Opinion
Argued February 8th, 1938.
Decided May 11th, 1938.
1. Appellant was expelled from membership in the respondent guild by its executive committee under a section of the guild constitution providing that no member whose interests were deemed by the executive committee to lie with the employer should be allowed to remain a member, "but in any case the applicant or member concerned may appeal the decision of the * * * executive committee of the Guild to the Guild in general meeting." Held, appellant is not at liberty to invoke the jurisdiction of equity to enjoin the respondent from putting his expulsion from membership into effect, until he has exhausted the appellate remedies bestowed by the constitution and laws of the respondent and of the parent society.
2. There is no basis in the proofs for appellant's claim that the pursuit of the internal remedy provided under the constitutions of both the parent body and the respondent of appealing the decision of expulsion to the general meeting of the guild, would be futile, illusory or vain.
3. There is no property right which is in immediate jeopardy; appellant has not, by reason of the expulsion complained of, lost his employment, nor is such a loss threatened. Even where property rights are involved, there will be no judicial interposition until the remedy within the body has been exhausted, if it is adequate and the members have so stipulated.
On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Bigelow, whose opinion is reported in 122 N.J. Eq. 316.
Mr. Edward R. McGlynn, for the appellant.
Mr. Abraham J. Isserman, for the respondent.
We are of opinion that, in the circumstances here presented, appellant is not at liberty to invoke the jurisdiction of equity until he has exhausted the appellate remedies bestowed by the constitution and laws of the respondent Guild and of the parent society. We find no justification for the flouting of the tribunals set up within the society for the adjudication of a controversy such as this — one that involves a fundamental policy of the subordinate body, i.e., whether the "interests" of the member lay with the employer-publisher as against the Guild and its members, and therefore peculiarly for the cognizance of the organization itself in the first instance.
There is no property right in immediate jeopardy. Appellant has not, by reason of the action complained of, lost his employment; nor is such a loss threatened. Even where property rights are involved, there will be no judicial interposition until the remedy within the body has been exhausted, if it is adequate and the members have so stipulated. Cameron v. International Alliance, c., 118 N.J. Eq. 11; Ocean Castle, c., v. Smith, 58 N.J. Law 545; affirmed, sub nom. Smith v. Ocean Castle, c., 59 N.J. Law 198; Roxbury Lodge, c., v. Hocking, 60 N.J. Law 439.
The constitutions of both the parent and the subordinate bodies impose upon the members the obligation of resort to the society's own tribunals, for the settlement of a controversy, before invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. We find no basis in the proofs for appellant's claim that the pursuit of the internal remedy so provided would be "futile, illusory and vain." The case is within none of the exceptions to the general rule.
We therefore deem it unnecessary to pass upon the questions relating to the validity of the proceedings already had within the union.
The decree dismissing the bill is accordingly affirmed.
For affirmance — PARKER, CASE, BODINE, DONGES, HEHER, PERSKIE, HETFIELD, DEAR, WELLS, WOLFSKEIL, RAFFERTY, WALKER, JJ. 12.
For reversal — None.