Opinion
2 CA-CV 2022-0030
12-27-2022
Adrian Miranda, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. City of Casa Grande, a municipality; Richard Rush, in his individual capacity as an Officer of the Casa Grande Police Department, Defendants/Appellees.
Robbins & Curtin PLLC, Phoenix By Joel B. Robbins and Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C., Phoenix By David L. Abney Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Titus Brueckner & Levine PLC, Scottsdale By Larry J. Crown and Elan S. Mizrahi Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CV201801191 The Honorable Jason R. Holmberg, Judge
Robbins & Curtin PLLC, Phoenix By Joel B. Robbins and Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C., Phoenix By David L. Abney Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Titus Brueckner & Levine PLC, Scottsdale By Larry J. Crown and Elan S. Mizrahi Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
Presiding Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Brearcliffe and Judge Cattani concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTROM, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 Adrian Miranda appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Casa Grande and dismissing as a defendant Officer Richard Rush of the Casa Grande Police Department. As discussed below, we agree with the trial court that Casa Grande and Officer Rush are entitled to judgment as matter of law, and we therefore affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 The facts of this case have been set forth in detail by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on Miranda's single federal claim. Miranda v. City of Casa Grande, 15 F.4th 1219, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 2021). We briefly summarize those facts here. In July 2017, Miranda was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of his truck, which was stopped, with some of its lights illuminated, in a lane of traffic. He was arrested for failure to comply with law enforcement and was transported to the police station. There, Miranda performed poorly on a field sobriety test, submitted to a portable breath test that revealed an elevated blood alcohol content (BAC), and was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Three times, Officer Rush asked him to consent to a blood test, advising him pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1321(B) that refusal would result in his driver license being suspended for twelve months. After Miranda refused to consent three times, Rush left the room and began preparing a search warrant. See § 28-1321(D). Miranda then asked another officer to "let them know" he would be "doing the blood work." The message was relayed to Rush, but he still proceeded to obtain the telephonic search warrant. Rush then advised Miranda that, because he had refused to consent to the blood draw, his license would be suspended for one year.
¶3 Eventually, after some resistance from Miranda, the blood draw was completed. Testing revealed a BAC of 0.183, well over the concentration at which intoxication may be presumed. See A.R.S. § 28-1381(G)(3). Miranda was charged with DUI and other crimes. His employer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, placed him on administrative duties and suspended his law enforcement authority, both because of his lack of a valid driver license and for "conduct unbecoming an officer and misuse of his position." As a result, Miranda's pay was reduced. He alleges he also suffered anxiety, shame, and humiliation. He later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI.
¶4 In September 2017, an administrative hearing was conducted at Miranda's request. See § 28-1321(G)-(K). When asked by the administrative law judge (ALJ) whether, at any point before the service of the warrant, Miranda had changed his mind and indicated he would submit to the blood draw, Rush responded, "No, ma'am." The ALJ found that Officer Rush's testimony was "sufficiently credible," that he had reasonable grounds to believe that Miranda had been in actual physical control of his truck while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that he had reasonably arrested Miranda for DUI. Finding further that "[a]t no point before the service of the warrant did [Miranda] change his mind and recant," the ALJ affirmed the twelve-month suspension of Miranda's license.
¶5 After the hearing, Miranda-who is not independently able to recall the events of the night in question-obtained surveillance video from the Casa Grande Police Department. It showed Miranda indicating his willingness to consent to the blood work. Miranda then sought a second administrative hearing.
¶6 The rehearing occurred in July 2018. Officer Rush again testified, explaining that after Miranda had "adamantly denied and said that he did not want to take the test over and over again," Rush had not understood that Miranda had been recanting his refusal. The second ALJ again found that, based upon the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of Miranda's arrest, it was reasonable for them to have believed that Miranda had been in actual physical control of the truck and to have arrested him for DUI. However, the ALJ further found that, although Miranda had initially refused to consent, he had recanted that refusal and voluntarily submitted to the blood draw. The ALJ also found that Miranda had clearly advised Rush of that change. Although the second ALJ did not find that Rush had testified falsely during the first administrative hearing, she voided Miranda's license suspension. U.S. Customs and Border Protection then reinstated Miranda's position and law enforcement authority.
