Opinion
C23-1130JLR
01-17-2024
ALAN MILLS, Plaintiff, v. NOAH ZEICHNER, Defendant.
ORDER
James L. Robart, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court are pro se Plaintiff Alan Mills's motions for partial summary judgment (MSJ (Dkt. # 21); MSJ Reply (Dkt. # 39)), and to hold nonparty Martin Floe in contempt of a subpoena (Contempt Mot. (Dkt. # 41); Contempt Reply (Dkt. # 53)). Defendant Noah Zeichner opposes the motion for partial summary judgment and Mr. Floe opposes the motion for contempt. (MSJ Resp. (Dkt. # 33); Contempt Resp. (Dkt. # 47).) Also before the court is Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (MJP (Dkt. # 43); MJP Reply (Dkt. # 65).) Mr. Mills opposes Mr. Zeichner's motion. (MJP Resp. (Dkt. # 62).) The court has considered the motions, the litigants' submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,the court GRANTS Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and DENIES Mr. Mills's motions as moot.
None of the litigants have requested oral argument (see MSJ at 1; MSJ Resp. at 1; Contempt Mot. at 1; Contempt Resp. at 1; MJP at 1; MJP Resp. at 1), and the court determines that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition of the motions, see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).
II. BACKGROUND
The court sets forth the relevant factual background as pleaded by Mr. Mills before turning to the relevant procedural history.
Mr. Mills and his wife are residents of Seattle and share a daughter, A.K. (See Compl. (Dkt. ## 1-2 (sealed), 8-6 (redacted)) ¶¶ 4.1, 4.13, 4.21.) A.K. is an Ingraham High School student who participated in an extracurricular academic competition called the “Euro Challenge” in 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 4.1-4.2.) The Euro Challenge is a national competition in which high school students give formal presentations about topics related to the European economy. (See id. ¶ 4.2.) Typically, teams of students travel to New York City to give their final presentations. (See id. ¶ 4.14.) Ingraham's Euro Challenge team consisted of A.K. and six other students, and was advised by Mr. Zeichner, an Ingraham social studies and Spanish teacher. (Id. ¶¶ 2.2, 4.2-4.3.) As an adviser, Mr. Zeichner “regularly met with the Euro Challenge Team, critiqued its work, arranged for its meeting space, arranged for its formal practice presentation,” and communicated with competition representatives. (Id. ¶ 4.3.)
Initially, Mr. Mills was actively involved in the Euro Challenge team's preparation, assisting in the research and analysis as well as critiquing practice presentations. (Id. ¶ 4.4.) But Mr. Mills began to observe that the Euro Challenge was causing excess stress to A.K., whose team members “were not carrying their weight.” (Id. ¶¶ 4.6.1-4.6.2.) It also became clear to Mr. Mills “that the team's presentation was only mediocre compared with prior winning Euro Challenge presentations,” and that “the Euro Challenge Team was almost certainly not going to become a finalist for the competition.” (Id. ¶ 4.6.3.) Mr. Mills “did not want [A.K.] to be satisfied with such mediocrity.” (Id.) In addition, Mr. Mills grew concerned that Mr. Zeichner “was making poor decisions” and that his “poor leadership was harming [A.K.].” (Id. ¶ 4.6.6.)
For these reasons, on April 11, 2022, Mr. Mills asked A.K. to stop participating in the Euro Challenge. (Id. ¶ 4.6.) Mr. Mills emailed Mr. Zeichner the same day and copied A.K. on the message, in which he expressed discomfort with Mr. Zeichner's decision-making abilities and stated his desire that A.K. stop participating. (Id. ¶ 4.7; Id., Ex. 2.) Mr. Zeichner responded, addressing some of Mr. Mills's concerns, advising that he would remove Mr. Mills from email communications with other parents about the competition, and stating, “[i]f you are willing to reconsider your decision and have a conversation about the trip [to New York], please let me know.” (Id., Ex. 2.) Mr. Mills replied, “I still think it is best for [A.K.] to spend her time on pursuits other than the Euro Challenge competition.” (Id.)
Meanwhile, A.K. and Mr. Zeichner exchanged emails about the competition. A.K. apologized to Mr. Zeichner, stating that her father's decision “was made without my knowledge and I only heard about it through the email he sent,” and that she “want[ed] to do whatever is possible to help the team.” (Id., Ex. 3.) A.K. also asked Mr. Zeichner to “refrain from telling my group members or their families about this until I let them know,” stating she would “most likely let my group members know Wednesday after I know this situation is not going to change.” (Id.) Mr. Zeichner responded: “I'm sorry too. Let's hold off on saying anything to the other students and families until we receive the actual schedule and travel details from New York....I will email your dad when I have those details . . . hopefully I can meet with your dad and we can work this out.” (Id.)
Mr. Mills alleges that after April 14, 2023, he received no further communications from Mr. Zeichner about the Euro Challenge and he believed that A.K. had stopped participating. (See id. ¶¶ 4.10-4.11, 4.15, 4.17.) Nevertheless, because A.K. “was angry about” Mr. Mills's decision, and because Mr. Zeichner “was encouraging her to stay on the Euro Challenge Team,” A.K. “disobeyed and deceived” Mr. Mills by continuing to participate. (Id. ¶ 4.15.) Mr. Mills alleges that Mr. Zeichner supported A.K.'s participation by continuing “to host meetings of Euro Challenge Team members (including [A.K.]) in his classroom” and continuing “to help the Euro Challenge Team (including [A.K.]) to prepare for and give the final presentation.” (Id.) A.K. participated up to and through the final presentation in May 2022, which the team gave virtually via Zoom due to COVID-19 restrictions. (Id.) A.K.'s mother knew of A.K.'s participation but never informed Mr. Mills, who did not learn of A.K. and Mr. Zeichner's “deception” until August 20, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 4.16-4.18.)
From April 11, 2022, to August 20, 2022, A.K. did not speak to her father. (Id. ¶ 4.18.) Mr. Mills refers to this time as A.K.'s “Silent Period.” (Id.) Whenever Mr. Mills attempted to talk to A.K. during this time, he was met with “passive aggression and silence,” and the two resorted to communicating through email. (Id. ¶¶ 4.20-4.21.) Mr. Mills alleges that during this time, A.K.'s “physical and mental health dramatically deteriorated.” (Id. ¶ 4.22.) She experienced frequent headaches, stomach aches, nausea, and loss of appetite. (Id.) A.K.'s personality also “dramatically changed,” becoming “subdued and morose.” (Id. ¶ 4.23.) Her “speech became nearly inaudible, slurred, and hard to understand,” and “her speech toward family members became often biting, sarcastic, and harsh.” (Id.) She also no longer enjoyed her schoolwork. (Id.) These symptoms and personality changes allegedly persist to this day. (Id. ¶¶ 4.22-4.23.) According to Mr. Mills, A.K. told him that, in retrospect, she believes Mr. Zeichner “acted wrongly” and that in doing so, he “harmed both her and her family.” (Id. ¶ 4.24.)
Acting pro se, Mr. Mills filed this action on or around June 30, 2023, in King County Superior Court. (Id. at 1.) Mr. Mills raises a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Mr. Zeichner unlawfully interfered with Mr. Mills's fundamental constitutional right to parent by encouraging A.K. to continue participating in the Euro Challenge against Mr. Mills's express wishes. (Id. ¶¶ 6.C.1-6.C.9.) Mr. Mills also raises state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and under RCW 4.24.010, a wrongful death and injury statute. (Id. ¶¶ 6.A.1-6.B.6.) Mr. Zeichner removed the matter to this court on July 28, 2023. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. # 1).) Mr. Zeichner answered the complaint and raised a number of affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity. (Am. Answer (Dkt # 29) at 9-11.)
On October 2, 2023, Mr. Mills filed a motion for partial summary judgment concerning qualified immunity. (See generally MSJ.) The motion seeks a ruling that: (1) Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim “is valid”; (2) Mr. Zeichner “cannot use the doctrine of qualified immunity to prevent [Mr. Mills] from suing him under [Section] 1983”; and (3) Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim “can go forward.” (Id. at 8.) Meanwhile, the parties had been engaged in discovery, and on October 30, 2023, Mr. Mills filed a motion to hold Mr. Floe-the Ingraham principal-in contempt of a subpoena. (See generally Contempt Mot.) Mr. Mills had sought certain documents from Mr. Floe, who allegedly failed to appear to produce those documents. (Id. at 2-3.) Shortly thereafter, on November 3, 2023, Mr. Zeichner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking to dismiss this entire case. (See generally MJP.) Each motion remains pending before the court.
