Opinion
No. 653, 2011
02-22-2012
TYRONE A. MILES, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff-Appellee.
Court—Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County Cr. ID 0709015392A
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 22nd day of February 2012, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief, the State's motion to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Tyrone Miles, filed this appeal from the Superior Court's denial of his first motion for postconviction relief. The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Miles' opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) The relevant facts of this case reflect that the victim, a convenience store clerk in Dover, was shot and robbed on September 11, 2007. Police recovered a surveillance videotape of the crime. A still photograph taken from the videotape was published in a local newspaper the next day. Within hours, police received a tip identifying Miles as the suspect in the photograph. On the video, officers saw the suspect touch the handle on a door to the store's water heater closet. Police lifted a palm print from the door handle, which matched prints on file for Miles. Officers took Miles into custody the day after the shooting. Upon initial questioning, Miles denied any involvement in the crime, although he stated he had been in the store the day before the crime. Police held him in custody while search warrants were executed for several premises where Miles was known to stay. Several hours later, police resumed questioning Miles after Miles had inquired about the strength of the evidence against him. Miles then admitted shooting the victim but claimed that the victim had asked him to do it because she wanted to die. Ten days after the shooting, the police visited the victim in the hospital. She was unable to identify Miles as the shooter from a photographic lineup, although she did identify him at trial.
(3) A Kent County jury convicted Miles on February 12, 2009 of attempted first degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Miles filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the Superior Court denied. This appeal followed.
Miles v. State, 2009 WL 4114385 (Del. Nov. 23, 2009).
(4) Miles enumerates three claims in his opening brief on appeal. First, he contends that he was denied due process at trial due to the victim's tainted identification of him in court. Second, Miles argues that he was denied due process when the Superior Court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to sentencing him as a habitual offender. Finally, Miles contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney: (i) failed to move to suppress the victim's tainted identification of him as the shooter; (ii) failed to move to suppress the indictment; (iii) failed to move to suppress the palm print; (iv) was not present in the prosecutor's office when the victim viewed the surveillance videotape, which he contends was a critical stage of the proceedings; and (v) failed to request an evidentiary hearing on Miles' habitual offender status.
(5) In reviewing the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief, this Court first must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before it may consider the merits of any postconviction claims. Superior Court Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is thereafter barred unless the defendant can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights. In this case, Miles did not challenge the victim's in-court identification or the habitual offender proceeding at trial or on direct appeal. Miles now asserts that his attorney's ineffectiveness was the cause of his default.
(6) In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that: (a) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. There is a strong presumption that counsel's representation was professionally reasonable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Id. at 689.
(7) With respect to the victim's in-court identification of Miles, the record reflects no basis upon which defense counsel could have raised an objection. Counsel carefully cross-examined the victim about her inability to identify Miles from a photographic lineup that she had reviewed ten days after she was shot. The victim testified that she was able to identify Miles as the shooter because she had reviewed the surveillance videotape of the crime, which led her to the conclusion that Miles was the same man shown on the videotape. That videotape was admitted into evidence and was shown to the jury. Having established the basis for the victim's identification of Miles as the perpetrator, the jury was free to draw its own conclusion about the credibility of the victim's identification from its own review of the surveillance tape. We find no error in counsel's failure to object to the victim's in-court identification of Miles.
See Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992).
(8) Furthermore, with respect to Miles' complaint about the habitual offender hearing, the record reflects that the State presented certified copies of Miles' prior felony convictions. Miles admitted on the record that he had two predicate felony convictions, which qualified him for sentencing as a habitual offender. In light of this admission, there was no basis for the Superior Court to hold a hearing on Miles' status as a habitual offender, and there was no basis for counsel to object. Under the circumstances, both of Miles' first two claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3).
See Cammile v. State, 2008 WL 1887285 (Del. Apr. 30, 2008).
(9) Moreover, we find no merit to any of Miles' remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As we have already noted, counsel did not err in failing to seek suppression of the victim's identification because there was no basis for such a motion. Nor was there any legal basis for counsel to seek suppression of the indictment or the palm print. As the Superior Court properly found, the charges against Miles were supported by probable cause (namely, the surveillance video and Miles' taped confession), and there was no jurisdictional defect in the indictment. Furthermore, the police were not required to produce the actual door handle from which the palm print was lifted in order for the print evidence to be admissible. Finally, Miles' contention that the victim's viewing of the surveillance videotape was a "critical stage" of the proceedings for which his counsel should have been present is unsupported by any case law.
Miles appears to argue that allowing the prosecutor to show the victim the surveillance videotape of the crime is analogous to a postindictment "line-up" at which defense counsel should have been present. Miles cites no case law in support of this analogy. Indeed, we find no analogy to be drawn. Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (stating that, "Even we were willing to view the counsel guarantee in broad terms as a generalized protection of the adversary process, we would be unwilling to go so far as to extend the right to a portion of the prosecutor's trial-preparation interviews with witnesses.").
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice