Opinion
Index No. 34038/2020E Motion Seq. 001
01-14-2022
ROBERT MILLER, Plaintiff, v. CENTERLIGHT HEALTHCARE, INC., Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
Motion Date: 9/13/2021
Present: Hon. Wilma Guzman J.
DECISION/ORDER
HON. WILMA GUZMAN, JSC
Recitatio\as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of these motions:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion, Memorandum of Law in Support, Affirmation in Support, and Exhibits
("A" through "C") thereto................................................................................ 1
Affirmation in Opposition of Motion and
Exhibits ("A") thereto....................................................................................... 2
Memorandum of Law in Reply....................................................................... 3
Upon the foregoing papers and after due deliberation, and following oral argument, the Decision/Order on this motion is as follows:
Upon deliberation of the application duly made by Defendant, Centerlight Healthcare. Inc., (hereafter referred to as "Centerlight"), by notice of motion, and all the papers in connection therewith and opposition thereto, for an order pursuant to CPLR §3211(a) (1) (2) (5) and (7) for dismissal as against Plaintiff Robert Miller (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff) is heretofore denied.
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants in a Summons and Complaint filed November 20, 2020 under Index No. 34038/2020E alleging Centerlight failed to pay Plaintiff for all of his time worked and for certain overtime hours worked under New York Labor Law. Plaintiff also alleges that Centerlight failed to provide Plaintiff with accurate wage statements. Counsel for this action is The Law Firm of Louis Ginsberg, P.C..
Centerlight now moves pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (2) (5) and (7) to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. arguing Plaintiffs causes of action for nonpayment of wages and overtime pursuant to New York Labor Law (hereafter referred to as "NYLL"), fail to state a claim, are preempted, cannot be maintained due to arbitration and award, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action Additionally, Centerlight moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (1) for dismissal of plaintiff s remaining cause of action, failure to provide accurate wage statements, arguing Centerlight provided documentary evidence in the form of wage statements that refute Plaintiffs claim.
Conversely, Plaintiff argues that the NYLL wage and overtime claims are sufficiently pled, are completely independent from the collective bargaining agreement entered into June 1, 2009 (hereafter referred to as "the CBA") and not preempted.
Dismissal of Wage & Overtime Claims for Failure to State a Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the NYLL and argues the heightened pleading standard of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereafter referred to as "FLSA") applies to Plaintiffs overtime claims. The court in Brown v S. Nassau Communities Hasp., "New York Labor Law claims are subject to the notice pleading requirements of CPLR §3013, and, while plaintiffs complaint is not overly detailed, it clearly provides notice of her claims as required by CPLR 3013. clearly pleading that she worked 40 hours per week as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours." Brown, 2019 NY Slip Op 32239[U], * 11 (Sup Ct. NY County 2019). NY CPLR §3013 says "Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense." Connors, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Civil Practice Laws and Rules, §3013:2.
"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction .. . We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 (1994) (citing Morone v Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481. 484; Ravello v Orofina Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633. 634). "[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" Id. (citing Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268 275; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co.. supra, at 636).
Plaintiff has not pled claims under the FLSA, or under both the FLSA and the NYLL, but only under the NYLL. Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their NYLL wage and overtime claims. As for the wage claims, Plaintiff pled that he worked through his meal break for approximately 45-60 minutes per week and described the tasks that would be completed during meal break time. Accepting this as true, this is sufficient to put defendant on notice of the unpaid wage claim and transactions at issue; that Centerlight did not pay Plaintiff at for at least some time every week.
Plaintiff also alleged that he worked between 1 hour and 55 minutes and 3 hours and 10 minutes in excess of his scheduled shift up to five times per week. This provides a range of hours unpaid and the frequency at which the unpaid time occurred. The range and frequency estimates provide additional support for plaintiffs wage claims. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges he typically worked 37.5 hours per week. Plaintiffs regular work week, plus the time working through meal breaks, plus the range of times Plaintiff alleges he worked in excess of his shift put plaintiff between 38 hours and 15 minutes and 54 hours and 10 minutes in a given week. Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly pled there were some weeks where he worked more than 40 hours. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied.
Dismissal of Wage & Overtime Claims as Preempted
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs wage and overtime claims are preempted by §301 of the National Labor Relations Act (hereafter referred to as "NLRA), which states that if resolving a state law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA, the claim must either be dismissed as preempted or treated as a federal claim. Vera v Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109. 114 (2d Cir 2003). "Claims -tangentially involving a CBA' are not preempted by 301. For example, if a state creates statutory rights or rules completely independent of the CBA, lawsuits brought to enforce those rights will not be preempted." See Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 at 211-212. Plaintiff is the "master of the complaint," and may choose to bring state-law claims rather than ones based on federal law: Caterpillar. Inc. v Williams , 482 U.S. 386. 396 (1987). NYLL claims for nonpayment of wages, nonpayment of minimum wage, and nonpayment of overtime are typically not preempted because they are completely independent of and don't require analysis of the CBA. Kaye v Orange Regional Med. Ctr., 975 F.Supp.2d 412, 423 (SDNY 2013). Where plaintiffs claims turn on the behavior and motivation of the employer, and not on interpretation of the meaning of a CBA, plaintiffs claims were not preempted. Tamburino v Madison Sq. Garden. LP, 115 A.D.3d 217, 222 (I st Dept 2014).