III. ANALYSIS
Below, the court addresses Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as it is dispositive of this case. The court begins by setting forth the relevant legal standard and addressing the parties' procedural arguments before turning to the merits.
A. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed- but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss, the standard for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Dworkin v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989); Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, the court may consider the pleadings, documents attached to the pleadings, documents incorporated therein, or matters of judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must accept the non-moving party's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2019); Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012) (first citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); and then citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
B. Procedural Matters
As a threshold matter, both parties raise procedural arguments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). That rule provides that if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
Mr. Mills argues the court should treat Mr. Zeichner's motion as one for summary judgment because it “employ[s] reasoning based on assumptions far outside the pale of undisputed ‘facts,'” and therefore improperly relies on materials outside the pleadings. (Resp. at 39-40 (“For example, many of the arguments assume that the injuries to [A.K.] and Plaintiff are either non-existent or far milder than the Complaint alleges.”).) That Mr. Mills disagrees with Mr. Zeichner's characterization of the facts does not mean that Mr. Zeichner's motion relies on materials outside the pleadings. Mr. Mills has not pointed to any documents, materials, or evidence relied on in the motion that do not appear in the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). (See generally MJP Resp.) The court therefore declines Mr. Mills's invitation to treat the instant motion as one for summary judgment.
Next, Mr. Mills asks the court to take judicial notice of certain documents that he acknowledges are, “strictly speaking, beyond the Complaint,” including affidavits of A.K. and A.K.'s mother as well as emails between Mr. Zeichner and various nonparties. (Resp. at 9-10.) Mr. Zeichner argues the court should strike and/or exclude these documents pursuant to Rule 12(d), as they are not subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). (Reply at 12-13.) “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); see also Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because the effect of judicial notice is to deprive a party of an opportunity to use rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument to attack contrary evidence, caution must be used in determining that a fact is beyond controversy under Rule 201(b).” (quoting Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 114 F.Supp.2d 797, 816 (N. D. Iowa 2000))). The court has reviewed the materials provided by Mr. Mills and concludes they are not appropriate for judicial notice because they contain facts subject to reasonable dispute. The court therefore DENIES Mr. Mills's request for judicial notice and excludes the documents from its consideration of the instant motion. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
C. Standing
Turning to the merits of the instant motion, Mr. Zeichner argues that Mr. Mills lacks standing to bring his claims. The court disagrees.
“Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element of standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). Washington law similarly requires a plaintiff to show that he suffered an injury in fact. Wash. State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. Nat'l Homebuyers Fund, Inc., 445 P.3d 533, 537 (Wash. 2019) (noting that state law “standing is not intended to be a particularly high bar,” and instead “serves to prevent a litigant from raising another's legal right”). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is ‘concrete and particularized' and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'” Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Generally, a plaintiff does not have standing to assert claims on behalf of parties who are not before the court. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (stating that an injured party “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”); see also Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[C]onstitutional claims are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously.”). Thus, a plaintiff “must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (emphasis added).
Here, Mr. Zeichner argues that Mr. Mills lacks standing because he (1) fails to articulate an “actionable constitutional injury” in fact (MJP at 17), and (2) improperly seeks to redress harm to A.K. rather than himself. Neither argument is persuasive.
The court understands the term “constitutional injury,” as used by Mr. Zeichner, to mean an injury caused by the alleged violation of Mr. Mills's constitutional rights, as opposed to an injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. (See MJP at 17 (arguing that Mr. Mills's claimed harm “does not constitute the type of permanent familial damage or deprivation of [Mr. Mills's] parental rights to constitute an actionable constitutional injury”).).
