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In Ward, our Supreme Court addressed, as a matter of first impression, "whether the limitations period in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., is jurisdictional, and, if not, whether this Court should adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling."
Summary of this case from Patrick v. StateOpinion
May 30, 1950. Rehearing Denied July 5, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, F.R. Hocker, J.
Paty, Warwick Paul, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
R.P. Hamlin, Tavares, for appellees.
The dominant question presented in this case is whether or not Lake County Medical Center is immune from taxes. We are confronted with the contention that it is taxable under Section 16, Article XVI of the Constitution. F.S.A. I do not think this provision of the Constitution has any relevancy whatever to the question presented. This provision of the constitution was carried in substantially the same language in the constitution of 1868 and the constitution of 1885.
The reason for its inclusion in both constitutions was that under Chapter 610, Acts of 1855, certain railroad companies were enjoying tax exemption privileges and the makers of the constitution wanted to be sure that such privilege be no longer enjoyed by them. In the constitution of 1885 the exemption was retained for any corporation constructing a barge canal across the state because such a project was thought to be in the offing and was a live question at the time. When Chapter 610 was enacted Florida had less than 100,000 people, two-fifths of whom were slaves. It had one tramway twenty-two miles long pulled by mules and did not have a foot of steam railroad, so all kinds of inducements were being offered for railroads and a barge canal across the peninsula. Section 1, Article IX was also a part of the constitution of 1885, and was regarded as the taxing Article for all purposes, so in my view, Section 16 of Article XVI is for all practical purposes now obsolete. All real and personal property is assessed as provided by Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution and because of adequate means of rapid transportation there is no longer any thought of a barge canal across the State.
In the main what is said in the preceding paragraph is abundantly supported by Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637, 639, and Bloxham, Comptroller, v. Florida Cent. P.R. Co., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902. It is also fortified, by my experience as a practitioner and as a member of the legislature. In such capacities, I have discussed these and other provisions of the constitution of 1885 with many of the members of the constitutional convention, among them Honorables R.F. Taylor and W.A. Hocker who were later Justices of this Court, Honorables Syd L. Carter, E.C.F. Sanchez and J.A. Hendley, distinguished members of the Florida bar, Honorable W.N. Shears, State Supt. of Public Instruction, Honorables Joseph H. Humphries, John Neel and R.F. Rogers, State Senators, Honorables E.L. Odom and H.H. Duncan, distinguished in other walks, and Honorable J.B. Whitfield who reported the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and was later Attorney General, State Treasurer and a Justice of this Court.
Since the adoption of the Constitution of 1885, Section 1, Article IX has been the universal Beadeker to guide taxing officers in imposing tax assessments on "all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." It appears now that sixty-five years after the adoption of the constitution, we are urged to discard this universal practice and hold that the property brought in question should be assessed under Section 16, Article XVI of the Constitution because it happened to be the property of a corporation. All the latter provision of the Constitution presumes to do is to make the property of such corporations "subject to taxation", so in any event we are relegated to Section 1, Article IX for the means to do so.
It is true, that in State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 141 Fla. 233, 192 So. 770, second appearance in 146 Fla. 752, 2 So.2d 303, and in University Club v. Lanier, 119 Fla. 146, 161 So. 78, we applied Section 16, Article XVI of the Constitution. The exemption part of Section 1, Article IX, and Section 16, Article XVI are practically identical, but later when we decided Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So.2d 70, to which we shall presently refer, a conflict arose. There were new aspects to the latter litigation and the result of the conflict was more in the nature of confusion than it was error. I think the error or the confusion should be corrected rather than persevered in.
Rogers v. City of Leesburg and Cragor Co. State ex rel. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So.2d 15, 16, were the first cases in which we had occasion to apply Chapter 19376, Acts of 1939, F.S.A. § 192.06. The latter Chapter undertook to clarify Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution by stating the conditions under which properties used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes might be exempt from taxation. The pertinent requirement being that if the "property is actually occupied and used for one or more of the purposes stated and not more than seventy-five per cent of the floor space is rented and the rents, issues, and profits used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, the property is exempt from all State, County and Municipal taxes."
Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution clothes the legislature with a very liberal discretion in providing for a "uniform and equal rate of taxation," for a "just valuation of all property, both real and personal" and for exemption for "municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." We think it comprehends the whole law for taxing real and personal property. We think the legislature had ample power to enact Chapter 19376, Acts of 1939. It grew out of the fact that Masonic and other fraternal or charitable institutions were constructing lodge buildings with ground floors for rent and other floors for lodge purposes. Taxing officers have universally recognized this and have attempted to observe it. The legislature takes the same oath to support the constitution that we do and in view of the discretion given them, we are unwilling to say that they transgressed their authority.
The bill of complaint in the instant case prays for a declaratory decree adjudicating whether or not the property of Lake County Medical Center is immune from taxation under Section 1, Article IX, as construed by Chapter 19376, and if it be held not immune, that defendant be required to return it to the assessment roll for 1946 and 1947, for assessment purposes, and to impose all lawful taxes due thereon. At final hearing on bill and answer, the chancellor found that there was no dispute about the facts, that the Lake County Medical Center was a charitable, non-profit corporation, that its property is used for a charitable purpose and that for the years 1946, 1947 and 1948 not more than 75 per cent of its floor space was rented and that the rents for the period stated were used for the charitable purpose of the Medical Center. I think Section 1, Article IX authorizes the legislature to define the terms of exemption of "all property", including that referred to in Section 16, Article XVI and when it has done so, this Court has no right to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.
It is accordingly our view that Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution as interpreted by Chapter 19376, Acts of 1939, is the controlling law of the case, that we so held in Rogers et al. v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So.2d 70, when a similar question was involved, so the judgment should be affirmed on authority of this case.
Affirmed.
CHAPMAN, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
ADAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., dissent.
The controlling question submitted is: "Is the property of a non-profit corporation, not used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes exempt from taxation?"
A satisfactory answer to this question calls for comment upon former appearances of this case as well as other opinions of this Court which we shall review presently.
In State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So.2d 303, we had the subject of this litigation before us the second time and by a unanimous opinion settled the question that this property was taxable. That decision was bottomed squarely on the proposition that no immunity from taxation existed because the property was owned by a corporation and it was not held and used exclusively for one of the enumerated purposes recited in Section 16 of Article 16, Florida Constitution. Thereafter the property remained on the tax roll until the assessor omitted to place it on the roll for 1946 and 1947 when the same citizen and taxpayer brought this suit for a declarative decree, testing the question of exemption. In Miller v. Doss, 160 Fla. 660, 36 So.2d 442, we upheld this bill. When the answer was filed no essential factual difference was shown from what we had before us in State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, supra.
What in our opinion led the lower court into error is found in the case of State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 491, 8 So.2d 17, wherein this Court held, in a divided opinion, that Section 16 of Article 16 only applied to corporations for profit. See also Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So.2d 70.
We acknowledge that these cases conflict with our prior opinion in this very case and led the chancellor into error. However, our conclusion is to adhere to the law of this case and hold that this property is taxable. Chapter 19376, Laws of 1939, has no application to this case. Here we are concerned with Section 16, Article 16, and not Section 1 of Article 9, Florida Constitution.
To avoid further confusion we now recede from our opinions in State ex rel. Cragor Company v. Doss and Rogers v. City of Leesburg, supra, insofar as it was held there that Section 16, Article 16, Florida Constitution, only applied to corporations for profit. This section of the Constitution is most comprehensive in its application to all corporations except one to construct a ship canal. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to make other or additional exceptions, obviously such would have been included also.
Exemptions from taxes are, in fact, special favors granted at the expense of other taxpayers and as such are frowned upon by the law. When applied for, the claim should be strictly construed. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232; Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211.
Corporate existence affords many advantages for those who wish to hold and enjoy property. The corporation may, and usually does, enjoy perpetual existence. It is a shield from liability for its incorporators and shareholders. As an entity it bears no civic or moral responsibility to society. In the face of the all inclusive language of Section 16, Article 16, Florida Constitution, we see no reason to hold that one kind of a corporation may have special privileges where another may not.
THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.