Opinion
No. HHB CV06 5001586S
January 25, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE (#103)
This matter concerning the sale of a mobile home appeared before the court on the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's second prayer for relief. The court heard argument at short calendar on December 18, 2006. After considering the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I BACKGROUND
In its complaint, the plaintiff, Mobile Homes By Delafield, alleges that, in August 2005, it entered into an agreement with the defendant, Diane Doner, whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant a new 14-foot by 66-foot Titan Brentwood model mobile manufactured home (the mobile home), including delivery, set up, and connection of utilities, for which the defendant agreed to pay the sum of $54,285.00. The plaintiff alleges also that, on or about October 20, 2005, it delivered and set up the mobile home at the defendant's property, located in Plainville, Connecticut. See complaint, ¶ 2. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that, although the defendant moved into the mobile home and occupies it, she has not paid the balance due of $9,285.00.
In its first prayer for relief, the plaintiff claims money damages. In the second prayer for relief, the plaintiff claims "[r]eturn of its property in Defendant's possession."
In her motion to strike, the defendant contends that the plaintiff's second prayer for relief is inappropriate as a matter of law and should be stricken because, pursuant to General Statutes § 42a-2-401, which is part of the Uniform Commercial Code, General Statutes §§ 42a-1-101 et seq., title to the mobile home already has passed to the defendant. In response, the plaintiff argues that the conveyance of title of a mobile home is not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
II DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides, in pertinent part, "[w]henever any party wishes to contest . . . (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any . . . complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Section "10-39 . . . allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." (Footnote omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
The standard of review on a motion to strike is well established. "We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317-18, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).
"In deciding upon a motion to strike or a demurrer, a trial court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and cannot be aided by the assumption of any facts not therein alleged . . . Where the legal grounds for such a motion are dependent upon underlying facts not alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant must await the evidence which may be adduced at trial, and the motion should be denied . . . Nothing in our cases suggests, however, that every argument in a motion to strike is rendered defective by the moving party's allegation of some fact not contained in the pleadings, regardless of whether that fact is relevant for each argument in the motion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, 215 Conn. 345, 348-49, 576 A.2d 149 (1990).
The definition provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, General Statutes § 42a-2-105(1), states that " `Goods' means all things, including specially manufactured goods, which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities covered by article 8 and things in action. `Goods' also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in section 42a-2-107."
Section 42a-2-107 provides, "(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like, including oil and gas, or a structure omits materials to be removed from realty is a contract for the sale of goods within this article if they are to be severed by the seller but until severance a purported present sale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell.
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops or other things attached to realty and capable of severance without material harm thereto but not described in subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of goods within this article whether the subject matter is to be severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third party rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract for sale."
Concerning sales of goods, General Statutes § Sec. 42a-2-401(2) provides, "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of lading (a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment; but (b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there." Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that the parties explicitly agreed as to when title would pass.
The defendant argues that, since the plaintiff alleges in its complaint that delivery of the mobile home occurred in October 2005, title to the mobile home passed to her at that time. "The code provides, in effect, that one who delivers goods cannot retain title. At most, he may retain a security interest or obtain a lien. General Statutes 42a-2-401." Providence Electric Co. v. Sutton Place, Inc., 161 Conn. 242, 247, 287 A.2d 379 (1971).
Connecticut courts have stated that transactions concerning mobile homes come within the Uniform Commercial Code's purview. In Tolland Bank v. Gastringer, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 96804 (August 31, 1990, Kulawiz, J.) [ 2 Conn. L. Rptr. 352], the court found that the plaintiff bank could not use General Statutes § 42-98 to foreclose its security interest in a mobile home. "The complaint in this case alleges a personal loan secured by an interest in a mobile home. It would appear to fall outside the scope of Sections 42-83—42-100a [which then concerned retail installment sales financing]. Proceedings should take place under the Uniform Commercial Code." Id.