First, Mr. Mills has adequately pleaded an injury in fact with respect to his Section 1983 claim: the alleged deprivation of his fundamental right to direct the upbringing of his child. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6.C.1-6.C.9); see also Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has held that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). That is sufficient for standing purposes. In arguing to the contrary, Mr. Zeichner claims that Mr. Mills has not alleged an “actionable constitutional injury” because the stated harm “boil[s] down” to mere “familial stress and conflict.” (MJP at 17-18 (arguing that district courts in this Circuit have declined to recognize constitutional injury premised on nothing more than familial discord).) Mr. Zeichner appears to confuse the question of standing with the merits of Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim. In essence, Mr. Zeichner argues that Mr. Mills lacks standing because his alleged injury is based on a constitutional claim that fails as a matter of law and therefore is not “actionable.” (See id. at 17-19.) But Mr. Zeichner's cited cases do not support this proposition.
For example, in Harry A. v. Duncan, two parents sued high school officials after their daughter was unknowingly videotaped in the locker room by male students. 351 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1063-65 (D. Mont. 2005). Because the parents had conceded that they lacked standing to bring a derivative Section 1983 claim based on their daughter's injury, the parents attempted to avoid summary judgment by arguing that they themselves had suffered constitutional injury to the parent-child relationship. Id. at 1066. The district court observed that existing precedent established “a constitutionally protected right to be free from termination of the parent-child relationship,” but not from mere “disturb[ance to] the tranquility of the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). The parents' alternative theory of injury fell short of alleging termination of the parent-child relationship, and the court therefore granted summary judgment because the parents “failed to allege facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find in their favor”-not because they lacked standing. Id. at 1068-69. Accordingly, Harry A does not suggest that Mr. Mills lacks standing because his alleged injury amounts to mere familial conflict. And Mr. Zeichner's other cited cases do not support his position, either. (See MJP at 18 (first citing Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1060 (9th Cir. 2019) (no mention of standing); then citing Benitez v. Gresham-Barlow Sch. Dist., 3:12-CV-1003-ST, 2012 WL 3878419, at *7 (D. Ore. Sept. 6, 2012) (same); and then citing Teen Rescue v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-00457-JAM-EFB, 2019 WL 4511622, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2019) (dismissing claim for lack of standing where a challenged statute did not actually compel the plaintiff to do anything and the alleged constitutional injury was therefore “hypothetical” and not “real”).) That Mr. Mills's claimed injury stems from an alleged constitutional deprivation that may not ultimately be actionable does not necessarily preclude standing. The court concludes that Mr. Mills has sufficiently pleaded an injury in fact with respect to his Section 1983 claim.
To the extent Mr. Zeichner seeks dismissal of Mr. Mills's other claims based on his alleged failure to articulate an “actionable constitutional injury,” Mr. Zeichner is misguided. (See MJP at 17 (appearing to argue that Mr. Mills lacks standing to pursue any of his “claims” because “he has not alleged a concrete and particularized injury to his parental rights” (capitalization altered)).) Neither the tort of IIED nor RCW 4.24.010 requires a showing of constitutional injury; such a showing is relevant only to Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim. In any event, Mr. Mills has articulated an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to his claims for IIED and wrongful injury of a child. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6.A.3 (alleging that Mr. Zeichner's “outrageous conduct . . . caused injury . . . to Plaintiff”), 6.B.3 (alleging that Mr. Zeichner's acts “substantially injured” and “caused disruption of the parent-child relationship between [A.K.] and Plaintiff”).) The court therefore declines to grant judgment on the pleadings with respect to Mr. Mills's claims for IIED and under RCW 4.24.010 based on the lack of an “actionable constitutional injury.” (MJP at 17.)
Second, Mr. Mills has sufficiently alleged injury to himself. To start, Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim is premised on the alleged violation of his fundamental right to parent-a right that Mr. Mills himself plainly holds. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6.C.1-6.C.9); see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. Mr. Mills's claim under RCW 4.24.010 for injury to the parent-child relationship is similarly premised on harm to Mr. Mills-specifically, the “loss of love and companionship from [A.K.].” (Compl. ¶ 6.B.4.) Whether Mr. Mills has standing to assert his state law IIED claim is a closer call, as the complaint primarily seeks compensation for A.K.'s emotional distress. (See id. ¶¶ 6.A.3-6.A.4 (alleging that Mr. Zeichner's conduct “caused extreme emotional distress for [A.K.],” which manifested in physical illness and a “dramatic personality change”).) But the court is mindful that it must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and here, the complaint expressly states that Mr. Zeichner's “outrageous conduct . . . caused injury to [A.K.] and to Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 6.A.3 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, Mr. Mills has standing to assert his IIED claim to the extent he seeks to redress harm to himself. The court therefore declines to grant judgment on the pleadings based on lack of standing.
D. Immunity
Mr. Zeichner argues judgment on the pleadings is warranted because federal and state law immunize him from liability for Mr. Mills's claims. Mr. Zeichner raises three potential bases for immunity, and the court addresses each in turn.
1. Qualified Immunity
Mr. Zeichner argues that qualified immunity shields him from liability under Section 1983, and the court agrees. Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 150 (2017) (“Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to ‘discretionary functions' performed in their official capacities.”). The doctrine gives officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In evaluating qualified immunity, the court must ask two questions: “(1) whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the government official's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2011). “If the answer to either is ‘no,' the official cannot be held liable for damages.” Id. The court “may address the second question first, particularly where ‘it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.'” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S 223, 237 (2009)). The court begins and ends its analysis in this case with the second question.
A clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Dep't, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[C]ase law must ordinarily have been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that what he is doing violates federal law.”). Courts must not “‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality.'” Farnan, 654 F.3d at 986 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). A “sweeping statement of the law is . . . inappropriate for assessing whether qualified immunity applies.” Id. at 987; see also, e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”). Rather, the right alleged to have been violated must be defined in a “more particularized manner” and with “specificity.” Id. at 986-87 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). Although it is not necessary to identify a case “precisely like this one,” Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2009), there must be “some parallel or comparable factual pattern” to establish that the contours of the right were clearly established, Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, plaintiffs “generally ‘must identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the defendant] was held to have violated [that right].” Shafer, 868 F.3d at 1117.
The court concludes that the right of which Mr. Mills was allegedly deprived was not so “clearly established” as to defeat qualified immunity. Indeed, Mr. Mills fails to articulate the claimed right with any degree of particularity beyond his “fundamental federal and Constitutional rights regarding the care, upbringing, and education of [his] child” (Resp. at 21), which he alternatively describes as his parental right “to care for the health and welfare of his daughter” (id. at 38) and “to protect his child” (id. at 32). (See generally id.; Compl.) This is the type of generalized and “sweeping statement of the law” that the Supreme Court has expressly warned against in the context of qualified immunity. Farnan, 654 F.3d at 986; see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. Mr. Mills's overly broad framing of the claimed right in this case is perhaps understandable, as no court has ever recognized the fundamental due process right of a parent to compel a public school teacher to prevent a child from voluntarily participating in an extracurricular academic activity. Mr. Mills has cited no case to this effect (see generally Resp.), and the court is not aware of any such case. Existing precedent makes clear that the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children is neither unlimited nor does it extend as far as Mr. Mills would have it. See, e.g., Fields, 427 F.3d at 1204-05 (collecting cases illustrating that “parents' liberty interest in the custody, care, and nurture of their children” is not exclusive and frequently gives way to state regulation in educational settings). The Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted the view that, although
parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child. Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day, school discipline, the timing and content of examinations, the individuals hired to teach at the school, the extracurricular activities offered at the school or . . . a dress code, these issues of public education are generally committed to the control of state and local authorities.Id. at 1206 (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005)). In other words, the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children “does not extend beyond the threshold of the school door.” Id. at 1207. Accordingly, nothing in the law would have made clear to a reasonable person in Mr. Zeichner's position that encouraging A.K. to continue voluntarily participating in the Euro Challenge would violate Mr. Mills's constitutional rights. See Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 946. Mr. Zeichner is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
Mr. Mills argues the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply because Mr. Zeichner's allegedly offensive conduct reflected ministerial rather than discretionary functions. (Resp. at 10-11 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (stating that qualified “[i]mmunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions” as opposed to “‘ministerial' tasks”)).) The court is not persuaded. A ministerial duty “is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under circumstances admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.” Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. 347 (1868). Mr. Mills offers no explanation why he believes Mr. Zeichner's conduct should be considered ministerial. (See id.) Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Mills, none of the factual allegations in the complaint suggest that Mr. Zeichner's conduct was anything other than discretionary. (See generally Compl.) Indeed, as Mr. Zeichner points out, “Mr. Mills's Complaint consists of allegations criticizing Mr. Zeichner for his judgment, ‘poor teacher leadership,' and ‘poor decisions' relating to his advisory role for the Euro Challenge club.” (Reply at 3-4 (citing Compl. ¶ 4.6.6).) Mr. Zeichner's discretionary decisions lay at the very core of this case.
Because Mr. Zeichner is entitled to qualified immunity, the court GRANTS Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Mr. Mills's Section 1983 claim.
Mr. Zeichner next invokes immunity under the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7941 et seq. (the “Coverdell Act”). (MJP at 14-15.) The purpose of the Coverdell Act “is to provide teachers, principals, and other school professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 7942. To that end, the Coverdell Act provides that “no teacher in a school shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the teacher on behalf of the school” where the teacher was acting within the scope of their employment and “in furtherance of efforts to control, discipline, expel or suspend a student or maintain order or control in the classroom or school.” 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a)(1)-(3). See, e.g., Wormuth v. Lammersville Union Sch. Dist., 305 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1114-16, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (holding a school principal was entitled to immunity under the Act for allegedly negligent conduct pertaining to the control and discipline of a student who harassed the plaintiffs' child).
Here, the complaint is devoid of factual allegations suggesting that Mr. Zeichner's allegedly unlawful conduct pertains to the control or discipline of a student. Rather, the challenged conduct relates to an extracurricular activity that A.K. voluntarily undertook with Mr. Zeichner's encouragement. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4.2-4.3, 4.6.6, 4.7-4.15 (describing Mr. Zeichner's actions in encouraging A.K. to continue participating in the Euro Challenge without Mr. Mills's knowledge or permission).) Because the conduct at issue does not relate to the control or discipline of a student, Mr. Zeichner is not entitled to immunity under the Coverdell Act.
3. RCW 4.24.470
Lastly, Mr. Zeichner invokes RCW 4.24.470 as a basis for immunity. (MJP at 15-16.) RCW 4.24.470 provides that “[a]n appointed or elected official or member of the governing body of a public agency is immune from civil liability for damages for any discretionary decision or failure to make a discretionary decision within his or her official capacity.” RCW 4.24.470(1). See, e.g., Doscher v. Timberland Reg'l Libr., No. 3:22-cv-05340-RJB, 2022 WL 4534403, at *1, *7 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 2022) (applying RCW 4.24.470 to immunize library board members from claims stemming from incidents in which library staff instructed the plaintiff to comply with COVID-19 masking policies). The statute expressly defines “public agency” to include school districts, and it defines “governing body” as “the policy-making body of a public agency.” RCW 4.24.470(2)(a)-(b).
The court fails to see how RCW 4.24.470 applies to Mr. Zeichner, a public school teacher. To qualify for immunity under that statute, Mr. Zeichner would have to show that he is an “appointed or elected official” or that he is a member of the policy-making body of Seattle Public Schools, RCW 4.24.470(1), but he has shown neither. (See generally Am. Answer (Dkt. # 29) (no allegation that Mr. Zeichner is appointed, elected, or belongs to the school board); MJP (same); MJP Reply (same).) Although Mr. Zeichner would interpret the statute broadly to encompass discretionary acts by any government employee undertaken within the scope of employment (MJP Reply at 6-7), such an expansive reading would contravene the plain language of the statute, which unambiguously limits discretionary immunity to only certain government officials. See RCW 4.24.470(1). The court concludes that Mr. Zeichner does not fall within the class of government officials protected by RCW 4.24.470.
E. Mr. Mills's Remaining Claims
Because qualified immunity shields Mr. Zeichner from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but his other theories of immunity fail, Mr. Mills's state law claims remain to be addressed. The court next examines whether Mr. Mills has stated a claim for IIED or wrongful injury of a child under RCW 4.24.010. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Zeichner is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to each remaining claim.
1. IIED
Mr. Mills raises a claim for IIED. To prove such a claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) the actual result of severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632 (Wash. 2003). The first element requires proof that the conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002) (quoting Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1012 (Wash. 1989)). In addition, a third party IIED plaintiff “must be an immediate family member of the person who is the object of the defendant's actions, and he must be present at the time of such conduct.” Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333, 337 (Wash. 1998) (quoting Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (Wash. 1975)) (affirming dismissal of IIED claim because the plaintiffs “were simply not present when the conduct occurred”).
