Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CPF-07-506955
Dondero, Judge
This appeal comes to us following rulings by the trial court that sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend to plaintiff’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, and entered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff claims that his appeal is not moot, and challenges the trial court’s ruling that he was not entitled to “fair procedure” before his removal from a supervisory committee of the San Francisco Police Credit Union (SFPCU or the union). We find that plaintiff’s appeal has been rendered moot in part by the expiration of his term on the Committee, and plaintiff has not properly alleged that he is entitled to rights under the common law doctrine of fair procedure. We therefore affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As this appeal is from a ruling on a demurrer, our recitation of facts is based upon the material allegations properly pleaded in the first amended complaint or any reasonable implications there from, the exhibits attached to the pleading, and any matters which may be judicially noticed. We presume all material allegations of the first amended complaint to be true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966–967; McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.)
Defendant SFPCU is a federally insured, state-chartered, nonprofit, cooperative credit union, regulated by and organized under the laws of the State of California to provide financial services and products to its members, who are primarily law enforcement and first responder personnel located in the San Francisco Bay Area. The governing bodies of the SFPCU are a Board of Directors (Board) consisting of seven members, and a Supervisory Committee (Committee) consisting of three credit union members. According to the bylaws of the SFPCU, the Committee is responsible for inspecting and reviewing the union’s policies and procedures to safeguard against fraud and self-dealing, and must submit annual audits of the records, assets and liabilities of the union to the Board. (See also Fin. Code, §§ 14551, 14551.5, 14553.) The Committee also has the specified duty to call a meeting of the members of the union to consider any unlawful or unauthorized practices.
Financial Code section 14450 provides: “The credit union shall be directed by a board consisting of an odd number of directors, at least five in number, each of whom shall be a member of the credit union in his own right, to be elected by the members at their annual meeting.” Financial Code section 14550 provides: “Every credit union shall have a supervisory committee of at least three persons, each of whom shall be a member of the credit union.”
Plaintiff John Mindermann was a SFPCU member, elected to serve as one of the three volunteer members of the Committee until the expiration of his term in February of 2008. As a Committee member, on September 21, 2004, plaintiff prepared and distributed to the Committee and Board members a memorandum in which he questioned some of SFPCU business practices and suggested that the Board undertake a “comprehensive assessment” of business operations. In January of 2005, plaintiff “consulted with an outside expert” to request an evaluation of the financial performance of SFPCU. He then drafted a summary of the expert’s findings and opinions, which recommended a review of SFPCU’s investments and operations by an outside management consultant. Plaintiff submitted the report to the Board on January 18, 2005. The Board responded negatively to the report and confiscated all copies of it. Plaintiff continued to present his concerns with the financial condition of the SFPCU, and particularly its San Mateo Branch, throughout 2005 and into 2006.
In March of 2005, the Board asserted that plaintiff had “violated his fiduciary duty” and obligation to maintain the confidentiality of SFPCU records, and made a “ ‘slanderous attack’ on members of the SFPCU’s management” that was contrary to the best interests of the union. In January of 2006, SFPCU adopted a “Confidentiality Policy” that prohibited disclosure by Committee members of financial or business information of the union. Plaintiff was directed to sign the Confidentiality Policy, but declined to do so. He asserted that the scope of the proposed Confidentiality Policy was “too broad” and would undermine discussion of financial policies with SFPCU members.
In October of 2006, plaintiff announced that he intended to seek election to the Board at the next annual meeting in February of 2007. On November 21, 2006, the Board sent to all SFPCU members a notice of a “Special Meeting of the Membership” scheduled for December 7, 2006, to “vote to remove” plaintiff from the Committee. The SFPCU bylaws state that a director, officer or member of the Committee may be “removed from office by the affirmative vote of two thirds of the members present at a special meeting” called for that purpose, but “only after an opportunity has been given them to be heard.” Plaintiff received a copy of the notice; he was also asked to resign from the Committee. Prior to the scheduled special meeting plaintiff requested but was never given an explanation of the reasons he was asked to resign or the charges upon which his proposed removal from the Committee were based.
