Opinion
April 11, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Helen Freedman, J.).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the party against whom summary judgment is sought, a reasonable trier of fact could find that plaintiff worked in proximity to where defendant's predecessor's products were being used, and that he was exposed to asbestos emitted therefrom (see, Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. [Salerno v Garlock Inc.], 212 A.D.2d 463). Certainly, plaintiff has submitted adequate proof that defendant's predecessor was likely to have furnished the asbestos products that were among those to which plaintiff was exposed. "The plaintiff is not required to show the precise causes of his damages, but only to show facts and conditions from which defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. [Brooklyn Nav. Shipyard Cases], 188 A.D.2d 214, 225, affd 82 N.Y.2d 821). This is particularly true on defendant's motion for summary judgment, where plaintiff is required only to show the existence of triable questions of fact, and where any doubt must be resolved against summary resolution." (Reid v Georgia-Pacific Corp., 212 A.D.2d 462, 463.) Diel v Flintkote Co. ( 204 A.D.2d 53) and Cawein v Flintkote Co. ( 203 A.D.2d 105), on which defendant relies, are distinguishable in that in those cases "there was no showing that opened packages of [the] defendant[s'] * * * asbestos were placed in the zone of those plaintiffs' exposure" (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. [Salerno v Garlock Inc.], supra, at 464).
Concur — Wallach, J.P., Asch, Nardelli, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.