Mr. Mills's IIED claim fails for two reasons. First, Mr. Mills does not allege that he was physically present to witness any of the conduct at issue (see generally Compl.), which is a requirement of third-party IIED claims in Washington, Reid, 961 P.2d at 337. Mr. Mills instead alleges that Mr. Zeichner conspired with A.K. outside his presence and without his knowledge. (See id. ¶¶ 4.9-4.15, 4.17.) In fact, Mr. Mills did not even learn of the offending conduct until months after it happened. (Id. ¶¶ 4.7 (explaining that Mr. Mills withdrew his consent to A.K.'s participation in the Euro Challenge on April 11, 2022), 4.15 (stating that A.K. continued participating through May 2022), 4.17 (“I did not find out about Zeichner's and [A.K.]'s deception until August 20, 2022.”).) This case is no different than Lund v. Caple, where the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an IIED claim because the plaintiff “did not even learn of the conduct until several months later.” Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226, 228-29 (Wash. 1984) (holding an IIED claim against a pastor who slept with the plaintiff's wife was “fatal[ly] flaw[ed]” because the plaintiff was not present at the time of the affair). Because Mr. Mills was not present, his IIED claim fails.
Second, even when viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Mills, Mr. Zeichner's conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim for IIED. At worst, Mr. Zeichner manipulated A.K. to do something that Mr. Mills did not want her to do. Washington cases allowing an IIED claim to proceed involve acts that are far more extreme than those alleged here. See, e.g., Grimsby, 530 P.2d at 295-96 (allowing claim to proceed where plaintiff alleged he had to “witness the terrifying agony and explicit pain and suffering of his wife while she [p]roceeded to die right in front of his eyes” as a result of doctor's failure to provide medical care); Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 631-32 (affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff where defendant stalked plaintiff for at least three years, was convicted multiple times for violations of no-contact orders, called plaintiff over 700 times at her home and place of work, and threatened to kill plaintiff and the man she was dating); cf. Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 543, 545 (Wash.Ct.App. 2006) (holding the record did not establish “the required intent or necessary severity” to sustain an IIED claim where juveniles took plaintiff's cat from her front porch, doused it in gasoline, and set it on fire, killing it). The court has little trouble concluding that Mr. Zeichner's conduct was neither extreme nor outrageous. The court therefore GRANTS Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Mr. Mills's IIED claim.
2. RCW 4.24.010
Finally, Mr. Mills raises a claim under RCW 4.24.010, which authorizes a cause of action for damages for the wrongful death or injury of a child. See RCW 4.24.010(1) (providing that a parent “who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child” may maintain “an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a child”). The statute permits recovery for both economic and non-economic losses, including “for the loss of love and companionship of the child, loss of the child's emotional support, and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship.” RCW 4.24.010(2). In other words, the statute provides for loss of parent-child consortium damages that flow from the child's injury or death. See, e.g., Colleen v. United States, 843 F.2d 329, 330, 332-33 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming award of $300,000 in non-economic damages under RCW 4.24.010 to the parents of an infant who suffered severe and permanently disabling brain damage at birth due to the hospital's negligence).
Mr. Mills's claim under RCW 4.24.010 is somewhat out of the ordinary in that he seeks loss of consortium damages based on emotional rather than physical injury to A.K. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4.14-4.25, 6.B.3 (alleging that Mr. Zeichner's conduct caused mental and emotional harm to A.K., which caused a personality change and physical symptoms of stress).) Notably, the statutory text does not expressly foreclose such claims. See RCW 4.24.010 (placing no limitation on the types of injuries that may be cognizable). As one court has recognized, whether non-physical injuries such as constitutional violations or mental and emotional harm “are cognizable as a child's ‘injury' within the meaning of RCW 4.24.010 appears to be a novel question of Washington law.” Jones v. Grant Cnty., No. CV-12-0188-EFS, 2012 WL377796, at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2012) (conducting a statutory interpretation analysis and concluding that the parents could “seek recovery under RCW 4.24.010 based on . . . violations of [the child's] constitutional rights.”). For the reasons explained infra, however, the court finds it unnecessary to decide whether RCW 4.24.010 contemplates claims predicated on non-physical injury to a child. The court will assume for purposes of this motion that such a claim is cognizable.