The special meeting was held on December 7, 2006, at a time and place that plaintiff alleges was “more likely” to result in a vote that supported the Board’s proposal to remove him as a member of the Committee. At the meeting, a Board member recited the purported charges against plaintiff and offered the Board’s opinion that he should be removed from the Committee on the following grounds, which plaintiff heard for the first time: that he disclosed confidential information to an outside consultant; he was the sole volunteer Committee member who refused to sign the Confidentiality Policy; and he acted outside the structure of the Committee and without approval to disrupt the business of the SFPCU. Plaintiff was “given an opportunity to speak to the charges for removal,” but a vote of the members was commenced before he finished speaking or “could answer questions.” The result of the vote was that plaintiff was removed from his position on the Committee.
At issue here are the allegations of the first amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief and damages (the complaint), which was filed by plaintiff on October 20, 2008, and included causes of action for wrongful removal, breach of membership contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the right of fair procedure. In the complaint plaintiff asserted that his removal from office represented a “public reproval” or “public accusation” that was undertaken by the SFPCU “out of malice and hostility” toward him. He further alleged that defendant acted “in retaliation” for his efforts to scrutinize SFPCU’s financial policies. He characterized the purported reasons for his removal from the Committee as “asserted in bad faith” and in contravention of his rights “and of public policy.” Plaintiff specifically challenged as unjustified and “false” the claims made by defendant that he was the only volunteer to refuse to sign the Confidentiality Agreement, that he wrongfully disclosed confidential information to an outside consultant, and that he acted “outside the structure” of the Committee. He sought a writ of mandate and declaration that the vote to remove him from the Committee must be set aside as “null, void, and of no force or effect, and contrary to public policy.” He has also requested a declaration that before conducting a special meeting to remove a Committee member the SFPCU must conduct a “fair proceeding” with notice of accusations, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut the charges. For injury to his reputation, humiliation, public stigmatization, and embarrassment, he has requested compensatory damages, along with punitive damages to deter the SFPCU from “such actions in the future.”
Plaintiff previously filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief and damages, but the trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, with leave to amend.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on several grounds: that plaintiff cannot state a cognizable cause of action for wrongful removal from the Committee; the common law right of “fair procedure” does not apply to plaintiff’s removal; and the action has been rendered moot by the expiration of plaintiff’s term of office on the Committee. Following a hearing on December 19, 2008, the trial court found that plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot, and as to the “other claims” for damages, the “right of fair procedure” does not apply to a “voluntary member of a committee in the credit union.” The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and judgment was entered in favor of defendant. This appeal is taken from the judgment entered upon the demurrer and “all prior rulings” in the case.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff presents two essential arguments in this appeal. First, he claims that the “case is not moot” due to the expiration of his term as a member of the Committee. He also argues that even if the case is moot in part he “may recover damages for violation of the right to fair procedure,” which applies to his removal from the Committee. Plaintiff maintains that he was not given adequate “notice” or an opportunity to confront the charges against him as required under the “common law right of fair procedure.” Plaintiff therefore complains that the trial court not only erred by sustaining defendant’s demurrer, but also improperly failed to grant his prior motion for summary adjudication of his right to receive “written notice of the charges against him.”
In our review of “ ‘a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 352; see also Lee v. Blue Shield of California (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1377–1378.) “In addition, the Supreme Court has held: ‘ “[T]he allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (C.J.L. Construction, Inc. v. Universal Plumbing (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 376, 383.) Our task as a “reviewing court, therefore, ‘is to determine whether the pleaded facts state a cause of action on any available legal theory.’ [Citation.]” (Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257, 266.) “On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving error. [Citation.] ‘Because the trial court’s determination is made as a matter of law, we review the ruling de novo.’ [Citation.]” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
I. The Dismissal of the Declaratory Relief Causes of Action as Moot.
We first consider the issue of mootness. After the complaint was filed in the present case, plaintiff’s tenure as a volunteer member of the Committee expired by its own terms in February of 2008. The trial court found that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot as a result of the termination of plaintiff’s term on the Committee. Plaintiff acknowledges that he cannot be returned to his position on the Committee, but submits that the court erred by dismissing his equitable actions on the ground of mootness. He argues that despite the expiration of his term he has presented ripe issues to be determined that implicate the personal stigma associated with his removal from the Committee and the public importance attached to the action taken by the SFPCU.
