 104); Bailey filed a complaint on November 16, 2021 (Doc. 106); and Molina filed a complaint on November 22, 2021 (Doc. 108). Defendants filed the motion to dismiss Irizarry's complaint on November 23, 2021 (Doc. 111); the motion to dismiss Maldanado's complaint on November 29, 2021 (Doc. 115); the motion to dismiss Bailey's complaint on November 30, 2021 (Doc. 118); and the motion to dismiss Molina's complaint on December 2, 2021 (Doc. 120). On November 29, 2021, Maldanado filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 117). On December 3, 2021, Molina filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 122). On December 6, 2021, Irizarry filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 125).
On January 18, 2022, Molina filed the “motion for justice and fairness,” requesting the Court to direct Defendants to serve legal documents directly to SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 147). On January 28, 2022, Bailey filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 153). Irizarry and Maldanado filed motions to compel proper service, requesting that the Court direct Defendants serve legal documents directly to SCI-Huntingdon, on February 2, 2022, and February 8, 2022, respectively. (Doc. 159; Doc. 165). On April 14, 2022, the Court denied Molina, Irizarry, and Maldanado's individual motions that sought to compel Defendants to serve all correspondence intended for Plaintiffs directly to SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 147; Doc. 159; Doc. 165; Doc. 188; Doc. 189). On May 12, 2022, Maldanado filed a motion for leave of Court to file a supplemental complaint. (Doc. 190). On June 8, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motions to dismiss. (Doc. 196).
In the complaints, Plaintiffs aver that the “structures, mechanical systems, and other features of the physical plant at SCI Huntingdon have fallen to disrepair.” (Doc. 101, ¶ 3; Doc. 104, ¶ 3; Doc. 106, ¶ 4; Doc. 108, ¶ 4). Plaintiffs state that, through regular inspections by facility staff and guards, the DOC knows of the prison facility's disrepair, including lack of ventilation, presence of mold and asbestos, lead-based water pipes, and inadequate mechanisms for locking cell doors to prevent rapid evacuation in case of a fire or other emergency. (Doc. 101, ¶ 6; Doc. 104, ¶ 6; Doc. 106, ¶ 5; Doc. 108, ¶ 5). Plaintiffs allege that inmates at SCI-Huntingdon are being exposed at a high rate to the COVID-19 virus due to the facility's lack of proper ventilation and overcrowding. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 147-152; Doc. 104, ¶¶ 147-152). Regarding the facility's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiffs contend that inadequate quarantine protocols, the unavailability of cleaning supplies and masks, cohort size exceeding CDC recommendations, and deficiencies in social distancing protocols have contributed to the spread of the virus. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 46-64; Doc. 104, ¶¶ 46-64). For relief, Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Doc. 101, at 29; Doc. 104, at 36-37; Doc. 106, at 21-22; Doc. 108, at 21-23).
On July 25, 2022, the undersigned recommended the following: Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction (Doc. 117; Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153) be denied; Defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. 111; Doc. 115; Doc. 118; Doc. 120) be granted, such that all claims against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice and that all remaining claims be dismissed without prejudice; Maldanado's motion for leave to file a supplement complaint (Doc. 190) be denied; Molina's motion to withdraw (Doc. 209) his motion to file a supplement complaint be granted; Defendants' motion to stay discovery (Doc. 196) be denied as moot; and Plaintiffs be granted leave to file a single, all-inclusive fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 202). The Court adopted the undersigned's recommendation on August 30, 2022. (Doc. 213).
Maldanado filed a fourth amended complaint on August 22, 2022. (Doc. 210). Molina filed a fourth amended complaint on August 24, 2022. (Doc. 212). Irizarry filed a motion for extension of time to file a fourth amended complaint on October 5, 2022. (Doc. 217). Defendants filed an answer to Molina's fourth amended complaint on October 17, 2022. (Doc. 218).
II. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen a civil amended complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the amended complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In this case, because Plaintiffs are prisoners suing governmental employees and bringing this suit in forma pauperis, both provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F.Supp.2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' ....” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK MetalsCorp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien &Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
A. Permissive Joinder of Plaintiffs
The undersigned finds that Plaintiffs' allegations prompt against joinder. “In exercising its discretion [whether to permit joinder], the District Court must provide a reasoned analysis that comports with the requirements of the Rule, and that is based on the specific fact pattern presented by the plaintiffs and claims before the court.” Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009). In Hagan, 570 F.3d 146, the Court of Appeals addressed certain considerations applicable to civil cases in which multiple prisoner-plaintiffs seek to join in one action pursuant to Rule 20. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs permissive joinder of parties and provides in part that the Court may allow joinder of plaintiffs if “they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(1).
The requirements prescribed by Rule 20(a) are to be liberally construed in the interest of convenience and judicial economy. SeeSwan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2002). However, the policy of liberal application of Rule 20 is not a license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit. See, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 Fed.Appx. 436 (3d Cir.2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.2007).
Moreover, Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Similarly, a district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to sever a party or claim pursuant to Rule 21. Although Rule 21 is most commonly invoked to sever parties improperly joined under Rule 20, “the Rule may also be invoked to prevent prejudice or promote judicial efficiency.” Lopez v. City of Irvington, No. 05-CV-5323, 2008 WL 565776, *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2008); see also Sporia v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1944) (not limiting Rule 21 severance to cases of misjoinder); Wyndham Assoc. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Rohr v. Metropolitan Ins. & Cas. Co., No. 06-CV-10511, 2007 WL 163037 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2007) (court may also consider whether jury confusion would result from the volume of evidence if the plaintiffs were joined); 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 21.02(1) (3d ed.2007) (courts may issue severance orders under Rule 21, even in the absence of misjoinder and non-joinder of parties, “to construct a case for the efficient administration of justice”).
Specific factors to be considered in determining whether severance is warranted include: “(1) whether the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different from one another, (2) whether the separable issues require the testimony of different witnesses and different documentary proof, (3) whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted, and (4) whether the party requesting severance will be prejudiced if it is not granted.” German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 896 F.Supp. 1385, 1400 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In addition, a district court has the inherent power “ ‘to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.'” United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir.2005) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “A court's inherent power to manage its caseload, control its docket, and regulate the conduct of attorneys before it, provides authority to fashion tools that aid the court in getting on with the business of deciding cases.” Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3d Cir. 1985).
Here, Plaintiffs initially filed one, collective complaint to initiate this action. (Doc. 1). However, it appears that Plaintiffs are now attempting to file individual complaints within the same action. (Doc. 210; Doc. 212; Doc. 217). Moreover, when this action was initiated on January 8, 2021, Plaintiffs were all state inmates incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 1). However, as of the date of this recommendation, none of the Plaintiffs are currently incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon. On March 31, 2022, and June 6, 2022, Maldanado filed notices of change of address, notifying the Court that he has been permanently transferred from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Mahanoy in Frackville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 187; Doc. 194). On July 18, 2022, Molina filed a notice of change of address, notifying the Court that he has been permanently transferred from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 201). On October 5, 2022, in the motion for extension of time to file a fourth amended complaint, Irizarry notified the Court that he has been permanently transferred from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Dallas in Dallas, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 217). Finally, an examination of the Pennsylvania DOC Inmate Locator Service indicates that Bailey is currently incarcerated at SCI-Forest. See PA DOC Inmate Locator, available at http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2022).
While, “[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties,” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (footnote omitted), “[i]n making a joinder decision, the district court is guided by the underlying purpose of joinder, which is to ‘promote trial convenience and expedite the resolution of disputes, thereby eliminating unnecessary lawsuits.'” Swan, 293 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Alexander v. Fulton County, Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir.2000)). “[T]he court has discretion to deny joinder if it determines that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense or delay.” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652 (3d ed.2009) (citations omitted); see also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 632 (7th Cir.2001) (a district court's discretion with respect to joinder “allows a trial court to consider, in addition to the requirements of Rule 20, ‘other relevant factors in a case in order to determine whether the permissive joinder of a party will comport with the principles of fundamental fairness'” (citations omitted)).
