Opinion
No. 05-11-00282-CR
07-16-2012
TARIQ MUSTAFFA MILLER, Appellant v. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed July 16, 2012.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 002-82138-10
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Murphy, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Fillmore
Tariq Mustaffa Miller pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of failure to identify. The trial court assessed punishment of twenty-days' confinement. In a single issue, Miller contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence stemming from his investigatory detention because the police officers lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. We affirm the trial court's judgment. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in this case is well settled. Background
In the record, the spelling of Miller's middle name is inconsistent. In this opinion, we utilize the spelling contained in the judgment.
Miller was arrested for public intoxication. As a result of providing false identification information to a peace officer at the time of the arrest, Miller was charged with the misdemeanor offense of failure to identify, with status as a fugitive at the time of the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b) & (d) (West 2011). Prior to trial, Miller filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from his detention, contending the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to detain and interrogate him and, therefore, he was unlawfully detained in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions and the code of criminal procedure.
At the hearing of the motion to suppress, the trial court heard evidence that on March 16, 2010, at approximately 12:45 a.m., Plano Police Department dispatch received a call from an unidentified caller regarding a disturbance in an apartment complex parking lot. Officer Shawn Carter was the first to arrive on the scene and to make contact with the subjects. Officer Alan Hassan arrived immediately thereafter. Hassan testified that police department dispatch advised there was a disturbance between a male and a female in the parking lot in front of Building 14 of the apartment complex, and the female could be heard screaming. Hassan believed the call notes indicated the subjects were African-American. However, Hassan admitted his arrest report does not mention that dispatch relayed the race of the subjects or informed him the woman had been screaming. He could not recall whether the male was sitting or standing when he arrived at the scene. Hassan did not know whether the caller was anonymous and knew nothing of the reliability of the caller or how the caller came to observe the subjects. While at the scene, neither officer sought out the caller.
When Hassan arrived at the apartment complex, he saw Carter talking to a male and female. For officer safety, Hassan requested Carter to send the male to him for further investigation. Hassan observed Miller's eyes to be red and bloodshot and that he was swaying as he tried to stand still. Miller complied with Hassan's request that he sit on the curb. In response to questioning, Miller stated he and Linda Turner, his girlfriend with whom he lived, had been arguing in the parking lot, but no acts of violence occurred. Miller also stated he had consumed one beer prior to the argument. He was planning to remain at the location. When asked to identify himself, Miller told Hassan his name was Yasin Carroll.
Turner testified she was Miller's girlfriend at the time he was arrested. According to Turner, she and Miller were in the parking lot outside Turner's apartment, with Miller sitting in a car and Turner standing outside the vehicle, and they were arguing.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and signed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
F1. On March 16, 2010, a Plano police dispatcher received a call from an unidentified caller regarding a disturbance occurring in front of Building 14 at 3300 West Park Boulevard, Plano, Texas.The trial court concluded that "[e]ven if the officer's initial contact had been an encounter, reasonable suspicion of public intoxication developed contemporaneously with the initial contact; and the officer lawfully detained [Miller] upon observation of the signs of intoxication."
F2. Police were dispatched to a parking lot of an apartment complex in Plano, Texas to investigate an argument.
F3. It was unknown to Officer Hassan and the other responding officers the identity of the reporting party. It was unknown if the reporting party was a resident of the complex, how or if the party actually observed the disturbance. No attempt was made by the officers at the scene to ascertain the identity of the caller.
F4. It was unknown to the responding officers the approximate age, height, and weight of those engaged in the disturbance. It was unknown whether the parties were near a car, and if so, the make, model, color or description of said car. The responding officers knew that a female was yelling at a male in front of Building 14.
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F6. Officer Carter was the first to arrive and made contact with both subjects. Officer Hassan immediately followed. Mr. Miller was sitting inside a car and Ms. Turner was standing by the car. For safety and investigative concerns, the officers separated the subjects with Officer Hassan ending up with the male.
F7. The male subject, who was eventually identified as Tariq Mustaffa Miller, was ordered near Officer Hassan, and swayed slightly as he stood in front of the officer. Miller's eyes were red and bloodshot. Hassan asked Miller to sit on the curb and he complied. In response to questioning, Miller stated he and his girlfriend had been arguing in the parking lot but that no acts of violence had occurred.
F8. Miller stated that he lived with the female subject and that he had consumed one beer prior to the argument. Miller initially stated he was planning to leave the location, but then stated he was planning on staying at the location. At this point the officer asked the male subject for his driver's license and to identify himself; whereupon, what turned out to be a fictitious name was given to the peace officer.
Miller pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of failure to identify, with status as a fugitive, and the trial court assessed punishment of twenty-days' confinement. Miller filed this appeal.
Discussion
In his sole issue on appeal, Miller contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress all evidence stemming from his investigatory detention. Miller argues the police officers lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we apply an abuse of discretion standard and overturn the trial court's ruling only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We apply a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, while reviewing pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on credibility determinations under a de novo standard. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923. This standard of review applies specifically to a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The trial court is the sole trier of fact and the judge of witness credibility and weight to be given to witness testimony. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Where, as in this case, the trial court makes explicit findings, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, supports those findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo and will uphold the ruling so long as it is supported by the record and correct under any legal theory applicable to the case. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Banda v. State, 317 S.W.3d 903, 907-08 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
B. Applicable Law
1. Encounters and Detentions
There are three distinct types of interactions between police officers and citizens: (1) consensual encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests. State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine into which category an interaction falls. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49.
An officer may initiate a consensual encounter with a citizen without any objective justification, and the citizen is free to terminate the encounter at will. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466. An encounter takes place when an officer approaches a citizen in a public place, asks questions, and the citizen willingly listens and answers. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49. An officer is as free as anyone to stop and question a fellow citizen and may, without reasonable suspicion, request identification and information from a citizen. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466.