“ ‘As a general rule, “an appeal presenting only abstract or academic questions is subject to dismissal as moot.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547.) “It is this court’s duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it....” ’ [Citations.]” (Chantiles v. Lake Forest II Master Homeowners Assn. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 914, 921; see also Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 421.) “ ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citations.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) “ ‘ “It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.” ’ [Citations.]” (Chantiles v. Lake Forest II Master Homeowners Assn., supra, at p. 921; see also People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486; In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193.)
The relief that plaintiff seeks with his declaratory and injunctive relief actions is an order that sets aside his removal from the Committee as a null and void action by the SFPCU. Even if we were to find the SFPCU’s action invalid and set aside the removal of plaintiff from the Committee, the expiration of his term would make any declaratory relief ineffectual. Plaintiff cannot be reinstated to a position that has terminated for reasons other than his removal by the Board. Even if we were to reverse the judgment, remand the case for further proceedings, and the trial court was to ultimately find that plaintiff’s removal was improper, he could not resume the position as a Committee member. Yet this is, in part, what he seeks in this litigation. We cannot afford plaintiff effective declaratory or injunctive relief in the form of vacating his dismissal from the Committee, and therefore that part of the appeal is moot. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214; Bell v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 629, 636–637.)
Plaintiff contends that his request for additional relief may still be effectively granted, in the form of a declaration that before conducting a special meeting to remove any Committee member the SFPCU must conduct a “fair proceeding” which grants notice of charges and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence. That form of relief, claims plaintiff, affects the rights of other members of the Committee, and endures notwithstanding the end of his personal term in office. He asserts that the rights of members of the Committee to fair procedure prior to removal “concern matters of public importance that are capable of repetition, yet are short-lived and evade normal review,” and thus “are not moot.”
We acknowledge the established principle that “appellate courts may in their discretion decide questions that have been rendered moot as a result of subsequent events,... where the issues presented are of importance and ‘are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review.’ [Citations.]” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78.) While we agree with plaintiff that his request for a declaration of the rights of a Committee member to a fair hearing may not be expressly limited to his personal removal from office, we find that the issue is not appropriately adjudicated in this appeal. With the termination of plaintiff’s term of office, his request for a declaration of rights has become hypothetical and speculative. No continuing violation of rights has been alleged, and we have no way of knowing based on the record before us that any future proceedings to remove a member from the Committee will duplicate the proceedings that occurred in the present case. Much of plaintiff’s claim of deprivation of rights focuses on the precise nature of the removal proceedings that resulted here – for instance, the particular time and place of the hearing, the form of notice he received, and the opportunity he was given to speak – and may very well not recur in the future.
The issue of the rights to be accorded Committee members in a removal proceeding is also not a proper subject of an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. “The controversy that is the subject of declaratory relief ‘ “ ‘ “must be of a character which admits of specific and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial determination, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts....” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]... Moreover, declaratory relief ‘ “operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs. It serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs; in short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather than execute them.” ’ [Citations.]” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403.) Similarly, “ ‘injunctive relief is available to prevent threatened injury and is not a remedy designed to right completed wrongs. [Citations.] “It should neither serve as punishment for past acts, nor be exercised in the absence of any evidence establishing the reasonable probability the acts will be repeated in the future. Indeed, a change in circumstances at the time of the hearing, rendering injunctive relief moot or unnecessary, justifies denial of the request.” [Citation.] Unless there is a showing that the challenged action is being continued or repeated, an injunction should be denied. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 464–465.)
A prospective declaration of the future rights of Committee members faced with removal is unwarranted without any indication in the record that there will be a repetition of the procedures that transpired in the case before us. The issue of future rights is not ripe for adjudication. “ ‘ “The principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual controversy is a tenet of common law jurisprudence, the precise content of which is difficult to define and hard to apply.... A controversy is ‘ripe’ when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.” ’ [Citations.] Even where a particular matter is an inherently proper subject of declaratory relief, ‘ “ ‘ “a declaratory judgment may not be rendered in respect to [such a matter] in disregard of the customary limitations upon the granting of such relief.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403–1404.)
