Opinion
No. DBD CV07-5003558 S
January 25, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On November 15, 2007, the plaintiff, Theresa Mitchell-McKenna, commenced this action by service of process. The plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in which she alleges common-law negligence against the co-defendant, Jed Tick, and lessor liability against the co-defendant, Hertz Vehicles, LLC (Hertz), under General Statutes § 14-154a. On December 21, 2007, Hertz filed a motion to strike on the grounds that General Statutes § 14-154a is preempted under federal law by the Federal Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30106.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).
The plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2005, while she was driving southbound on Danbury Road, Route 7, a public highway in Ridgefield, Connecticut, her car was struck by a 2005 Nissan operated by Tick, who had rented said vehicle from Hertz, its owner. The plaintiff does not allege any negligence on the part of Hertz.
In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike, Hertz argues that federal law preempts the plaintiff's claims. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) preempts all state laws that impose liability on motor vehicle lessors for accidents caused by the lessor's customers. General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." General Statutes § CT Page 1326 14-154a(a).
Federal law preempts § 14-154a(a). The Graves Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases that vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of rental of lease, if — (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)." (Emphasis added.) 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)-(2). The plaintiff does not allege any negligence on the part of Hertz.
While neither our Supreme or Appellate Courts have dealt with a case in which 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) applied, both have acknowledged that this federal statute presumably preempts 14-154a. Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9, 923 A.2d 673 (2007) ("The amicus also notes, however, that this reasoning is effectively defeated by 49 U.S.C. § 30106, which became effective on actions commencing after the date of its enactment on August 10, 2005 (and therefore does not apply to the present case), and presumptively eliminated the vicarious liability imposed by § 14-154a."); Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668, 911 A.2d 315 (2006) ("We note that as of August 10, 2005, federal law preempts the state law and abolishes claims of vicarious liability against lease companies. 49 U.S.C. § 30106"). All the Connecticut Superior Court cases which have dealt with 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) have held that this federal law preempts vicarious liability claims based solely on lessor liability under § 14-154a.
Ruegg v. Allis, Superior Court, district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 06 5001822 (November 28, 2007, Pittman, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 551]; Chen v. Gutierrez, Superior Court, district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5009030 (November 9, 2007, Tanzer, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 511]; Escaleria v. Powell, Superior Court, district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 5004566 (November 6, 2007, Matasavage, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 468]; Ross v. Richardson, Superior Court, district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5006711 (October 19, 2007, Miller, J.); Bivens v. Johnie, Superior Court, district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5000511 (September 19, 2007, Agati, J.); Poirier v. Papadopoulos, Superior Court, district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 06 5001333 (July 19, 2007, Aurigemma, J.); Gaines v. Safeco Ins. Co., Superior Court, district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5005684 (July 16, 2007, Rittenband, J.); Walker v. Lubwama, Superior Court, district of New Haven, CV 06 5006567 (May 29, 2007, Holden, J.); Iljazi v. Dugre, Superior Court, district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5002684 (April 13, 2007, Gilligan, J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 249, 250); Dorsey v. Beverly, Superior Court, district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5004081 (March 7, 2007, Jones, J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 51, 53-54); Echols v. Elrac, Inc., Superior Court, district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 06 5001408 (February 8, 2007, Taylor, J.); Davis v. Ilama, Superior Court, district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 05 4007074 (March 14, 2006, Brunetti, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 178, 181).
"Under the forgoing federal statute, the owner of a vehicle is not liable under state law for personal or property damage arising from the operation of its vehicle if 1) the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, 2) there is no negligence by the owner, and 3) there is no criminal wrongdoing by the owner." Poirier v. Papadopoulos, Superior Court, district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 06 5001333 (July 19, 2007, Aurigemma, J.).
In this case, there is no dispute that the owner is engaged in the trade of renting or leasing motor vehicles, there is no allegation by the plaintiff that Hertz itself was negligent, and there is no allegation of any criminal conduct by the owner. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.