Where Plaintiffs claims are outside of the time period covered by the CBA entered into by the parties, those claims are necessarily independent from and do not require interpretation of a CBA. Id. at 421. Here, the CBA was effective June 1. 2009 and ended April 30, 2015. Plaintiffs causes of action are alleged from November 20, 2014 through November 20, 2020. Therefore, the CBA was only effective from November 20, 2014 until April 30, 2015, or approximately five months and ten days of the six year statute of limitations period. As such. Plaintiffs claims from May 1, 2015 through November 20, 2020 are necessarily independent of the CBA. Kaye, 975 F.Supp.2d at 423.
As to the five months and ten days where the CBA was applicable, Plaintiff seeks enforcement of rights completely independent from the CBA. Plaintiffs complaint is completely void of any mention of the collective bargaining agreement and the elements of a NYLL wage an hour violation do not require substantial interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. For example, although the CBA provides that any hours above 37.5 per week are overtime, Plaintiff is not seeking overtime wages for hours over 37.5, but seeks his regular rate of pay for those hours; Plaintiff is only seeking overtime wages for hours in excess of 40 pursuant to the NYLL. In this way, Plaintiffs case is distinguishable from Freeman v. River Manor Corp, which Centerlight cites in support of their argument that Plaintiffs claims should be preempted. Freeman v Riv. Manor Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist LEXIS 131692, at 10-11 (EDNY Aug. 5, 2019). In Freeman, the plaintiff sought overtime wages for hours between 35 and 40 where Plaintiffs CBA provided any hours above 35 per week were overtime. Thus, there, plaintiff was seeking to enforce a right given to him by the collective bargaining agreement. Freeman, 2019 U.S. Dist LEXIS 131692 at 7. Here, plaintiff is seeking vindication of his rights under the NYLL, not the CBA and his claims are not preempted by the CBA. Defendant argues that under the CBA, hours worked in excess of 35 had to be authorized by the employer, but, as said. Plaintiff is not seeking to enforce his rights under the CBA and under the NYLL all time worked must be compensated. Thus, defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims as preempted is denied.
Dismissal of Claims because of Arbitration Provision or Res Judicata
Centerlight also argues for dismissal under CPLR §3211(a)(5) because "the cause of action may not be maintained because of arbitration and award, collateral estoppel, discharge in bankruptcy, infancy or other disability of the moving party, payment, release, res judicata, statute of limitations, or statute of frauds." CPLR § 3211 (Consol., Lexis Advance through 2021 released Chapters 1-656).
This court finds no valid argument or law supporting dismissal pursuant to §3211(a)(5). As to any argument that arbitration and award should prevent the court from hearing the case, there was not an arbitration award issued between the parties. As to any argument that the Freeman case, discussed supra, is res judicata, Freeman is distinguishable because the Plaintiff in that case was seeking to vindicate rights given to him by the collective bargaining agreement, whereas here, the Plaintiff is seeking to vindicate rights given to him exclusively by the NYLL. As such, the courts are not deciding the same issue and the Freeman case cannot bar this claim on the basis of res judicata. Thus, the motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) is denied.
Dismissal of Failure to Provide Wage Statements Claim as Refuted by Documentary Evidence
Defendant argues that Defendant provided wage statements that constitute documentary evidence refuting Plaintiffs claim for failure to provide accurate wage statements. Defendants argue that because the wage statements submitted allegedly complied with NYLL Article 6, § 195(3), that the issue of the accuracy of the wage statements has been disposed of by documentary proof. Under CPLR §3211(a)(1), a dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law. See, e.g., Heaney v Purdy. 29 N.Y.2d 157 (1971).
Here, Plaintiff does not argue that Centerlight did not provide wage statements. Plaintiff also does not argue that Centerlight"s wage statements were defective because they did not comply with the statute. Plaintiff argues that Plaintiffs wage statements were not accurate because they do not adequately reflect all time and hours the Plaintiff worked and was allegedly not paid for. As such, dismissal is inappropriate here as Centerlight has not conclusively refuted Plaintiffs claims as a matter of law by documentary evidence by simply providing wage statements. Copper v Cavalry Staffing, LLC, 132 F.Supp.3d 460, 465 (EDNY 2015). Plaintiffs claims are not disputed by documentary evidence and thus the motion to dismiss under §3211(a)(1) is denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant New York City Housing Authority's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.