Opinion
C. A. N21C-05-082 VLM
10-17-2024
Dwayne Milton and Shawna Milton, individually and on behalf of Minor B. v. Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children, et al.
Raj Srivatsan, Esquire Lindsey E. Imbrogno, Esquire
Raj Srivatsan, Esquire
Lindsey E. Imbrogno, Esquire
VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA JUDGE
Counsel:
This is the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). After consideration of all pleadings, for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
Unless otherwise noted, this Court's recitation is drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint ("Compl.") and all documents the parties incorporated by reference. D.I. 1.
Plaintiffs Milton and Shawna Milton are the parents of Plaintiff Minor B. ("B.M."). They filed a medical negligence claim on behalf of B.M. against Defendants Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (Nemours), Dr. Gina Amoroso, and Lisa Kelly, RN, and individual claims for defamation and emotional distress.
Compl. at 1-2.
The Complaint initially asserted six counts, three related to emotional distress. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Count IV asserting Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED), leaving five remaining counts to include both Intentional and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress; (IIED) and (RIED), respectively.
Id. at 5-10 (Count I (Defamation), Count II (IIED), Count III (RIED), Count IV (NIED), Count V (Medical Negligence), and Count VI (Respondeat Superior Against Defendant Nemours)).
See D.I. 237.
Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on various grounds, including the emotional distress claims, namely lack of expert testimony. Following oral arguments on March 11,2024, and a bench ruling hearing on May 30, 2024, this Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the IIED and RIED claims. As to the remaining issues raised for summary judgment, the Court allowed the parties to supplement the record, and the parties' respective filings were filed in June and July of 2024.
Defs.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 8-9, D.I. 133.
See D.I. 280.
See D.I. 332, 333, 341, 357, and 379.
On June 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reargument on the Court's dismissal of Count II, the IIED claim. Plaintiffs' counsel further requested leave to file for interlocutory review if this Court ruled against Plaintiffs. Defendants filed their opposition on June 12, 2024. Because the supplemental filings may have had some bearing on this Motion for Reargument, the Court took the matter under advisement pending its review of those filings.
Pls.' Mot. for Reargument, D.I. 281 (hereafter "Mot.").
Plaintiffs' request for leave to seek interlocutory review prior to this Court's ruling on this pending motion is not ripe and the Court does not address it. Id. at 6.
D.I. 325.
Eleven days before trial was scheduled to begin on July 22, Plaintiffs' counsel filed two letters, requesting continuance of the trial and to re-open discovery, which he believed would potentially moot this Motion for Reargument. On July 19,2024, this Court granted Plaintiffs' request for a continuance of the trial and denied the request to reopen discovery. The pending motions are now ripe for consideration.
D.I. 402, 404. Plaintiffs' counsel indicated an intent to "seek reopening of discovery," and asked leave to "permit supplemental briefing, if necessary, to demonstrate the areas of discovery required, now that time is not an issue which renders some of the arguments made in the seven pending briefings potentially moot." D.I. 402 at 1.
D.I. 408.
Standard of Review
A motion for reargument permits a trial court to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment. "Delaware law places a heavy burden on a [party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59." The moving party has the burden to demonstrate that the Court must correct an error of law or prevent manifest injustice deriving from its judgment. "A Rule 59(e) application is not an avenue for the moving party to raise new arguments or to rehash arguments already decided by the Court." And such motion will be denied unless the Court has "overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles," or "has misapprehended the law or facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision" challenged.
See Ramon v. Ramon, 963 A.2d 128, 136 (Del. 2008) ("A motion for reargument is the proper device for seeking reconsideration by the Trial Court of its findings of fact, conclusion of law, or judgment.") (internal citations omitted).
Koslvshyn v. Comm'rs of Town cf Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 2007).
See Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969) ("manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors").
Maravilla-Diego v. MBM Construction II, LLC, 2015 WL 5055955, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 27, 2015) (citing cases).
