Opinion
August 10, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Volusia County, Hugh M. Taylor, J.
Horn Ossinsky, Daytona Beach, for appellants.
Chas. W. Luther, Daytona Beach, for appellees.
The legislature of 1949 enacted Chapter 26294, Laws of Florida, Special Acts, establishing advertising tax districts in Volusia County, authorizing the board of county commissioners to levy and collect annually a special tax on all taxable property therein for the purpose of advertising the advantages, facilities and products in said taxing districts and providing for the expenditure of the proceeds of said tax under the direction and supervision of the board of county commissioners. The said act further provided that it take effect only upon ratification at a referendum election as provided therein.
There was a taxpayers' suit brought to restrain the holding of the referendum election, but in the light of subsequent circumstances it became unimportant and is not discussed. The board of county commissioners brought this suit for declaratory decree, praying that it be determined (1) whether or not said referendum election be called and held countywide or in each of said advertising tax districts as the board of county commissioners may determine, (2) whether or not said referendum election be called in compliance with Section 21, Article 3 of the Constitution, F.S.A., or some other requirement of the law, (3) whether or not those participating in said referendum election should be limited to freeholders, and (4) whether or not Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is constitutional. A motion to dismiss was overruled and on final hearing, the chancellor held (1) that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is constitutional, (2) that said referendum election should be held in compliance with Section 21, Article 3 of the Constitution, (3) that said referendum election should not be limited to freeholders, but that all electors should be permitted to participate therein, and (4) that said referendum election should be called and held in all the taxing districts at the same time. This appeal is from the decree so entered.
It is first contended that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949 is invalid in that it delegates governmental power to a person or group of persons not appointed by the governor or elected by the people.
Appellants contend that this question requires an affirmative answer and rely on Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767, 31 A.L.R. 491, to support their contention. The real point decided in that case was that any tax imposed in the State of North Carolina for advertising purposes must be approved by a majority vote of the registered voters, otherwise it would be invalid. Contrary to the holding in the last cited case, this court has repeatedly held that an advertising tax for state, county or municipal purposes may be lawfully imposed. City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619; City of DeLand v. Moorhead, 96 Fla. 737, 119 So. 117; Earle v. Dade County, 92 Fla. 432, 109 So. 331; C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 174 So. 248, 112 A.L.R. 562; Stewart v. Thursby, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742; State ex rel. Barnett Nat. Bank of DeLand v. Thursby, 112 Fla. 257, 150 So. 252.
These cases would seem to remove any question as to the constitutional validity of Chapter 26294 or the charge that governmental power is delegated to those not appointed by the governor or elected by the people. There is in fact no delegation of governmental powers attempted by said act. The board of county commissioners is shown to have acted at all times within the power delegated to it and the chambers of commerce contemplated by the act are nothing more than agents of the board of county commissioners who may approve or disapprove any or all of their acts. The chambers of commerce can spend none of the advertising tax funds for secretarial or administrative help, the board of county commissioners directs the budget and other policy of the chambers of commerce and requires them to make an annual accounting of all expenditures. There is no aspect of expenditure of tax funds in which they act except as directed by the board of county commissioners.
It is next contended that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is violative of the State and Federal Constitutions in that it is unreasonable, discriminatory, capricious and arbitrary.
This question and the argument relating to it would have been more appropriately addressed to the legislature, suffice it to say that the Constitution of Florida contains no limitation on the creation of special taxing districts for local improvements. Consolidated Land Company v. Tyler, 88 Fla. 14, 101 So. 280. Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, in consideration of this principle, created three advertising districts in Volusia County based on the three major interests of the county, citrus, tourists and grazing. The citrus area was incorporated in taxing district one, the tourist area in taxing district two and the grazing or cattle area in taxing district three. At the referendum election the tourist area approved the tax and was incorporated in the taxing district, while the citrus and grazing areas disapproved the tax and were not so incorporated. So it results that the only question with which we are confronted is whether or not the lands within that taxing district should contribute to the cost of advertising the advantages of the district as a tourist locality.
This question and the circumstances out of which it grew present the novel one in the case. The tourist business is one of the most important businesses in the state and as among tourist communities, one of the most competitive ones. That a tax may be imposed to advertise for that purpose is too well settled to permit discussion. Like conserving the public health, comfort and welfare, the fact that all do not participate in the burdens and benefits alike is no reason for striking down the tax. Some may share the benefits who do not share the burden, but that does not abrogate the power to impose it. Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; Martha Bright Farms v. Broward County Port Authority, 117 Fla. 361, 158 So. 70. There is certainly no more satisfactory way to impose a tax than giving those who have to pay it the chance to impose it.
It is finally contended that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is invalid in that it discriminates between citizens and businesses within Volusia County.
On account of the result of the referendum election, there is no basis in the record for this question. In advertising district number two a tax of two mills was approved, but in advertising districts one and three where the tax proposed was one mill, it was defeated. It follows that the advertising tax took effect only in district two where it was uniform so we are not concerned with and express no opinion as to the tax in the citrus and grazing districts where it was rejected.
The judgment of the chancellor is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN, THOMAS, ADAMS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.