Similarly, in Black v. Schenectady Discount Corp., 31 Conn.Sup. 521, 324 A.2d 921 (App.Div.Ct. Of Common Pleas 1974), the court construed provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code where a finance company held a security interest in the inventory of a mobile home dealer and sought to repossess a mobile home sold to a buyer in the ordinary course. "The definition of buyer in the ordinary course of business in § 42a-1-201(9) restricts the application of § 42a-9-307(1) [now § 42a-9-320(a)] to buyers `from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind.' Thus, the subsection applies primarily to buyers from inventory, as, for example, buyers of [mobile home seller's] mobile homes . . ." Id., 524-25.
Section 42a-1-201(9) provides, in pertinent part, " `Buyer in ordinary course of business' means a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices . . . A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale. Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. `Buyer in ordinary course of business' does not include a person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt."
Connecticut courts may look to decisional law from other states on Uniform Commercial Code provisions in construing Connecticut's Uniform Commercial Code. See Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 233 Conn. 304, 326, 659 A.2d 1166 (1995) (court may look to interpretations of other states regarding analogous provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code).
The view that mobile homes are treated as goods under the Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in other states. "A mobile home falls clearly within the definition of `goods' found in § 2-105." Osburn v. Bendix Homes Systems, Inc., 1980 OK 86, 613 P.2d 445, 448 (Okla. 1980) (citing Uniform Commercial Code, 12A. O.S. 1971 § 2-101 et seq.). "Arkansas cases have recognized that a mobile home is goods and therefore covered by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code." Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 5 Ark.App. 67, 69, 632 S.W.2d 247 (1982).
The court is unpersuaded by the plaintiff's contention that ownership and title of a mobile manufactured home are governed by General Statutes § 21-67a, specifically §§ 21-67a(b) and 21-67a(d). These cited portions of § 21-67a concern the filing and recording of papers relating to evidence of ownership of a mobile manufactured home, not to when title thereto is deemed, by law, to have passed.
Section 21-67a(b) states, in part, "Any person owning a mobile manufactured home on or after October 1, 1986, shall file with the town clerk of the municipality in which the mobile manufactured home is located a certificate of title, bill of sale or other document evidencing the person's ownership of the mobile manufactured home."
Section 21-67a(d) states, "Any document transferring title to a mobile manufactured home located in a mobile manufactured home park or on a single-family lot, when duly executed and recorded in accordance with subsection (c) of this section, shall have the force and effect of the equivalent statutory form deed as provided for in section 47-36c."
In its memorandum of law, page 2, the plaintiff argues that "[s]ince a conveyance of title to a mobile manufactured home has not been properly executed and delivered to the Defendant, title to the subject mobile manufactured home has not passed to the Defendant." This allegation is not pleaded in the complaint. As discussed above, on a motion to strike, the court cannot consider facts which are not alleged in the operative complaint. See Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, supra, 215 Conn. 348. Likewise, for the same reason, since no facts are alleged in the complaint as to the mobility of the mobile home after delivery and set up, the court disregards the parties' arguments, which were presented orally at short calendar, concerning whether the mobile home could be moved after delivery.
As noted above, the plaintiff alleges in the complaint that it delivered the mobile home to the defendant's property in Plainville, Connecticut. "Clearly, the item was moved and was, therefore, movable at the time of the identification to the contract." Duffee v. Judson, 251 Pa.Super. 406, 412, 380 A.2d 843 (1977) (mobile home transaction was governed by Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code). See General Statutes § 42a-2-105(1).
The court concludes, in accordance with the decisional law cited above, and pursuant to Connecticut's Uniform Commercial Code, also cited above, that the alleged transaction at issue is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions concerning the sale of goods. See General Statutes § Sec. 42a-2-401. Since, according the allegations in the complaint, delivery occurred, title to the mobile home passed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the plaintiff's second prayer for relief, in which it seeks the return of "its property," is legally insufficient. Such relief could not be legally awarded. See Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 325.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's second prayer for relief is granted.
It is so ordered.