Opinion
No. 118423.
2012-06-28
Robert MILLER, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant.
Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP by Nicole Bellina, Esq., for Claimant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York by Thomas R. Monjeau, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant.
Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP by Nicole Bellina, Esq., for Claimant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York by Thomas R. Monjeau, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant.
JAMES H. FERREIRA, J.
Claimant Robert Miller filed a claim in the Court of Claims on May 18, 2010, seeking damages for alleged wrongful confinement, negligence and violation of claimant's state constitutional rights. The claim alleges that defendant confined claimant “for approximately 30 days beyond his legally imposed sentence” (Claim, ¶ 2). Issue was joined on July 15, 2010 and discovery ensued. A trial on liability was held on April 17, 2012. Claimant called Timothy Kelly, an employee with the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter NYSDOCCS), as a witness. Defendant called no witnesses. Several documents were offered and received into evidence without objection.
Effective April 2011, the Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole were merged to form the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.
The underlying facts of this claim are not in dispute. Claimant, who was 64 years of age at the time of the alleged wrongful confinement, was sentenced for narcotics related offenses to a determinate sentence of 1 1/2 years confinement and 1 1/2 years of post-release supervision (hereinafter PRS) ( see defendant's exhibit A). Claimant's incarceration maximum expiration (hereinafter ME) date was May 4, 2009, and his PRS ME date was November 4, 2010 ( see claimant's exhibits 1 and 6). Claimant had served his sentence at Rikers Island, a New York City facility, before arriving at Downstate Correctional Facility (hereinafter Downstate), a State institution, on May 12, 2009 ( see id.). Claimant was released by Downstate on June 3, 2009 ( see claimant's exhibit 6).
It appears from the Uniform Sentence and Commitment that claimant was also sentenced on May 4, 2009 ( see defendant's exhibit A).
Claimant asserts that he was incarcerated beyond his ME date. Defendant does not dispute claimant served time beyond his ME date, but asserts that claimant's confinement was privileged and that the State was not negligent because the State had to take measures to ensure that, prior to claimant's release, conditions for his PRS, such as his housing and any treatment components, were in place.
Claimant called Timothy Kelly, a NYSDOCCS employee since November 1997, who testified that in March 2009, he was a Facility Parole Supervising Officer II at Downstate. In that position he oversaw parole operations and supervised staff. He generally supervised two parole officers, but at that time, supervised only one parole officer. The parole officer interviews inmates and prepares them for their release into the community and for appearances before the Parole Board. Kelly also supervised parole support staff, including three keyboard specialists, one of whom was Jacqueline Truet, a Keyboard Specialist II. Kelly acknowledged that, on occasion, inmates arrive at Downstate past their release date or ME date. In such circumstances, those inmates are referred to as “emergency” or “immediate release”. Kelly and his staff learned about such inmates by an e-mail from the inmate records or admissions offices. Once notified, his staff prepared a folder for each inmate containing the inmate's pre-sentence report, rap sheet, sentence and commitment papers, and any orders of protection. The folder is then given to a parole officer “as quickly as possible” who then reviews the contents and interviews the inmate. Delays in giving the folder to a parole officer can occur if there are “multiple cases at once” or an officer is out sick. The parole officer can usually conduct the interview for an inmate held past his ME date “that day or the next day.” After the interview, the parole officer enters the information, including the proposed address for the inmate, into the case management system (hereinafter CMS [a computer database] ) and assigns the inmate a field parole officer from the area where the inmate would be reporting. The parole officer also signs any release papers and enters any other relevant “special needs” information into the CMS concerning the inmate.
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the electronic audio recording of the trial.
The next step involves sending the inmate's folder to Kelly to request conditions from the Parole Board. Kelly then sends the Parole Board an e-mail with “recommended special conditions”. Notification that an inmate is beyond his ME date is sent to the Secretary to the Board of Parole. The length of time for a response from the Parole Board can vary “from case to case” and can be a day, two days or even a week. Kelly stated that the usual time frame for a response from the Parole Board is “two or three days” and that there is no difference in response time when an inmate is past his or her ME date. Once the conditions are received from the Parole Board, Kelly and his staff ensure the inmate's proposed residency is approved by the field office and that there are no other issues precluding his release, such as any outstanding warrants or other detainers.
Here, claimant arrived at Downstate on Tuesday, May 12, 2009. Kelly was first notified that claimant was past his ME date by e-mail on Thursday, May 14, 2009, ( see claimant's exhibit 2). A May 14, 2009 memorandum from NYSDOCCS addressed to claimant acknowledges receipt of a letter from claimant regarding his release date and directs a NYSDOCCS employee to investigate the matter and answer directly to claimant ( see claimant's exhibit 5).
A parole officer interviewed claimant on Tuesday, May 19, 2009, and claimant's information was entered in the CMS system on that date. Eight days later, on Wednesday, May 27, 2009, Kelly notified the Parole Board by e-mail that he needed approval of parole conditions for claimant ( see claimant's exhibit 4). Kelly received approval of the conditions from the Parole Board on Friday, May 29, 2009.
Kelly contacted the field office by telephone regarding approval for claimant's residency on Friday, May 29, 2009. Kelly followed up again by telephone with the field office on Monday, June 1, 2009 and Tuesday, June 2, 2009. Kelly received residence approval and assignment of a parole officer on June 2, 2009 and signed claimant out for release. Claimant was released on Wednesday, June 3, 2009.
During cross-examination, Kelly stated that before an inmate assigned to PRS is released, there must be a supervision plan and an approved address in place. He also stated that the parole office staff does not work at the correctional facility on weekends or holidays. Parole Officer Royce, the only parole officer at the facility at that time, interviewed claimant on May 19, 2009. After that interview, Kelly learned that claimant did not have a home or residence. This information was entered into the CMS system and became part of the inmates's community preparation package, which was then sent to the Manhattan 3 field office. As of May 21, 2009, a release date had not been assigned for claimant ( see claimant's exhibit 3). Kelly could not recall exactly why it took until Wednesday, May 27, 2009, to contact the Parole Board for approval of conditions. He attributed the delay to being “short-staffed” and having one less parole officer at the facility. Approval from the Parole Board was received on May 29, 2009. At that time, no parole officer or senior parole officer in the Manhattan field office had been assigned to claimant. Kelly contacted the field office again on June 1 and June 2. On June 1 Kelly learned that claimant's residency would be the Bellevue Men's Shelter, and on June 2 learned who was assigned to claimant as a field parole officer. On the afternoon of June 2, he reviewed with claimant his release papers, parole conditions, and residency. Claimant was then discharged on June 3, 2009.
“The elements of a cause of action for unlawful confinement are that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged' “ (Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d 988, 991 [2010], quoting Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 85 [2001];accord Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 556 [1977];Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 [1975],cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929 [1975] ). There is no dispute based on the evidence proffered at trial that the first three elements are satisfied. Defendant incarcerated claimant following his conviction for narcotics related offenses. Claimant was conscious of his confinement and opposed it as demonstrated by his letter inquiry to prison officials regarding his release date ( see claimant's exhibit 5).
The only issue needing further examination is whether claimant's confinement beyond his ME date of May 4, 2009 until his release on June 3, 2009, was privileged. It is well settled that “confinement [is] privileged to the extent that it is imposed under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with regulations” (Gittens v. State of New York, 132 Misc.2d 399, 402 [1986];see also Hudson v. State of New York, 35 Misc.3d 241, 248, [2011];Mickens v. State of New York, 25 Misc.3d 191, 200 [2009] ). Where the terms of confinement are set forth in a sentence and commitment order “prison officials are conclusively bound by the contents of commitment papers accompanying a prisoner' “ (Matter of Murray v. Goord, 1 N.Y.3d 29, 32 [2003], quoting Middleton v. State of New York, 54 A.D.2d 450, 452 [1976],affd43 N.Y.2d 678 [1977][emphasis added] ). Notably, “it is defendant and not claimant who bears the burden of proving that confinement was privileged” ( Nelson v. State of New York, 20 Misc.3d 1125[A] [2008], affd67 A.D.3d 1142 [2009];see also Gonzalez v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 810, 812 [1985];Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d 988, 991–992 [2010] ).
Based upon these principles and their application to the facts presented here, and after weighing the evidence proffered at trial, including the exhibits received into evidence and the testimony and demeanor of the witness, the Court finds that claimant has proven his cause of action sounding in wrongful confinement against defendant by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
Here, defendant argues that “the State's imprisonment of Mr. Miller beyond his ME date was privileged based upon the valid Sentence and Commitment which placed claimant in the custody of DOCCS and directed that DOCCS set up and impose a term of PRS” (defendant's post-trial memorandum, p. 4). In support of that argument, defendant relies on this Court's Decision in Jackson v. State of New York, UID No.2010–039–209 [Ct Cl, Ferreira, J., Dec. 6, 2010] ), in which the Court affirmed that “[g]enerally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged [citation omitted] and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment” ( id., quoting Holmberg v. County of Albany, 291 A.D.2d 610, 612 [2002],lv denied98 N.Y.2d 604 [2002] ).
The flaw in defendant's reasoning, however, is that while the existence of a facially valid order directing “confinement” insulates those involved from liability for claims of false imprisonment with respect to the confinement directed in the sentencing order ( see Jackson v. State of New York, supra ), it does not follow that imprisoning someone beyond his or her ME date is privileged. The Uniform Sentence and Commitment in this case directed that claimant serve a “Definite/Determinate” sentence of “1 1/2 yrs (Det)” (defendant's exhibit A). The trial testimony and defendant's own documents clearly establish that claimant's ME date of May 4, 2009 was the maximum date claimant could be held ( see claimant's exhibits 1, 2, 3; see also claimant's exhibit 4 [NYSDOCCS electronic message to Parole Board dated May 27, 2009, requesting conditions for claimant “who is past his Incarcerative M.E. date”] ). In other words, the privilege extended to NYSDOCCS to confine claimant attaches for the duration of the determinate sentence for the actual imprisonment or confinement ordered. Any confinement beyond that specifically authorized by the sentence and commitment order is not privileged ( see Greaves v. State of New York, 35 Misc.3d 290, 296 [2011] [DOCS' “determination to hold claimant beyond the time as required by the order of the sentencing court is not privileged”] ).
Although claimant's sentence included a period of PRS, that does not, contrary to defendant's argument, grant NYSDOCCS the authority to confine claimant beyond the date he is supposed to be released from prison. Defendant insists that it expended diligent efforts to secure the terms of claimant's PRS as quickly as possible, knowing that claimant was being held after his ME date had passed, including obtaining conditions from the Parole Board and finding a residence for claimant. While laudable, the Court can discern no statutory or regulatory authority-nor has defendant established any legal basis-justifying the confinement of claimant beyond his incarceration ME date, as defendant sorts out the details associated with imposing PRS. Moreover, no legal instrument, court order or documentary support was proffered by defendant to establish that claimant could be lawfully held beyond his ME date ( see Sanabria v. State of New York, supra at 991–992, 908 N.Y.S.2d 527).
Defendant's reliance on Donald v. State of New York (17 N.Y.3d 389 [2011] ) is similarly misplaced. That case has little, if any, relevance to the instant facts, where it is undisputed that claimant was confined beyond his ME date. In Donald, supra, the Court addressed four cases where the claimants had received determinate sentences and the sentencing judge had not imposed PRS terms. The Department of Correctional Services (hereinafter DOCS) subsequently entered PRS terms for each of the four claimants administratively. The Court held, inter alia, that DOCS was immune from liability on the ground that even though DOCS made “a mistake in judgment” in imposing the PRS administratively, DOCS “was exercising-albeit mistakenly-the discretion given it by law [and] its acts cannot be a basis for state liability” ( id. at 395, 396, 929 N.Y.S.2d 552, 953 N.E.2d 790).
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that claimant has established by a preponderance of the credible evidence his cause of action sounding in wrongful confinement against defendant for the period of time from May 12, 2009 through June 3, 2009, during which claimant was confined at Downstate. Because claimant has established his cause of action sounding in wrongful confinement, the Court declines to address the other two causes of action alleged in the claim that arise out of the same conduct. Any motions made at trial upon which the Court had previously reserved or which remain undecided are denied.
Although claimant's incarceration ME date was May 4, 2009, defendant received claimant into its custody at Downstate on May 12, 2009. Thus, the time period for which defendant may be held liable begins on May 12, 2009 and runs through June 3, 2009, the date claimant was released ( see claimant's exhibits 1 and 6).
Notably, because claimant has established his cause of action sounding in wrongful confinement, defendant cannot be liable for negligence based upon the same conduct ( see e.g. Wertzberger v. City of New York, 254 A.D.2d 352, 352 [1998];Cummins v. Schouten, 160 A.D.2d 1165 [1990] ).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter an interlocutory judgment on the issue of liability in accordance with this decision. The Court will schedule a trial on the issue of damages as soon as is practicable.
Let interlocutory judgment be entered accordingly.