Opinion
1-21-0328
09-30-2021
ABDUL MOHAMMED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARHEEN FATHIMA, Defendant-Appellee.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 20 CH 6926 Honorable Pamela M. Meyerson, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOWSE JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff s petition with prejudice is affirmed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure because plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that would entitle him to relief.
¶ 2 Plaintiff Abdul Mohammed appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County, which dismissed his chancery action with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs request to substitute a judge in DuPage County for cause in connection with the parties' marital dissolution action, and to transfer the matter to Cook County.
¶ 3 For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In May 2019, Judge McJoynt entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage between the parties under case number 2016 D 1115 in the circuit court of DuPage County. Plaintiff filed three separate appeals, which the Second District consolidated under case number 2-19-0397 and dismissed in June 2020. The Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiff leave to appeal on November 18, 2020.
¶ 6 Meanwhile, plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to disqualify Judge Joynt from the post-decree proceedings, and on March 4, 2020, the Second District dismissed plaintiff's appeal from the orders denying the motion. In July 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiff leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or a supervisory order disqualifying Judge McJoynt from case number 2016 D 1115 and transferring the case to Cook County.
¶ 7 In November 2020, plaintiff filed the underlying chancery action against defendant in the circuit court of Cook County under case number 20 CH 6926. In his verified petition, plaintiff asked the court to "substitute Judge McJoynt for a cause from case # 16-D-1115 pending in the circuit court of DuPage County or, in the alternative, for declaratory judgment or injunction prohibiting Judge McJoynt from hearing any case involving [plaintiff] and transferring case # 16-D-1115 from DuPage County Circuit Court to Cook County." In his affidavit, he cited subsection (b) of the statute governing a substitution of judge, which states, "An application for substitution of judge may be made to the court in which the case is pending, reasonable notice of the application having been given to the adverse party or his or her attorney." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(b) (West 2018). According to plaintiff, this provision does not require him to file the petition for substitution of Judge McJoynt in DuPage County. However, he previously filed such a petition in DuPage County, but Judge McJoynt assigned the petition to another judge for a hearing instead of transferring it to the chief judge for assignment. Plaintiff stated Judge McJoynt had no authority to assign his petition to Judge Douglas and thus Judge Douglas's order denying his petition for substitution of judge is void ab initio. Then, plaintiff listed 34 "causes" for substitution of Judge McJoynt including that "J. McJoynt has prejudice against Muslim men *** which is evidenced with the fact that only Muslim men are filing Petitions to Substitute him for a cause."
¶ 8 Defense counsel filed an appearance in this case and the circuit court granted defendant leave to file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's verified petition under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). In the motion to dismiss, defendant argued: plaintiff's petition in Cook County failed to state a cause of action for injunctive relief; Cook County did not have jurisdiction to review orders entered in DuPage County; and plaintiff's attempts to disqualify Judge McJoynt were already rejected by DuPage County.
¶ 9 Meanwhile on February 11, 2021 in DuPage County, defendant filed a petition for adjudication of direct civil contempt and for injunctive relief against plaintiff. In the petition, defendant noted that since the entry of the parties' judgment for dissolution of marriage in May 2019, plaintiff filed unsuccessful motions to reconsider, to stay enforcement, and to declare the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act unconstitutional. Defendant noted in September 2019, plaintiff filed a "motion to disqualify" Judge McJoynt for a cause, a "petition to disqualify" Judge McJoynt for a cause, and a petition for change of venue. She noted in November 2020, plaintiff filed a similar petition in Cook County requesting the substitution of Judge McJoynt for cause and transfer of the case to Cook County. Defendant asked the circuit court of DuPage County to order plaintiff to refrain from filing any related lawsuit or motion in another county requesting relief in this matter.
¶ 10 On March 19, 2021, defendant filed an emergency motion in DuPage County requesting a hearing on her petition for adjudication of direct civil contempt and for injunctive relief against plaintiff before the hearing in Cook County on plaintiff's petition. The motion was granted, and the DuPage court entered a temporary restraining order on March 22, 2021 ordering plaintiff not to pursue litigation in Cook County pertaining to the case.
¶ 11 The next day, the circuit court of Cook County entered an order dismissing plaintiff's petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The order stated it was "a final and appealable order disposing of all matters."
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). This allows the defendant to combine a section 2-615 motion to dismiss with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Id.
¶ 14 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on defects apparent on its face. De Jesus v. Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 190486, ¶ 15. The motion does not raise affirmative defenses (Goldwater v. Greenberg, 2017 IL App (1st) 163003, ¶ 9), and dismissal is proper when "it is clearly apparent from the pleadings that no set of facts can be proven that would entitle the plaintiff to recover" (In re Estate of Powell, 2014 IL 115997, ¶ 12).
¶ 15 By contrast, a section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts certain defects and defenses that defeat the plaintiff's claims. De Jesus, 2019 IL App (1st) 190486, ¶ 15. If those grounds do not appear on the face of the complaint, the motion must be supported by affidavit. Goldwater, 2017 IL App (1st) 163003, ¶ 11 (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2016)). The defendant's supporting documents must establish a defect or defense that defeats the plaintiff's claims. De Jesus, 2019 IL App (1st) 190486, ¶ 15.
