Opinion
March 5, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Benson, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The record reveals that the plaintiffs commenced this action in or about May 1986 to have certain deeds which they delivered to the defendants on February 2, 1981 declared void as part of a usurious loan agreement. The one-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 215 (6) is applicable to this action (see, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ Prac ¶ 215.11), and the limitations period begins running upon the date payment is made or property is delivered pursuant to the usurious transaction (see, Palen v Johnson, 50 N.Y. 49; Shute v Stattman, 254 App. Div. 783; Robinson v Miller, 210 App. Div. 450; Gilleran v Colby, 164 App. Div. 608). Inasmuch as the instant action to have the deeds declared void and for the return of the real property was commenced more than one year after the date of the delivery of the deeds to the defendants, it is time barred.
Moreover, we find unpersuasive the plaintiffs' contention that the complaint should be construed so as to set forth a cause of action pursuant to Real Property Law § 320 to have the deeds declared to be mortgages. While liberal construction of pleadings is favored (see, CPLR 3026; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633), the allegations of the complaint, even when broadly interpreted, demonstrate that the action was solely one to void the deeds on the ground of usury. Lawrence, J.P., Rubin, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.