Opinion
No. 504, 2004.
Submitted: May 20, 2005.
Decided: July 18, 2005
Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID No. 91002433DI.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 18th day of July 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Lenard Miller, Jr., filed an appeal from the Superior Court's September 30, 2004 order denying his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
Miller's first postconviction motion was denied by the Superior Court. This Court dismissed Miller's appeal from that order as untimely. Miller v. State, Del. Supr., No. 145, 1996, Veasey, C.J. (Apr. 22, 1996).
(2) In July 1992, Miller was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of two counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. He was sentenced to a total of 35 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 30 years for decreasing levels of probation. Miller's convictions were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
Miller v. State, Del. Supr., No. 471, 1992, Moore, J. (Nov. 1, 1993).
(3) In this appeal, Miller claims that: a) the prosecution engaged in misconduct at trial; b) the prosecution failed to properly collect and preserve evidence; c) the trial was unfair in that it was presided over by a biased judge; and d) his counsel provided ineffective assistance.
(4) Because Miller's postconviction motion had to be filed within three years of the date his conviction became final, it clearly is untimely. Furthermore, because this is Miller's second postconviction motion, any ground for relief that was not asserted in his previous postconviction motion is procedurally barred. In order to overcome these hurdles, Miller must demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation that undermined the legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. To the extent that Miller asserts claims that were formerly adjudicated, he must demonstrate that reconsideration of those claims is warranted in the interest of justice.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). The record reflects that the mandate in Miller's case was issued by the Clerk on November 17, 1993; therefore, his motion had to be filed no later than November 17, 1996 in order to be timely. Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554-55 (Del. 1990).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
(5) Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the Superior Court that Miller has failed to demonstrate that the procedural bars should not apply. Moreover, to the extent Miller seeks to overcome the procedural bars by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to demonstrate that any alleged error on the part of his counsel prejudiced his case.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.