Cummings v. Jimmy's Grille, Inc., 2000 WL 1211167, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2000).
Discussion
The central issue before the Court is whether it erred in granting summary judgment on the emotional distress claims due to the lack of expert testimony.
See Mot. at 1-3.
First, Plaintiffs contend that the Court overlooked controlling precedent, in failing to follow the holding in Snowden v. State to suggest no expert testimony is required for the IIED claims in this civil matter. The Court did not overlook the 1996 ruling in that criminal matter. It is inapplicable. Snowden involved a victim s ability to testify about emotional damages in the context of the State's burden of proof for a criminal offense. That differs from the requirements of proving an IIED claim in a civil context. This Court relied on Ciabattoni Doe and Collins which specifically address the need for expert testimony in IIED civil claims, as the appropriate and consistent authority with established legal principles.
Id. at 1-2.
677A.2d33 (Del. 1996).
Mot. at 2.
See Snowden, 677 A.2d, at 38.
Ciabattoni v. Teamsters Local 326, 2020 WL 4331344, at *5 (Del. Super. Jul. 27, 2020) (requiring expert testimony for IIED claim).
Doe v. Wildey, 2012 WL 1408879, at *4-5, *7 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2012) ("[T]he existence of emotional harm and its cause is a matter based on specialized knowledge better suited for expert testimony.").
Collins v. Afr. Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 2006 WL 1579718, at *6 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2006) (finding expert testimony necessary to establish emotional distress as a matter of law).
Plaintiffs further contend that this case is factually distinct from those requiring expert testimony due to the absence of "dense medical conditions."Specifically, that the Court relied on caselaw where those emotional distress claims involved "complex medical/neurological/physical" issues requiring expert testimony. And that here "[Plaintiff] Mom's facts aren't [as] complex" to require an expert.
Mot., n.5.
Id.
Id.
The characterization of "Mom's facts" to support an alleged emotional distress claim would, indeed, be for the factfinder. Mom's prior medical history here further underscores the need for expert testimony to assist that trier of fact in determining causation and the extent of emotional harm, if any, that may be related to Defendants' alleged conduct. As reinforced in Ciabattoni, without expert testimony, it would be challenging for a jury to determine "the intensity and duration of distress" attributable to the Defendants' actions as opposed to other life circumstances. An expert can best discern the specific emotional impact of the Defendants' alleged actions from other potential sources of distress.
See D.I. 325, Ex. A.
Ciabattoni, 2020 WL 4331344, at *5 (quoting Doe, 2012 WL 1408879, at *5).
Second, Plaintiffs assert the jury may infer outrageous conduct from the facts alone such that expert testimony is not necessary to establish a claim for IIED.This misconstrues the underlying rationale for expert testimony in IIED cases.
Mot. at 3-5.
Not only has this contention been previously argued and rejected, but it does not support a basis for relief under Rule 59. This Court's ruling was based on the absence of expert opinion as to causation, and not on the question of whether the conduct met the threshold of outrageousness. But even if the alleged conduct were deemed outrageous, expert testimony would still be necessary to establish causation and the extent of any alleged emotional harm. To rule otherwise is contrary to the principles established in Doe, where the Court expressly rejected the argument that expert testimony was not required for IIED claim because the conduct was extreme or outrageous.
Doe, 2012 WL 1408879, at *7.
Lastly, Plaintiffs offer a curative proposition-that they can find an expert now. The deadline for expert disclosures has long passed. Not only is this improper under Rule 59, but allowing new expert testimony at this juncture would unfairly prejudice Defendants and disrupt the orderly progression of the case, which has already been continued at Plaintiffs' request.
The deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert was September 5, 2023. See D.I. 172.
In sum, Plaintiffs have not met the substantial burden required for relief under Rule 59(e). They have not demonstrated that the Court overlooked controlling precedent, misapprehended the law, or that the initial decision would result in manifest injustice. The arguments presented largely reiterate those already considered and decided by the Court.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument is DENIED.