¶7 In July 2018, Miranda filed a lawsuit in Pinal County against Casa Grande and Officer Rush alleging "negligence/gross negligence," abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Casa Grande and Rush removed the case to federal court, where they moved for summary judgment. In August 2020, finding that Miranda had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal court dismissed his Fourteenth Amendment claim. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remanded the action to the Pinal County Superior Court. As noted above, the Ninth Circuit has since affirmed the district court's ruling on the federal claim. Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1221.
¶8 On remand, Casa Grande and Officer Rush filed a motion for summary judgment on the three state-court issues. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Rush as a defendant. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
¶9 We review de novo a trial court's grant of summary judgment, "viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, ¶ 12 (2003). We will affirm if there are no genuine disputes as to issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Green Cross Med., Inc. v. Gally, 242 Ariz. 293, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).
Negligence and Gross Negligence
¶10 Miranda's negligence and gross negligence claims are founded on his allegations that: (a) Officer Rush and other officers lacked probable cause to believe he had been driving or in actual physical control of his truck; (b) Rush knew that Miranda had consented to have his blood drawn, ignored that consent and obtained an unnecessary search warrant, and later testified falsely regarding whether Miranda had consented; and (c) Miranda suffered damages as a result of these errors in the investigation of his case. The trial court concluded that "Arizona law prohibits a simple negligence claim based on these alleged facts." We agree.
¶11 Common-law qualified immunity protects public officials, including police officers, from liability for acts that inherently require the official's judgment or discretion. Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, ¶ 9 (App. 2018). Criminal investigations are clear examples of such acts, as they "involve the exercise of personal deliberation and individual professional judgment that necessarily reflect the facts of a given situation." Id. ¶ 11. Thus, "[b]y its very nature, investigative police work is discretionary and appropriate for exemption from suit for simple negligence." Id.; see also Landeros v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 474 (App. 1992) (public interest mandates rejecting simple negligence claims against police officers involved in active investigation and prosecution of crimes, which require quick and important decisions that may not always be correct in hindsight). The actions Miranda challenges were all aspects of Officer Rush's investigative police work performed in the scope of his public duty,or his sworn testimony regarding that work. Rush and Casa Grande are therefore shielded from liability for simple negligence claims stemming from those actions. See Spooner, 246 Ariz. 119, ¶¶ 10-12.
Miranda contends qualified immunity should be unavailable because "Officer Rush was investigating no crime when he was procuring a search warrant for a blood test after Miranda had already consented to the blood test." We disagree. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, even if the warrant was unnecessary because Miranda had consented to the blood draw, "nothing prevented [Rush] from seeking a warrant regardless"-including as a precaution in case the significantly intoxicated and previously uncooperative Miranda had not, in fact, intended to recant his repeated refusal-"and there can be little doubt that the warrant was supported by probable cause." Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1225. Indeed, as Miranda elsewhere concedes, he had "flunked the breath test, flunked the horizontal-gaze nystagmus test, flunked the field-sobriety test, and displayed all of the physical attributes of a severely alcohol-impaired person. A first-semester law student could have prosecuted and won a DUI case based on the evidence already in the possession of the Casa Grande Police Department."
Miranda's argument that "there cannot possibly be any sort of investigative-police-work discretion in Officer Rush's false testimony to the ALJs" begs the question about whether any such "false testimony" occurred. This issue is discussed below in the context of Miranda's gross negligence claim.
Because we agree with the trial court that Arizona's long-standing recognition of common-law qualified immunity bars simple negligence claims for discretionary functions like investigative police work, we need not address whether Officer Rush and Casa Grande are also entitled to qualified immunity under A.R.S. § 12-280.02(A)(5).
