Opinion
No. 3D19-695
06-17-2020
Vincent MITCHELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, MILLER and GORDO, JJ.
GORDO, J.
Vincent Mitchell appeals his conviction and sentence for burglary of a structure, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present collateral crimes evidence. Specifically, Mitchell claims that the trial court erred in admitting Williams rule evidence that he committed a similar burglary at the same exact location two years prior to the incident at issue in the underlying case. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the collateral crimes evidence and affirm.
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2018, Mitchell was arrested for and charged with burglary of an unoccupied structure, GLE Scrap Metal, because he was seen throwing scrap metal over the fence of GLE's scrapyard in order to steal it. Specifically, Lay Rivacoba, the general manager of GLE, observed Mitchell in the northeast corner of GLE's scrapyard placing pieces of scrap metal into buckets and then throwing them over the fence for later retrieval.
Prior to trial, the State timely filed its notice of intent to rely on evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The State sought to introduce evidence that in 2016 Mitchell had committed a similar burglary of GLE. In that prior incident, Rivacoba saw Mitchell removing scrap metal in the same manner from the same exact location of GLE's scrapyard. In 2016, Mitchell was in the northeast corner of GLE's scrapyard, placing scrap metal in buckets and throwing the pieces over the yard's fence for later retrieval. The State alleged that it would use the prior incident to identify Mitchell, as he "utilized the exact same modus operandi in committing both burglaries."
Before the commencement of trial, the court considered the admissibility of Williams rule evidence. Mitchell argued that the 2016 incident was not "strikingly similar" and was not unique enough to be admitted at the underlying trial. The trial court disagreed, stating "[s]o what would be more similar than the exact same crime in the exact same place?" The court denied the defendant's motion in limine and permitted the State to introduce the Williams evidence, finding that it was sufficiently similar to the crime charged in the underlying case.
The State argues that Mitchell failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. Mitchell presented his objection and argument against the admission of the Williams evidence prior to trial. Because the trial court issued a definitive ruling on the record admitting the Williams evidence prior to trial, Mitchell was not required to lodge a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve the issue for this Court's review. See § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2020) ("If the court has made a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal."); see also Lubin v. State, 286 So. 3d 811, 812–13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) ).
--------
At trial, Mitchell argued that he was not the person who committed the 2018 burglary of GLE. The State introduced the collateral crimes evidence through Rivacoba's testimony. The witness testified that he recognized Mitchell because he had a similar incident with Mitchell in 2016 and then proceeded to describe the prior incident. At the conclusion of trial, the jury was instructed that it could only use the collateral crimes evidence "as that evidence relates to proof of opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, and the absence of mistake or accident."
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Relevant evidence is generally admissible, except where otherwise prohibited by law. § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2020). Trial courts have "broad discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence." Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 291 (Fla. 2009). Collateral crimes evidence "is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue" other than bad character or propensity. Id. at 291–92. The admissibility of collateral crimes evidence "is within the discretion of the trial court and its determination shall not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 2001) (citing Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1997) ).
The Williams court held that "evidence revealing other crimes is admissible if it casts light upon the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality." 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1959). This rule has been codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which states that "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." See Cozzle v. State, 225 So. 3d 717, 731 n.10 (Fla. 2017). "[I]n cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, [the Florida Supreme Court has] required ‘identifiable points of similarity’ between the collateral act and charged crime that ‘have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant.’ " McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1255 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981) ("The mode of operating theory of proving identity is based on both the similarity of and the unusual nature of the factual situations being compared.")).
Mitchell's theory of defense at trial was that he was not the individual who committed the 2018 burglary at GLE. As such, the identity of the perpetrator was a material issue in dispute. The collateral crimes evidence here was admissible for a purpose other than to demonstrate that Mitchell had bad character or a propensity to commit burglaries; it was relevant evidence that addressed the material, disputed issue of identity.
Given that in both instances Mitchell was in the northeast corner of GLE's scrapyard, utilizing buckets and throwing pieces of scrap metal over GLE's fence for later retrieval, the evidence of the 2016 collateral crime was strikingly similar to the charged 2018 burglary for which Mitchell was on trial. The trial court permitted the admission of the collateral crimes evidence for the purpose of identifying Mitchell, given the similar modus operandi in both burglaries. The State introduced the collateral crimes evidence at trial for the permissible purpose of establishing Mitchell's identity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020). The State did not utilize the collateral crimes evidence for any improper purpose. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Williams rule evidence.
Affirmed.