Opinion
No. C3-94-939.
Filed November 1, 1994.
Appeal from Hennepin County District Court File No. 9318522.
Marshall H. Tanick, Mansfield Tanick, P.A., Minneapolis, MN.
Surell Brady, City Attorney, Timothy S. Skarda, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, MN.
Considered and decided by Forsberg, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.
Chief Judge Simonett originally heard this case and has subsequently recused herself.
Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1992).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants Minnesota Council of Dog Clubs and American Dog Owners Association, Inc., brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Minnesota Cruelty to Animals Act. Minn. Stat. § 343.20-.37 (1992 Supp. 1993). Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of the act are unconstitutional, and sought to enjoin enforcement of the challenged provisions. Appellants challenge the trial court's dismissal of their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Minnesota Council of Dog Clubs (MCDC) is a non-profit organization of individuals who own dogs and other animals, whose primary purpose is to protect the interests of animal owners by promoting legislation concerning dogs and dog ownership. Appellant American Dog Owners Association (ADOA) is a non-profit New York corporation of individuals and organizations maintaining dogs and other pets for personal, commercial, and recreational purposes throughout the United States. Both organizations include members living in the City of Minneapolis, which has authority to enforce the Minnesota Cruelty to Animals Act. Appellants sought a ruling under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn. Stat. § 555.01-.16 (1992) that certain provisions of the Cruelty to Animals Act violate the privileges of due process and the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
Respondent City of Minneapolis brought a motion to dismiss appellants' complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that appellants failed to join all essential parties. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (a), (e), (f). The trial court found there was no justiciable controversy before it, and dismissed appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court did not reach the question of appellants' failure to join all essential parties. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting respondent's Rule 12.02 motion to dismiss. The issues of subject matter jurisdiction and sufficiency of a claim involve legal questions. On review, this court is not bound by and need not give deference to a trial court's decision on purely legal issues. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984).
It is well settled that a justiciable controversy must exist before a court has jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of a statute. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. 1977); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 390-91, 61 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1953). To obtain declaratory relief, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, "possess a bona fide legal interest which has been, or * * * is about to be, affected in a prejudicial manner." State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 92, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1946). Here, the trial court found appellants had failed to show that their organizations or any of their individual members were the subject of an enforcement action against them under the Cruelty to Animals Act, or that they were immediately threatened by such an action. The court therefore concluded appellants were unable to show any concrete, legally cognizable interests directly threatened by the Cruelty to Animals Act.
A specific legal action need not be pending, however, before the court may hear a declaratory judgment action. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 512 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. 1994) (employer allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the Minnesota Striker Replacement Act before any actual proceedings took place under the statute); see also Baertsch v. Minnesota Dep't. of Revenue, 518 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1994) (physicians allowed to challenge portions of the Minnesota Health Right Act prior to its enforcement).
Under the Declaratory Judgments Act, any person whose rights are affected by a statute may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the statute. Minn. Stat. § 555.02 (1992). We agree with appellants that their rights are affected by the Cruelty to Animals Act, which provides:
No person shall deprive any animal over which the person has charge or control of necessary food, water, or shelter.
Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2 (1992). This provision subjects appellants and their members to an affirmative duty which is neither "hypothetical" nor "abstract." See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 883 (constitutionality of state statute was ripe for review).
The Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity. Minn. Stat. § 555.12 (1992). We believe this case is one where a declaratory judgment action "is singularly appropriate for the resolution of disputes before the commission of wrongs." Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 884. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of appellants' action and direct it to reinstate appellants' complaint.
Reversed and remanded.