¶12 Of course, "[a] public official's conscious disregard of the law or the rights of others constitutes gross negligence," and he "remains liable for such conduct." Id. ¶ 10; see also Landeros, 171 Ariz. at 475 (liability possible where "police officers are grossly negligent in their investigation of a crime which results in an arrest"). But such liability only attaches if the official "knew or should have known that he was acting in violation of established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether his activities would deprive another person of their rights." Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 558 (1986). As noted above, Miranda claims that Officer Rush: (a) arrested him without probable cause; (b) "knew Miranda had consented to the blood test but obtained a search warrant despite that consent"; and (c) "testified falsely" at the two administrative law hearings and in his deposition. These arguments are insufficient to support Miranda's gross negligence claim for the following reasons.
¶13 On the probable cause question, Miranda places much emphasis on "facts on possession, control, and who was driving," which he insists are in dispute. But the relevant question is not whether Miranda actually was in physical control of his truck while impaired, or what a jury might have decided if provided with all the evidence collected on this issue after the fact. Rather, we, like the trial court, need only be satisfied that-based on the undisputed facts regarding what was before them at the time-Officer Rush and his fellow officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Miranda had been in actual physical control of his truck while impaired, such that he was reasonably investigated and arrested for DUI under § 28-1381(A). See State v. Morris, 246 Ariz. 154, ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (probable cause is information to justify belief by reasonable person that offense has been committed and requires only showing of probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not actual showing thereof). After reviewing the evidence and hearing testimony, two separate ALJs independently concluded that such grounds did exist and the investigation and arrest were reasonable. The trial court reiterated this conclusion, explaining that undisputed facts clearly suffice to establish probable cause as a matter of law. We agree.
In particular, as the trial court noted, it is undisputed that: Miranda's truck was stopped in a lane of traffic; he was awake in the driver's seat; some of the truck's lights were on or being operated; he did not exit the truck for a number of minutes despite being ordered to do so by officers; he exhibited signs and symptoms of impairment; he admitted to having been drinking; and he registered 0.137 on a portable breath test.
¶14 Having found an awake and obviously impaired Miranda in the driver's seat of his truck, with some of its lights illuminated while stopped in a lane of traffic, the officers had probable cause to investigate Miranda for DUI and then arrest him after he failed multiple sobriety tests. See State v. Moran, 232 Ariz. 528, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) ("A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense." (quoting State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 30 (2000))). Indeed, we would question the diligence and professionalism of an officer who failed to conduct a DUI investigation under those circumstances.
¶15 Miranda's other two arguments are related. He insists that Officer Rush "knew" but "purposefully ignored" that Miranda had consented to the blood test before obtaining the search warrant. And he contends, based on this purported knowledge, that Rush's testimony to the contrary before the ALJs and in his deposition amounted to "false testimony" or "lies" under oath. Knowing disregard of a suspect's consent or knowingly giving false testimony can, in some cases, amount to a police officer's "conscious disregard of the law or the rights of others" sufficient to support a claim of gross negligence. Spooner, 246 Ariz. 119, ¶ 10. But the claimant must show "wanton misconduct that 'is flagrant and evinces a lawless and destructive spirit.'" Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 195 Ariz. 349, ¶ 27 (App. 1999) (quoting Scott v. Scott, 75 Ariz. 116, 122 (1953)); see also Landeros, 171 Ariz. at 475. Miranda made no such showing here.
Of course, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, Officer Rush "strongly resists Miranda's allegation that he lied," maintaining that "his perception of the chaotic events was reasonable." Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1226.
¶16 Miranda is correct that the issue of gross negligence is ordinarily "a question of fact to be decided by the jury." Walls v. Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 595 (App. 1991). However, the issue need not be presented to a jury if the evidence is no "more than slight" and "border[s] on conjecture." Id. Where "no evidence is introduced that would lead a reasonable person to find gross negligence," a trial court may properly grant summary judgment on the issue. Id.; see also Badia, 195 Ariz. 349, ¶¶ 27, 33. By granting summary judgment here, the trial court implicitly concluded that Miranda had failed to present the required quantum of evidence that Officer Rush's conduct was grossly negligent. See Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 205 Ariz. 367, ¶ 21 (App. 2003). We agree.