We further conclude that the public interest associated with plaintiff’s removal is not of sufficient import to justify a declaration of rights without any present controversy. The exception to the rule of dismissal of a moot controversy for a public interest issue grants “the appellate court the discretion to decide a case which, although technically moot, poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.” (County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006, italics added.) The individual rights granted to Committee members charged with misconduct are unquestionably important to them, and also to the union members, but do not have implications for a broad segment of the public, and are not likely to recur. We will therefore not review matters related to plaintiff’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
II. Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages Caused by his Removal from the Committee.
Plaintiff’s claim for damages previously suffered as a result of his removal from the Committee is certainly not moot. That plaintiff cannot receive effectual equitable relief does not prevent us from resolving his action for damages. “An appeal will be decided... where part but not all of the controversy has been rendered moot.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78; see also Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 120–121.) We proceed to the merits of plaintiff’s assertion that he was denied fair procedure rights prior to his removal from the Committee.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred by finding he was not entitled to the rights accorded by the common law doctrine of “fair procedure.” Plaintiff argues that the SFPCU is a private organization “affecting the public interest to which the common law right of fair procedure applies.” He further argues that his expulsion from the Committee impaired not only his membership rights, but also his “fundamental financial interests in the SFPCU.” Plaintiff therefore complains that he was entitled to rights of fair procedure associated with his removal from the Committee, and defendant’s failure to provide him with the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard supports an actionable claim for damages.
“ ‘California courts have long recognized a common law right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from private organizations which control important economic interests [citations]....’ [Citations.]” (Delta Dental Plan v. Banasky (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1607.) “When the doctrine applies, private entities may not expel or exclude qualified persons without acting in a manner that is substantively rational and procedurally fair. [Citation.] The doctrine applies primarily to decisions affecting membership in private organizations that affect the public interest [citation], particularly when there are ‘substantial economic ramifications’ from exclusion [citation].” (Palm Medical Group, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 206, 215 (Palm Medical).) “The purpose of the common law right to fair procedure is to protect, in certain situations, against arbitrary decisions by private organizations.” (Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1066 (Potvin).)
We assume, as apparently did the trial court, that the SFPCU qualifies as a “gatekeeper” organization or “quasi-public” entity that affects the public interest. (Dougherty v. Haag (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 315, 335; Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 743, 747.) As plaintiff points out and the pleading alleges, the SFPCU is sanctioned and regulated by extensive statutory authority, both state and federal, that both protects the rights of its members to receive the benefits of a cooperative and provides for democratic controls of the operation of the credit union. (See Fin. Code, § 14002 et seq.) The structure, purposes and responsibilities of the Committee are also delineated in the statutes and by-laws of the organization. (See Fin. Code, §§14551, 14551.5, 14553, 14600.) A cognizable public interest component attaches to the operation of the SFPCU.
Even so, the fact that the relationship between a credit union and its members affects a public interest does not mean that the removal of a member from the Committee must comply with the common law right to fair procedure. (Palm Medical, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 206, 216; Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 743, 747.) Even if the SFPCU may be within the class of entities to which the right of fair procedure attaches, plaintiff has not asserted the kind of loss that triggers imposition of fair procedure requirements. The evolution of the fair procedure doctrine has resulted in an important, established limitation in cases of expulsion or exclusion of a member from an organization: the obligation to provide a fair procedure arises only where the acts of the organization effectively extinguish or significantly impair a significant economic interest of the individual. (Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1070–1071; Ezekial v. Winkley (1977) 20 Cal.3d 267, 272; Palm Medical, supra, at p. 219.) “[N]ocase holds that the doctrine applies to all private decisions which have economic ramifications for an individual, and it is quickly apparent that economic ramifications are not enough.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 179.) The California Supreme Court has definitively declared that the principles of the fair procedure doctrine are “ ‘narrowly applied to situations with substantial economic ramifications.’ [Citation.]” (Potvin, supra, at p. 1069.) “Thus, the right applies only to private decisions which can effectively deprive an individual of the ability to practice a trade or profession.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc., supra, at p. 177.) The right to fair procedure has not been extended to any situation “where the private organization’s action has not adversely implicated either an economic interest or a fundamental membership right.” (Kurz v. Federation of Pétanque U.S.A. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 136, 149.)