In this matter, there is a panoply of various health injuries that allegedly plagued Plaintiffs at SCI-Huntingdon, Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference, and failure-to-protect violations, First Amendment retaliation claims, etc., suggest that a joinder of all these claims would not foster the objectives of the Rule; rather, it is likely to result in undue prejudice, unwarranted expense and/or unnecessary delay. Simply put, the claims vaguely sketched in the complaints do not appear appropriate for joinder. See cf.Pope v. Miller, No. 07-CV-0284, 2007 WL 2427978 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2007) (finding it is not appropriate to join access-to-courts claims and Eighth Amendment medical-care and conditions-of-confinement claims). Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “Exhaustion of administrative remedies by one prisoner does not meet the exhaustion requirement for multiple prisoner plaintiffs seeking to join in one action; joinder may not be appropriate where a separate determination is required as to whether each co-plaintiff has complied with the exhaustion requirement.” Jones v. Corzine, No. CIV.09-4406(JLL), 2010 WL 1948352, at *11 (D.N.J. May 14, 2010) (citing Lilly v. Ozmint, No. 07-CV-1932, 2007 WL 2022190, *2 (D.S.C. July 11, 2007)). Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated at the same state correctional institution suggests that the judicial economy will benefit from each Plaintiff proceeding in individual actions. “[P]roceeding with multiple, separate litigation for each Plaintiff under the same cause number would be distracting at best-and costly, confusing, and grossly inefficient at worst.” Jones, 2010 WL 1948352, at *11 (citing Johnson-Bey v. Indiana Department of Corrections, Civil No. 09-0249, 2009 WL 1691150 (N.D. Ind. June 16, 2009), and Stewardv. Mississippi, Civil No. 07-0184, 2007 WL 4375210 (S.D.Miss. Dec.12, 2007)).
Thus, even if the Court construes the individual amended complaints and motion for extension of time to file an amended complaint as an implied application for joinder of Plaintiffs, such application must be denied. (Doc. 210; Doc. 212; Doc. 217). In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court reserve the instant matter for Plaintiff Molina and direct the Clerk of Court to open a new and separate individual matter for each of the remaining three Plaintiffs. It is further recommended that the Court allow Molina and each remaining Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an individual fourth amended complaint. Because the Court granted each Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiffs should continue to proceed in forma pauperis in the newly-opened cases. (Doc. 39).
Each fourth amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the [pleadings] already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Therefore, each individual Plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), set forth in averments that are “concise, and direct,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1), and stated in separately numbered paragraphs describing the date and time of the events alleged, and identifying wherever possible the participants in the acts about which the Plaintiff complains. Each complaint must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to any other pleading already filed. Young, 809 F.Supp. at 1198. The complaint should set forth plaintiff's claims in short, concise and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs. It should name proper defendants, specify the offending actions taken by a particular defendant, be signed, and indicate the nature of the relief sought. Further, the claims set forth in the complaint should arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and they should contain a question of law or fact common to all defendants. Each Plaintiff is placed on notice that failure to comply with these directions may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
To the extent that Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief based upon violations they experienced at Sci-Huntingdon, it is recommended that these claims be dismissed as moot because Plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated at Sci-Huntingdon. courts have held that a prisoner lacks standing to seek injunctive relief if he is no longer subject to the alleged conditions he attempts to challenge. See Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d cir. 1981). in addition, a prisoner's release or transfer from the prison that was the location of the alleged violations moots any claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003); see Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir.1993) (“[T]he district court could not provide [the plaintiff] with meaningful relief by entering an injunctive order respecting the [maximum security unit] in which [the plaintiff] was no longer incarcerated.”). Since the initiation of the present action, Plaintiffs have been transferred from Sci-Huntingdon to different state correctional institutions in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1; Doc. 187; Doc. 194; Doc. 201); see PA DOC Inmate Locator, available at http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2022). Accordingly, because Plaintiffs cannot cure this defect, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with prejudice. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Irizarry's motion for extension of time to file a fourth amended complaint (Doc. 217) be DENIED;
2. Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief be DISMISSED with prejudice as MooT; and
3. The instance matter, Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-00038, be reserved for Plaintiff Molina, and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to open new and separate individual matters for each of the three remaining Plaintiffs: Maldanado, Bailey, and Irizarry. Each Plaintiff should be granted thirty (30) days to file a fourth amended complaint stating that Plaintiff's individual claims and detailing the underlying facts.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated November 2, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.