Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-178-C
October 23, 2002
ORDER
Plaintiff Tony Mitchell, acting pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 9, 2002, and was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff alleges that employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID") French Robertson Unit enacted a policy requiring religious services to be conducted in each building of the unit rather than allowing all inmates of the Muslim faith in the Robertson Unit to worship together as required by their religion and permitted in other TDCJ-ID units. Plaintiff argues that this restriction unconstitutionally restricts his right to practice his religion in violation of the First Amendment. He requests that this Court appoint counsel to represent him, grant injunctive relief, grant a jury trial, award costs, and award both punitive and compensatory damages. The Defendants have not been served.
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court shall evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) (proving that a court shall review an in forma pauperis complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (stating that when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or one of its employees, the court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if the court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief); and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, "such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). A claim has no arguable basis in fact if "after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless" Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
District courts must construe in forma pauperis complaints liberally, particularly in the context of dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), but are given broad discretion in determining when such complaints are frivolous. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint may not be dismissed under § 1915(d)(2)(B) "simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely." Jolly v. Klein, 923 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (SD. Tex. 1996). A civil rights plaintiff must support his claim(s) with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiffs complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff `might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d at 97.
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that
convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison. Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. [L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives — including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The standard for evaluating an inmate's claim that a prison regulation improperly restricts his free-exercise rights requires a court to determine whether the regulation "is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id at 349. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the following factors are relevant to determining the "reasonableness" of a regulation:
(1) Is there a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward by prison officials to justify the regulation?
(2) Are there alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, that is, are inmates allowed other means to express their religious beliefs on a general level?
(3) What impact will accommodation of the asserted constitutional right have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally?
(4) Are alternatives to the prison regulation available that would accommodate the inmates' rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests?Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 489-90 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts need not consider each factor, however, and do not have to weigh the factors evenly. Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been informed that the policy was enacted at the French Robertson Unit to "reduce the potential of escape and other such security risks." Indeed, he even concedes that there was a recent escape at the unit. Furthermore, although Plaintiff complains that on a few occasions Muslim services were not held, his primary complaint is that all Muslims in the Robertson Unit are not allowed to worship together but must worship in services conducted in each individual building.
Plaintiff's complaint is clearly controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, supra. In that case, inmates complained that they were not allowed to attend the weekly Muslim congregational service held on Friday evenings because of their assignments to work details outside the main prison grounds. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 345-46. The Supreme Court considered the arguments put forth by prison officials regarding security needs, rehabilitative needs, the impact of alternative accommodations, and the rights actually retained by the inmates to practice their religion. Noting that the record clearly showed that the inmates were not deprived of all forms of religious exercise, the Supreme Court held that the "ability on the part of [the inmates] to participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the conclusion that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable." Id. at 352 Because Plaintiff cannot show that he has been deprived of all means of expression and he has failed to refute the prison officials statement that the policy was enacted for security reasons, he has failed to demonstrate that his First Amendment free-exercise right has been violated. See Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d at 491 (finding that prison regulation denying inmates the right to grow beards did not deprive Muslim inmates of all means of expression but merely removed one avenue of expression); Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that prison regulation prohibiting Muslim inmates from attending Friday services was not unconstitutionally restrictive because it satisfied all four "reasonableness" considerations). See also Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1995) (denying inmate's complaint that prison grooming regulations interfered with the free exercise of his religion where inmate conceded that his religious practices conflicted with the prison's penological interests in security and rejecting his argument that the prison's security interests were nonexistent because of his placement in administrative segregation).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintitrs complaint that all Muslims incarcerated in the French Robertson Unit are not allowed to worship together is frivolous. Although the restriction may infringe on Plaintiff's absolute right to practice his religion, "the loss of [his] absolute freedom of religious expression is but one sacrifice required by [his] incarceration . . . ." Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F.2d at 82. See Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions upon communal religious gatherings do not necessitate the identification of a compelling state interest.").
To the extent that Plaintiff's complaint may be liberally construed raise an equal protection complaint, the Court finds that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To state an equal protection claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that "the governmental action in question classif[ies] or distinguish[es] between two or more relevant persons or groups[,] . . . or . . . impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right." Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The plaintiff must specifically demonstrate that the prison officials acted with a discriminatory purpose. Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995). "Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group." Id.; Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d at 780.
Although inmates practicing the Muslim faith maybe an identifiable group within the prison, Plaintiff has failed to show that the policy was enacted with any discriminatory purpose. In fact, in response to one of Plaintiff's grievances, prison authorities responded that
Brown v. Beta states . . . Defendants shall treat adherents to the Religion of Islam equally and on the same basis as, and permit Islamic religious practices under substantially the same conditions as, are afforded to and enjoyed by adherents to Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faiths incarcerated within the Texas Department of Corrections. . . . You are being afforded the same opportunity to gather and have services as the offenders of other faiths are being allowed.See Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no constitutional violation where plaintiffs were "given the same reasonable opportunity to practice their faith as that provided other religious groups"). Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a violation of his individual constitutional rights or a violation of the rights of all inmates housed in the Robertson Unit, his claim that Muslim inmates in other TDCJ-ID) units may be allowed to worship as one group has no merit. See id (holding that inmate's complaint that prisoners in other units could possess tape recorders did not state a claim for violation of equal protection rights where he did not show violation of individual constitutional rights or rights of all inmates on his unit).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs complaint and all claims alleged therein should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
All pending motions are hereby denied.
This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
The dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint does not release Plaintiff or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation to pay any filing fee previously imposed.
Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this Order, he shall be required to pay the appeal fee of $105.00 pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and he must submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a certified copy of his 6-month Certificate of Inmate Trust Account along with his notice of appeal.