¶ 16 When reviewing a motion to dismiss under either section, the circuit court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and any reasonable inferences from them. De Jesus, 2019 IL App (1st) 190486, ¶ 16. The circuit court must also view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 213 Ill.2d 19, 23-24 (2004)). Our review is de novo. Goldwater, 2017 IL App (1st) 163003, ¶ 13. Under this standard, we may affirm the circuit court's dismissal on any basis supported by the record, but we begin with the court's sole basis for dismissal-lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Berrios, 2020 IL App (1st) 191133, ¶ 21 (first considering court's dismissal based solely on lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
¶ 17 Plaintiff contends the circuit court of Cook County erroneously dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. Citing People v. Velazquez, 2020 IL App (1st) 181958, plaintiff argues the circuit court should have transferred the matter to the chief judge for reassignment to the domestic relations division of the circuit court of Cook County rather than dismissing it.
¶ 18 Defendant maintains the circuit court of Cook County properly dismissed plaintiff's petition because it had no jurisdiction over Judge McJoynt's handling of the parties' post-decree proceedings in DuPage County. Lack of jurisdiction is an affirmative matter properly raised in a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Oliver v. Kuriakos-Ciesil, 2020 IL App (4th) 190250, ¶ 15. We agree plaintiff could not get relief from the circuit court of Cook County. However, this case does not present an issue of jurisdiction. See id. ("Although we agree that a circuit court judge may not properly review or direct the actions of another circuit court judge, we disagree that such circumstances necessarily present an issue of jurisdiction.").
¶ 19 "Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to hear and decide cases of a general class." Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2015 IL 117443, ¶ 15. Subject matter jurisdiction also includes a court's power to grant the relief requested. In re Marriage of Duff, 223 Ill.App.3d 889, 893 (1992). Except for administrative review actions, a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction of all justiciable matters pursuant to the Illinois Constitution. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd., 2015 IL 117443, ¶ 15. As section 9 of article VI of our constitution states:
"Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9.
¶ 20 Although there are various divisions in the circuit court, those divisions are not jurisdictional. In re Marriage of Schweihs, 222 Ill.App.3d 887, 890 (1991). Rather, "each circuit court has equal and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill.App.3d 938, 957 (1992). This equality of power and authority among the divisions and judges, however, does not give one judge a license to ignore orders entered by judges of coordinate authority whether they are in different divisions or counties. Id. In other words," [o]ne circuit judge may not review or disregard the orders of another circuit judge in the judicial system of this State [citation], and such action can only serve to diminish respect for and public confidence in our judiciary [citation]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliver, 2020 IL App (4th) 190250, ¶ 16 (quoting People ex rel. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gitchoff 65 Ill.2d 249, 257 (1976); citing People ex rel. East Side Levee & Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee & Sanitary District, 54 Ill.2d 442, 445 (1973)).
¶ 21 Notwithstanding each circuit court's equal and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction, one circuit court "should not compete with another over the same or substantially overlapping causes of action or in the administration of the same res" as that frustrates the goals of judicial economy and the orderly administration of justice. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 262 Ill.App.3d at 958. "The court which first acquires jurisdiction may protect it by enjoining pursuit of related litigation in other courts of coordinate jurisdiction." Schweihs, 222 Ill.App.3d at 892 (citing In re Marriage of Baltzer, 150 Ill.App.3d 890 (1986)). Although the issue presented is not want of jurisdiction, the circuit court of DuPage County, under Illinois law, could clearly enjoin plaintiff from pursing this related litigation in Cook County.
¶ 22 Here, the circuit court of DuPage County first acquired jurisdiction over the parties' marital dissolution action when they filed their respective petitions for dissolution of marriage in DuPage County. See Schweihs, 222 Ill.App.3d at 890 (the domestic relations division of the circuit court of Cook County had jurisdiction over the parties and their marital property because of their pending dissolution action). On March 19, 2021, defendant filed an emergency motion in DuPage County requesting a hearing on her petition for adjudication of direct civil contempt and for injunctive relief against plaintiff before the hearing in Cook County on plaintiff's petition. Then, according to the circuit court clerk of DuPage County's online docket for this matter, a temporary restraining order was entered on March 22, 2021. See 5510 Sheridan Road Condominium Ass'n v. U.S. Bank, 2017 IL App (1st) 160279, ¶ 15 (taking judicial notice of the clerk of the circuit court's online docket). Enabling the circuit court of DuPage County to handle all related disputes comprehensively is particularly important in dissolution proceedings, which often involve interrelated issues. In re Marriage of Gary, 384 Ill.App.3d 979, 986 (2008). Thus, under Illinois law, the circuit court of DuPage County was empowered to enjoin plaintiff from pursuing related litigation in Cook County. In re Marriage of Elliott, 265 Ill.App.3d 912, 914 (1994). Considering the pleadings in plaintiff's petition in the light most favorable to defendant as the nonmoving party, plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that would entitle him to relief.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's petition with prejudice under section 2-615.
¶ 25 Affirmed.