An investigatory detention occurs when a person yields to an officer's show of authority under a reasonable belief he is not free to leave. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49. The inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the citizen's position would have felt free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. An officer is justified in briefly detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable cause. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the detaining officer and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the detention exists. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When an officer subjects a defendant to an investigatory detention, the State's burden at a suppression hearing is to prove the reasonableness of the warrantless detention. Id.
2. Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the content of the information known to the officer as well as its degree of reliability. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923. The State need not, however, establish a crime actually occurred prior to the investigatory detention. Id. In determining what constitutes reasonable suspicion, a court may look only at those facts known to the officer at the inception of the detention, and a detention or search unlawful at its inception may not be validated by what it turns up. State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) ("The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search."). The reasonableness of a temporary detention is examined in terms of the "totality of the circumstances" at its inception. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. Individual circumstances must not be considered in isolation, and the facts known to the officer must amount to something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Id. at 35.
3. Public Intoxication
"Intoxicated" means "not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body". Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(A) (West 2011). The offense of public intoxication occurs when "the person appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another." Id. at § 49.02(a) (West 2011). A public place includes the common areas of apartment complexes, such as parking lots. See id. at § 1.07(40) (West 2011) ("public place" means any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes streets and common areas of apartment houses). An intoxicated individual who has access to a vehicle poses a danger to himself or others sufficient to detain or arrest the person for public intoxication. See Meek v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 175 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd)). Indeed, an intoxicated person can pose such a danger regardless of whether he has access to a vehicle. Meek, 175 S.W.3d at 927. The intoxicated individual need not commit any dangerous acts in the presence of an officer in order to pose a sufficient danger to himself or others. See id. It is enough if the officer observes a degree of intoxication indicating the individual poses a potential danger to himself or others. Id.
C. Analysis
Officers Carter and Hassan responded to a 9-1-1 call, a police department function not requiring reasonable suspicion. See generally, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 772.102 (West 2010) (purpose of subchapter is to establish 9-1-1 as primary emergency telephone number to make possible quick response to any person calling the phone number by police, fire, medical, rescue, and other emergency services). Neither Miller's nor Turner's testimony at the suppression hearing revealed facts indicating the initial encounter between them and the officers was a detention. Although both Miller and Turner testified the first responding officer parked his vehicle behind the vehicle Miller was sitting in and Turner was standing by, this was insufficient to qualify as a detention. See Thomas v. State, 633 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd) (investigatory detention did not begin when police officers stopped their car in front of the car in which defendant was sitting). A reasonable person in Miller's position would have felt free to ask the officer to move the squad car. Further, Miller admitted he lived at the complex. A reasonable person in that circumstance would have felt free to go inside his apartment and not to talk to the police officer. See Ashton v. State, 931 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (no investigatory detention occurred when police officer approached appellant sitting in a parked car in a public place and asked her to roll down her window). The officers did not need reasonable suspicion or other objective justification to engage Miller and Turner as they were talking in the parking lot. See State v. Woodard, 314 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010) (police officer was justified in approaching appellee on public sidewalk and asking a few questions, and police officer needed no articulable suspicion to engage appellee in this manner), aff'd, 341 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). According to the testimony of Miller and Turner at the hearing of the motion to suppress, they had been yelling at one another. Separating Miller from Turner soon after the police officers arrived for the police officer's safety and as a matter of protocol, did not constitute a detention of Miller.
We conclude the interaction between Miller and the police officers prior to Miller being asked to sit on the curb was a consensual encounter. The police officers needed no reasonable suspicion or other objective justification to engage Miller and Turner in questioning during the consensual encounter. See Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466; Woodard, 314 S.W.3d at 94. Miller was not detained until he was asked by Hassan to sit on the curb. Our analysis therefore focuses on whether Hassan had reasonable suspicion of public intoxication to justify Miller's temporary detention.
Hassan testified at the motion to suppress hearing concerning the objective facts that formed the basis for his investigative detention of Miller. Hassan's suspicion of public intoxication was based upon his observation of Miller's red and bloodshot eyes and Miller's swaying as he stood in front of Hassan. Further, evidence at the hearing of the motion to suppress established Miller was seated in the driver's seat of a vehicle when interacting with Turner, and Miller acknowledged he consumed a beer prior to the argument with Turner. Miller's physical condition in the apartment complex parking lot established a reasonable suspicion Miller was publicly intoxicated. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 1.07(40) & 49.01(2)(A). Although Miller testified he did not intend to drive away from the apartment complex, Hassan could have reasonably determined Miller posed a threat to himself or others by having access to a vehicle, justifying Hassan detaining Miller. See Meek, 175 S.W.3d at 927 (intoxicated individual who has access to a vehicle poses a danger to himself or others sufficient to detain or arrest the person for public intoxication).
The State carried its burden to establish the reasonableness of Miller's investigatory detention. Under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion of public intoxication arose during a wconsensual police encounter with Miller. The evidence at the suppression hearing established Miller was not detained until he was asked to sit on the curb by Officer Hassan. Officer Hassan had specific, articulable facts combined with rational inferences that led him to reasonably suspect Miller of public intoxication, and he was justified in temporarily detaining him on the curb. See Castro, 227 S.W.3d at 741.
Because reasonable suspicion of public intoxication arose during the consensual police encounter with Miller, we need not address whether the police officers suitably corroborated the anonymous 9-1-1 call to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of domestic violence or disturbing the peace.
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We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Miller's motion to suppress. We resolve Miller's sole issue against him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110282F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
TARIQ MUSTAFFA MILLER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-11-00282-CR
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Collin County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 002- 82138-10).
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices FitzGerald and Murphy participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered July 16, 2012.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE