Opinion
RE 18-182
10-26-2020
WILLIAM MILLER, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GAIL CHANDLER MILLER, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH A. LOUGHRAN, JR. Defendant.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MaryGay Kennedy, Justice
Before the court is Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Joseph Loughran. This matter arises from a dispute over the disposition of non-probate property following the death of Gail Chandler Miller on December 21, 2017. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff William Miller, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gail Chandler Miller, initiated this action against Defendant Joseph Loughran, Ms. Miller's registered domestic partner. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Loughran has failed to comply with two 2004 written agreements regarding the disposition of jointly held property and allocation of debt. Plaintiff also asserts that shortly before her death, Mr. Loughran induced Ms. Miller to change the beneficiary designation on her insurance policy from her children and grandchild to Mr. Loughran.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
I. Summary Judgment Factual Record
Gail Miller and Joseph Loughran began a relationship in 1982. They lived together from 1985 until her death in 2017. They registered as domestic partners in 2004. (Supp'g S.M.F. ¶ 1.; Add. S.M.F. ¶ 1.) Each of them had children from prior marriages. (Add. S.M.F. ¶¶ 1-3.) Ms. Miller's children are Christine Miller and William ("Bill") Miller. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 3.)
Ms. Miller and Mr. Loughran purchased a residence in Gorham in 1996. They later purchased a camp in Eustis in 2003. (Add. S.M.F. ¶¶ 46-47.) They were jointly responsible for the mortgages on each of the properties. Id. Contemporaneous with registering their domestic partnership in 2004, Ms. Miller and Mr. Loughran executed two signed and notarized documents, one regarding the couple's Gorham home and Eustis camp (hereinafter the "2004 Real Estate Agreement"), and the other regarding various debts owed by Mr. Loughran to Ms. Miller (hereinafter the "2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement"). (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 9.) Mr. Loughran continues to reside in the Gorham home. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 5.)
Ms. Miller's health began to deteriorate in April 2017, when she broke her leg in a skiing accident. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 26.) In June of that year, she fell and broke her hip. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 27.) Each of these accidents rendered Ms. Miller temporarily immobile, and Mr. Loughran provided her care and transportation during the several months of her rehabilitation. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 28.) In early October 2017, Ms. Miller had a biopsy which disclosed that she had mesothelioma and soon began chemotherapy treatment (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 30-31.)
On or about November 3, 2017, Ms. Miller changed the beneficiary designation on an annuity she had purchased from the Jackson National Life Insurance Company in 2010 (hereinafter the "Jackson Annuity"), valued at her death at $323,000, from her children, Bill and Christine Miller, and her grandson, to Defendant Joseph Loughran. (Add. S.M.F. 132.)
Ms. Miller died on December 21, 2017. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 2.) Her will, dated June 23, 1989, was submitted to probate. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 38.) Bill Miller and Christine Miller were named as co-personal representatives, and equal devisees under her will. (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 39.)
On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Defendant Loughran seeking a declaration that: (1) the 2004 written agreements require Mr. Loughran to share with Ms. Miller's estate, one-half the appraised value of the couples jointly owned Gorham residence and Eustis camp, as well as all money or property that was owed by the Defendant to Ms. Miller at the time of her death; (2) Mr. Loughran be required to deliver to the Plaintiff all money and personal property owed to and belonging to Ms. Miller at the time of her death, including those items the Defendant characterizes as gifts of jewelry that he gave to Ms. Miller; and, (3) the change in beneficiaries to the Jackson Annuity from Ms. Miller's son, daughter, and grandson to Mr. Loughran was the product of undue influence and should be voided pursuant to Maine's Improvident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S. §§ 1021-1025.
On April 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and a "Statement of Material Facts Not in Issue." Defendant filed an "Opposing Statement of Material Facts Not in Issue" on July 10, 2020, along with "Defendant's Statement of Additional Material Facts Submitted Per Rule 56(h)(2)." Plaintiff filed "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Additional Facts" on July 27, 2020.
II. Standard of Review
A party is entitled to summary judgment when review of the parties' statements of material facts and the record to which the statements refer demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821; M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). A contested fact is "material" if it could potentially affect the outcome of the case. Id. A "genuine issue" of material fact exists if the claimed fact would require a factfinder to "choose between competing versions of the truth." Id. (quoting Farrington's Owners' Ass'n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ¶ 9, 878 A.2d 504).
When deciding a motion for summary judgment/ the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A party opposing a summary judgment motion must establish a prima facie case for each element of his or her claims. Tri-Town Marine, Inc. v. J.C. Milliken Agency, Inc., 2007 ME 67, ¶ 7, 924 A.2d 1066. The evidence offered in support of a genuine issue of material fact "need not be persuasive at that stage, but the evidence must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination without speculating” Estate of Smith v. Cumberland Cty., 2013 ME 13, ¶ 19, 60 A.3d 759.
Each party's statements must include a reference to the record where "facts as would be admissible in evidence" may be found. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). A party's opposing statement of material facts "must explicitly admit, deny or qualify facts by reference to each numbered paragraph, and a denial or qualification must be supported by a record citation." Stanley v. Hancock Cty. Comtn'r, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 13, 864 A.2d 169.
III. Discussion
A. The 2004 Real Estate Agreement
Plaintiff asserts that the 2004 Real Estate Agreement covers not only the house in Gorham and camp in Eustis, but all of the couple's jointly owned property, which Plaintiff argues includes a joint account with Discover Bank. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 9.) Defendant maintains that the agreement pertains only to the jointly owned real property. (Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 4.) Defendant also disputes Plaintiff's characterization of his present obligations under the agreement and argues that he is no longer bound by the agreement because Ms. Miller and he orally agreed to rescind it.
1. Scope of the 2004 Real Estate Agreement
The agreement begins with the following language: "It is our intent that our families share equally in the inheritance of money or property owned jointly by us, Joseph A. Loughran and Gail C. Miller at the time of death of either partner. Half should go to Joe's children and half to Gail's children." (Pl.'s Ex. 3.) Despite this reference to "money” the only items of jointly owned property that are specifically mentioned in the agreement are the two real properties that the couple shared, namely the Gorharn home and Eustis camp. (Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
With regard to any joint bank accounts they held, Mr. Loughran points to 18-C M.R.S. § 6-212, which provides that "on death of a party sums on deposit in a multiple-party account belong to the surviving party or parties." Defendant contends that upon Ms. Miller's death, the Discover Bank account balance became his sole property. (Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 9.)
"The interpretation of ambiguous language in a contract... is a question of fact." farrington's Owners' Ass'n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, 878 A.2d 504, 507. Because the language of the agreement is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations as to whether the Discover Bank account (or any other jointly held property) was intended to be included under the agreement, summary judgment is denied with respect to the Discover Bank account balance.
2. Present Enforceability of the 2004 Real Estate Agreement
Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Loughran has failed to meet the conditions of continuing to reside in the Gorham home, as provided in the agreement. (Supp'g S.M.F. ¶ 5.) The agreement states that "[a]ny real estate held in joint name will be appraised by a licensed appraiser within 6 months and a market value of the property shall be established as of the date of death." (Pl.'s Ex. 3.) The document further provides/ m relevant part:
6. If the surviving partner chooses to retain the property he/she will have the option of
A. Paying to his/her heirs within 12 months any funds owed from the deceased.
B. Giving a note to the heirs that is to be paid at the time of sale of the property or death of the second partner.
Defendant asserts that "the payment of die decedent's portion of the value of the real estate need only be paid upon the sale of the property" and after the deduction of costs associated with the sale. (Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 7. hi addition, Defendant' claims that the 2004 Real Estate Agreement is no longer in effect because Ms. Miller had voided the agreement prior to her death. (Opp. 5.M.F. ¶ 16.) In a letter from Mr. Loughran to Bill and Christine Miller, dated February 2, 2018, Mr. Loughran stated, among other things, that he and Ms. Miller had agreed that the Gorham home and Eustis camp would "come to [him] in full with no encumbrances" and that personal property belonging to Ms. Miller that he had purchased or gifted to her would also pass to him. (Supp'g S.M.F. ¶ 5; Pl.'s Ex. 5.) Defendant's Statement of Additional Facts also recites several conversations that allegedly took place between Ms. Miller and Mr. Loughran in the month before her death, during which Ms. Miller allegedly told Mr. Loughran that the properties would come to him "free and clear."' (Add. S.M.F. ¶ 35.) Without addressing the admissibility of these statements at this point in the litigation process, the court finds there are genuine issues of material fact regarding both parties' interpretations of the agreement and whether the Defendant remains bound thereby. Accordingly/ summary judgment is denied as to claims pertaining to the 2004 Real Estate Agreement.
Without rnore, this appears to be a mischaracterization of the plain language of the agreement which states that a note is to "be given to the heirs if the surviving partner retains the property and elects option B, even if the note is not required to be paid until the property is later sold or upon the death of the second partner (Pl.'s Ex 3.)
"A court is not bound to address every argument put forth by a party when acting on a motion." Richter v, Ercolini, 2010 ME 38, ¶ 16, 994 A.2d 404.
B. 2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement
In Plaintiff's "Statement of Material Facts Not in Issue, ” Mr. Miller cites to the percentages Mr. Loughran admits to owing on the couple's shared mortgages in the 2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement. In the Statement, which is a signed and notarized affidavit, Mr. Loughran asserts that when he and Ms. Miller refinanced their Gorham residence, they agreed to take out an additional amount so that Mr. Loughran could pay his outstanding bills. (Supp'g S.M.R ¶ 2; Pl.'s Ex. 2.). He agreed that his share of the mortgage represented 61% of the total amount due. Id. He also stated that he had bills and financial obligations that were paid from the home equity loan that the couple used to purchase the Eustis camp, and that his share of that loan was 71%. Id.
The 2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement includes other general references to debt that Mr. Loughran admits owing Ms. Miller for improvements to the house and camp, stating that "[h]alf of these costs are my responsibility" and that "[a]ny money she has extended in my behalf is to be repaid." (Pl.'s Ex. 2.) Finally, the Statement references "records" in Ms. Miller's possession "that relate to both the house, the camp and other matters" and provides that "any outstanding debt that is a result of borrowing to cover expenses that were my responsibility shall be paid in full from my estate to Gail Miller prior to any distribution of assets to my heirs. Also any payments made by Gail in my behalf shall be reimbursed to her in full from my estate." (Pl.'s Ex. 2.)
The 2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement does not, however, provide any information as to the amount borrowed to cover Defendant's then-existing bills without making further assumptions. (Opp. S.M.R ¶ 2.) While Plaintiff suggests that Mr. Loughran may have destroyed Ms. Miller's records detailing the amounts he owed, this assertion is, at best, speculative at this point. Defendant raises additional concerns, pointing to the final paragraph of the Statement, that any money borrowed from Ms. Miller by Mr. Loughran which was unpaid at her death "shall be paid in full from my estate to Gail Miller prior to any distribution of assets to my heirs." (Pl.'s Ex. 2.)
Whether Mr. Loughran has any present obligations under the agreement and what, if any, amount may be due Plaintiff remains in dispute and present genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment with respect to the 2004 Debt Reconciliation Statement is denied.
C. Undue Influence
Plaintiffs last claim is that Ms. Miller's execution of the change in beneficiary form for the Jackson Annuity creates a presumption of undue influence under the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S. §§ 1021-1025, and should therefore be voided.
The Improvident Transfers of Title Act "protects elderly individuals against making transfers of property as a result of undue influence." McCollor v. McCollor, 2014 ME 39, ¶ 11, 87 A.3d 761. The Act establishes a rebuttable presumption of undue influence when an elderly dependent person makes a transfer to a person with whom he or she has a confidential or fiduciary relationship, providing that:
In any transfer of real estate or major transfer of personal property or money for less than full consideration or execution of a guaranty by an elderly person who is dependent on others to a person with whom the elderly dependent person has a confidential or fiduciary relationship, it is presumed that the transfer or execution was the result of undue influence, unless the elderly dependent person was represented in the transfer or execution by independent counsel.33M.R.S.§§ 1021(1).
In addition to establishing that there is an absence of disputed facts as to each element required for the statutory presumption to arise, a plaintiff must also establish that there are no disputed facts concerning the claims raised by the defendant to rebut the presumption. See Doyle v. Duquette, No. KE-06-044, 2008 Me. Super. LEXIS 188, *5. Defendant's position is that he did not induce Ms. Miller to change the 'beneficiary on the Jackson Annuity,, and that she in fact changed the beneficiary on her own accord and without his knowledge. (Loughran Aff. ¶ 74)
Whether Plaintiff has raised a presumption of undue influence and whether Defendant has raised genuine issues of material fact that successfully rebut the presumption, will require further development and analysis of the facts. At tills point the record does not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that Ms. Miller was unduly influenced by Mr. Loughran. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on Count III of the Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).