Opinion
FILE NO. 1165
The defendant landlord appealed from that part of the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, his evicted tenant, which awarded her counsel fees attendant on her suit for damages under the statute ( 47a-13) which requires landlords to supply essential services to tenants. He claimed that that portion of the challenged fees which related to services performed before commencement of the plaintiffs suit was wrongly awarded and that that portion which related to services performed during the pendency of the suit was excessive. Since both under 47a-13 and under the statute ( 52-251a) which provides for reimbursement of certain expenses to a plaintiff who, as here, prevails in a small claims matter transferred to the regular docket, counsel fees are specifically recoverable, and since this court found no abuse by the trial court of its discretion with respect to the awarding of attorney's fees, held that the trial court did not err in awarding the counsel fees it did award.
Argued November 24, 1981 —
Decided January 8, 1982
Action for damages resulting from malicious eviction and counterclaim for damages and for breach of lease agreement, brought to the Small Claims Court in West Haven and thence to the Superior Court in the eighth geographical area and tried to the court, Ramsey, J.; judgment for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant. No error.
Michael A. Wolak, III, for the appellant (defendant).
Charles C. Goetsch, for the appellee (plaintiff).
On June 1, 1979, the plaintiff, a former tenant of the defendant, filed a small claims action alleging that the defendant, in violation of General Statutes 47a-7 (a) and 47a-13, had maliciously evicted her from premises located at 33B Crouch Road in Branford. The facts found by the trial court are summarized as follows: Pursuant to a lease dated May 30, 1978, the plaintiff rented a summer cottage from the defendant for a one-year term. On February 11, 1979, the plaintiff discovered that because the water pipes in the cottage had frozen, she was without running water. Although she immediately notified the defendant of this condition, he had not yet repaired the pipes when the plaintiff returned to the premises on the following day. On February 13, 1979, the plaintiff paid her monthly rent and gave the defendant her keys so that he would have access to the premises for repair purposes. Upon returning to the premises later that same day, the plaintiff found a note from the defendant in which he held her responsible for the damaged pipes and claimed damages in excess of $1,000.
Four months later, the plaintiff brought this action in Small Claims Court seeking damages of $729.66. Because the amount of damages sought by the defendant in his counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Court, the case was transferred to the regular docket. The trial court subsequently found for the plaintiff on both the complaint and the counterclaim, awarding her $1,528.66. Portions of this award represented $586.91 in damages, $191.75 in counsel fees incurred prior to suit and $750 in attorney's fees for legal services provided throughout the action. The defendant has appealed from this judgment, contending that the trial court wrongfully awarded counsel fees for services incurred prior to suit and abused its discretion by awarding unreasonable and excessive attorney's fees for services rendered throughout the suit.
Absent contractual or statutory authorization, a party may recover from his opponent neither the expenses of litigation nor the expenditures for counsel fees. Bross Line Construction Corporation v. Ryan Crane Service Corporation, 32 Conn. Sup. 181, 182, 345 A.2d 594 (1975). General Statutes 52-251a authorizes the court to award to the prevailing plaintiff "in a small claims matter which was transferred to the regular docket . . . his costs, together with reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed by the court." Accordingly, it is unquestioned that the trial court was entitled to award to the plaintiff, as the prevailing party, both costs and reasonable counsel fees for services performed during the pendency of the suit.
The defendant, nevertheless, claims that the trial court erred by awarding counsel fees for services performed prior to the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff, however, brought her original action under General Statutes 47a-13; subsection (a) of this statute affords relief to tenants of those landlords who have failed to supply essential services, such as running water. Subsection (b) of 47a-13 provides that "[i]n any cause of action . . . arising under subsection (a) of this section, the tenant may recover reasonable attorney's fees." We see no reason why the plaintiff should not recover those counsel fees expended in pursuing her small claims action under 47a-13 as part of her recovery in addition to the counsel fees allowed her as prevailing plaintiff under 52-251a after transfer by the defendant to the court's regular docket.
Finally, the defendant contends that the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the court was unreasonably excessive. A court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees. The issue grows even more delicate on appeal; we may not alter an award of attorney's fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case. Hoenig v. Lubetkin, 137 Conn. 516, 525, 79 A.2d 278 (1951); C S Research v. Holton, 36 Conn. Sup. 619, 623, 422 A.2d 331 (1980); Bridgeport Singer Employees Federal Credit Union v. Piczko, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 621, 622, 222 A.2d 749 (1966). Absent a conviction that the action of the trial court constituted a clear abuse of discretion, we may not substitute our opinion concerning counsel fees for that of the trial court. Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 349, 374 A.2d 1040 (1977). We deem it ample to say that our careful consideration reveals no abuse of discretion by the court in awarding attorney's fees incurred as part of the original claim or later.