Mr. Zeichner argues dismissal is warranted because RCW 4.24.010 only authorizes loss of consortium damages that result from injury to the child-not from injury to the parent-child relationship itself, as Mr. Mills has alleged. (See MJP at 22-23 (arguing that Mr. Mills merely alleges “his daughter was injured because of damage to the parent-child relationship; not that the injury or death of A.K. caused him to experience damage to his parent-child relationship.”).) The court, however, must liberally construe the complaint, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, which expressly states that Mr. Zeichner's “wrongful acts harmed [A.K.]'s emotional and physical health, and led to a change in her personality, all of which damaged and continue to damage the parent-child relationship between Plaintiff and [A.K.].” (Compl. ¶ 6.B.3.) Stated differently, Mr. Mills asserts that Mr. Zeichner directly injured A.K. which, in turn, injured the parent-child relationship. The court respectfully disagrees with Mr. Zeichner's characterization of the complaint and declines to dismiss Mr. Mills's wrongful injury claim on this basis.
Mr. Mills's wrongful injury claim fails for a different reason: Mr. Mills has failed to plausibly show that Mr. Zeichner's conduct was wrongful in the eyes of the law. A claim under RCW 4.24.010 necessarily requires some showing that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, meaning that the defendant can be held legally liable for the offending conduct. See Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 171-72 (Wash.Ct.App. 1992) (affirming summary dismissal of claim under RCW 4.24.010 where there was no evidence that the defendant caused the alleged injury, and thus was not liable for that injury); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. 1954) (explaining that an action for wrongful death is derivative “in the sense that it derives from the wrongful act causing the death”); Dowler v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, No. 06-2-08565-1, 2012 WL 12977571, at *3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2012) (dismissing claim for damage to the parent-child relationship under RCW 4.24.010 because it was predicated on other claims that had been dismissed on summary judgment); 7 Robert Michael Ey, Causes of Action 319 § 12 (2d ed. 2023) (explaining that, to state a prima facie case of wrongful death or injury, it is “necessary to establish the defendant's liability for the injury or death of the plaintiff's child” (citing Benoy, 831 P.2d 166)). Here, Mr. Mills's Section 1983 and IIED claims fail as a matter of law. (Supra §§ III.D.1, E.1.) It would make little sense to permit a claim under RCW 4.24.010 where the court has dismissed Mr. Mills's other claims and there is no remaining basis on which to hold Mr. Zeichner liable for his allegedly injurious conduct. Because there is no corresponding showing of potential liability, the court GRANTS Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Mr. Mills's claim under RCW 4.24.010.
F. Leave to Amend
Mr. Mills requests the court's leave to amend his complaint. (Resp. at 40.) A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without leave to amend ‘unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Conversely, a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where amendment would be futile. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint with prejudice where the claims could not possibly be cured by amendment).
The court concludes that amendment would be futile in this case. There is no set of facts that Mr. Mills could plead, consistent with the allegations in his original complaint, that would overcome qualified immunity or state a claim for IIED. At its core, this case is about a public high school teacher's conduct in encouraging a student to participate in an extracurricular academic activity. Controlling Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses the proposition that Mr. Zeichner violated clearly established law based on conduct that occurred inside “the threshold of the school door.” Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206. And because the offending conduct occurred entirely outside of Mr. Mills's presence- indeed, he only learned of Mr. Zeichner's conduct months after it occurred-there are no additional facts Mr. Mills could plead that would meet the requirement of physical presence to state a claim for IIED. See Reid, 961 P.2d at 337-38. Having determined that amendment would be futile with respect to Mr. Mills's Section 1983 and IIED claims, the court concludes amendment would be similarly futile with respect to his wrongful injury claim. A claim under RCW 4.24.010 necessarily requires some corresponding basis of liability, and here, there is none. See Benoy, 831 P.2d at 171-72. The court therefore DENIES Mr. Mills's request for leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Mr. Zeichner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. # 43) and DENIES Mr. Mills's motions (Dkt. ## 21, 41) as moot. This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.