¶17 Miranda asserts that Officer Rush acted upon "a personal vendetta" with the "malicious decision to injure Miranda by getting the search warrant anyway- for the purpose of suspending Miranda's license." He claims that Rush "had a personal animus toward Miranda simply because Miranda was a federal border-patrol agent" and that Rush intended to harm Miranda for this reason. There is no material evidence to support these assertions. Such "[s]heer speculation is insufficient" to defeat summary judgment. Badia, 195 Ariz. 349, ¶ 29.
Evidence that Officer Rush described Miranda as "another live one" who had acted like "a fucking asshole" is not compelling evidence of malice or wanton disregard of Miranda's rights, particularly in the context of an evening during which it is not disputed that Miranda exhibited a persistent lack of cooperation with police. The same is true of the evidence that Rush said, "Nice," after learning that the clearly intoxicated and uncooperative Miranda was a Border Patrol agent.
Abuse of Process
¶18 Miranda's claim for abuse of process is founded on the allegations that Officer Rush knew, ignored, and lied about Miranda's having consented to the blood test. In so doing, Miranda asserts, Rush "took willful action and improperly used the judicial process," causing "injury, damage, or loss" to Miranda through the suspension of his driver license. The trial court found this claim "legally deficient."
¶19 The two essential elements of a claim for abuse of process are (1) a willful act in the use of judicial process (2) for an ulterior purpose that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 252, ¶ 11 (App. 2004). In an attempt to establish the second element, Miranda claims Casa Grande, through Rush, "had an ulterior purpose for its deprivation of [Miranda]'s driver's license, which was either personal animus toward [Miranda] or a distaste for [his] employer, the U.S. Border Patrol." These bare allegations are entirely speculative. And, as we have explained, to succeed on a claim for abuse of process, "a claimant must present more than mere speculation to support the assertion that the defendant has used court processes with an improper intent." Id. ¶ 18. Given Miranda's failure to provide proof of one of the essential elements of the tort of abuse of process, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on that claim. See Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 (App. 1981).
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
¶20 Miranda alleges that Officer Rush acted in an "intentional and/or reckless" manner, with "extreme and outrageous conduct" that caused Miranda to suffer "extreme emotional distress." These allegations track the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Arizona, namely that: (a) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (b) the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded near certainty that such distress would result from his conduct; and (c) the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43 (1987).
¶21 The trial court determined that Miranda had failed to allege "any conduct that could be considered sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a valid claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress." We agree. There is no serious argument that Officer Rush's conduct here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Miranda, was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). Indeed, Rush merely followed through with what he had warned Miranda he would do using the standard implied consent affidavit, which was to consider Miranda's third failure to consent to the blood draw as a final refusal. See Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1222.
¶22 Moreover, even viewing Miranda's statements that he suffered distress in the light most favorable to him, they do not suffice to establish the requisite emotional distress. Although Miranda states that he suffered distress at the prospect of losing his career, one reason U.S. Customs and Border Protection placed him on administrative duties and suspended his law enforcement authority was his own "conduct unbecoming an officer and misuse of his position." Id. at 1223. Miranda does not dispute this, arguing only that the suspension of his driver license, a condition of his employment, was part of the basis for the agency's decision. He has not argued, much less shown, that he would have faced no employment consequences or suffered less corresponding distress if his driver license had not been suspended. Given that Miranda failed to proffer evidence supporting multiple elements of the tort, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against him on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Disposition
¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Casa Grande and its dismissal of Officer Rush as a defendant. As the prevailing parties, they are entitled to their costs on appeal, A.R.S. § 12-341, upon their compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. We reject Miranda's request for an award of costs.