California courts generally conclude that the fair procedure doctrine is not applicable when the economic or public interest threshold has not been met. If an organization does not perform the gatekeeper function for a profession, courts will not compel the organization to maintain a fair procedure for an offended person. In Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc., supra, the court determined that neither the Producers Guild of America nor the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences could be viewed as a gatekeeper controlling the profession of film producing. Consequently, no fair procedure concerns were implicated when one of the producers of the Academy Award-winning film Crash was slighted for award recognition because these organizations did not conclude he satisfied the criteria for the award. (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 180.)
Similarly, tenure considerations by institutions of higher learning have been given a pass under the same reasoning. A university is under no obligation to provide a hearing before removing a professor from the tenure track. Denial of tenure does not deter a person’s right to pursue an academic profession. (King v. Regents of University of California (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 812.) Also, a nonprofit sports organization’s suspension of two volunteer umpires was not subject to fair procedure requirements, as neither public nor economic interests were deemed threatened by the organization’s judgment. (Kurz v. Federation of Pétanque U.S.A., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 136, 148–150.)
Here, plaintiff has not been expelled from the union or otherwise suffered deprivation of a substantial economic interest. He was removed from his elected, uncompensated post on the Committee, but he remains a member of the SFPCU and continues to receive all of the economic benefits and rights associated with that membership. In contrast to the cases relied on by plaintiff, nothing in the pleading suggests that the action taken by the Board compromised his ability to practice his trade or profession or deprived him of the fundamental right of membership in the SFPCU. (Cf. Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1070; Palm Medical, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 206, 219; Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1445; Hackenthal v. California Medical Assn. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 435, 441; Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. etc. (1906) 4 Cal.App. 565, 569.)
Plaintiff submits that the “stigma of his removal” may create a “chilling atmosphere which effectively discourages members from participating in the democratic aspects of credit union membership,” and thereby “impairs the ability” of the Committee to “exercise democratic control over members’ financial interests.” While we do not dispute the contention that the legislatively created right of SFPCU members to serve on supervisory committees is an important “aspect and benefit of credit union membership,” the elimination of plaintiff’s individual right to serve on the Committee is neither the equivalent of exclusion from membership itself nor the loss of a substantial property or economic interest. We do not find in the amended pleading any implication that plaintiff can no longer enjoy the privileges of SFPCU membership, or has lost the ability to practice his trade or profession – or, for that matter, is even precluded from again seeking election to the Committee.
We do not doubt plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered some “stigmatization” as a result of the removal, but we do not perceive that the discipline carries with it “ ‘the odor of public sanctions’ ” that justify the imposition upon defendant of fair procedure requirements. (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 180; cf. Salkin v. California Dental Assn. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1125.) Nor are we convinced that plaintiff’s personal removal from the Committee, and the specific reasons that were associated with it, will discourage other members of the union from seeking election to the Committee or will have a chilling effect on the important supervisory functions performed by the Committee. In the absence of the requisite allegations reflecting elimination of union membership rights or impairment of a substantial economic interest, we cannot extend the fair procedure doctrine to the action taken against plaintiff. “No policy reason or rationale from any case compels us to extend the principle to encompass internal decisions that are unrelated to exclusion or expulsion from membership or that do not adversely impair a member’s economic interest. Moreover, common sense and judicial restraint would also dictate that a court should not involve itself in internal disciplinary actions of the type involved in this case. Such determinations are better left to the discretion and expertise of the nonprofit mutual benefit organization’s governing board.” (Kurz v. Federation of Pétanque U.S.A., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 136, 149, fns. omitted; see also Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 743, 747–748.) We therefore conclude that plaintiff has failed to state any valid cause of action based upon his removal from the Committee, and the trial court did not err by sustaining the demurrer and entering judgment in favor of defendant. (Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America, supra, at p. 746.)
Our conclusion also resolves plaintiff’s contention that his motion for summary adjudication was erroneously denied.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.