Opinion
June 22, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (9) (b) authorizes the modification of the terms of a separation agreement which has been incorporated into a judgment of divorce upon a showing of extreme hardship (see, Sheridan v. Sheridan, 225 A.D.2d 604, 605). The court must conduct a hearing to determine whether modification is warranted only where the allegations of the party seeking modification present genuine issues of fact (see, Young v. Young, 223 A.D.2d 358; Soba v. Soba, 213 A.D.2d 472). Absent a prima facie case establishing entitlement to a downward modification, the applicant has no right to a hearing (see, Lloyd v. Lloyd, 226 A.D.2d 816; Matter of Zinkiewicz v. Zinkiewicz, 222 A.D.2d 684, 685).
Here, the husband's claims of extreme hardship are based on nothing more than self-serving, conclusory allegations and credit card statements revealing that he has incurred significant debt by drawing cash advances against those accounts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly rejected his application without a hearing.
Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.