Opinion
Civil 3:19-CV-02091
03-30-2023
DONALD MILES, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW KROWIAK, et al., Defendants.
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
The case comes before the Court for further consideration of two motions to dismiss. The plaintiff, Donald Miles (“Miles”), filed the complaint when he was in pretrial detention in the Lackawanna County Prison awaiting trial on various drug-related charges, including a conspiracy charge. After filing the complaint, however, Miles pleaded guilty to the charge of “Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver.” Miles alleges violations of state and federal statutes throughout these criminal proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that the court grant the pending motions to dismiss.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Miles, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by filing a complaint. Doc. 1. The complaint identified nine defendants, all of whom filed motions to dismiss the complaint. Docs. 7, 9, 15, 22. Upon consideration of these motions, we recommended that the court dismiss all claims against six of the defendants: Andrew Krowiak (“Attorney Krowiak”), Mark Powell (“Attorney Powell”), Brian Gallagher (“Attorney Gallagher”), Patricia Corbett (“Judge Corbett”), Michael Barrasse (“Judge Barrasse”), and Joseph Toczydlowski (“Attorney Toczydlowski”). Doc. 27. We recommended that the court stay the case against the remaining defendants: Lackawanna County (“the County”) and Detectives Harold Zech (“Zech”) and John Munley (“Munley”). Id. The court adopted this Report and Recommendation in part, dismissing the six defendants as recommended and remanding to the undersigned the motions to dismiss the claims against the County, Zech, and Munley for further consideration, due to the changed circumstances after the criminal case was resolved with Miles's guilty plea. Docs. 30, 31. The following facts are taken from the complaint. We set forth only the allegations relevant to the remaining claims.
Miles's claims stem from his arrest for multiple drug-related offenses. Based on the criminal information attached to Miles's complaint, he was charged with Delivery of a Controlled Substance, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Delivery of a Controlled Substance, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Drug Paraphernalia. Id. at 17. Miles alleges that Zech and Munley arrested him on December 13, 2017, without probable cause. Id. at 2. Miles claims that Zech and Munley pulled Miles out of a vehicle at gun point and placed him in a patrol vehicle against his will in order to effectuate the unlawful arrest. Id. Additionally, Miles contends that Zech and Munley made false statements in the affidavit of probable cause supporting the arrest. Id. at 3.
According to Miles, this arrest was the product of a conspiracy to intentionally deprive him of his liberty without due process. Doc. 1 at 2, 9, 10. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Zech and Munley worked together with Attorney Krowiak, Attorney Powell, and Attorney Gallagher to falsely accuse Miles of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance. Id. Miles alleges that the efforts of the prosecutors and detectives were for the sole purpose of effectuating an unlawful arrest and imprisonment and to maliciously prosecute and convict Miles. Id.
Miles also claims that he was deprived of liberty without due process. Id. at 6. Specifically, Miles alleges that the charge of criminal conspiracy was added by way of amended information in April and May of 2018. Id. at 3. Miles contends that he never had a preliminary hearing on this added charge of conspiracy and is being imprisoned on that charge without due process or probable cause. Id. Miles believes that neither the prosecutors nor the detectives ever intended to provide Miles with notice of the added conspiracy charge. Id. Instead, Miles discovered these charges when he received his co-conspirators' criminal docket sheet from prison staff per his request. Id. at 3, 11, 13.
Miles also alleges that he is being deprived of equal protection of the law because another inmate in the Lackawanna County Prison was provided with a preliminary hearing on his criminal conspiracy charge, whereas Miles was not. Id. at 7. Miles believes that the unequal treatment is to further the alleged conspiracy between the defendants. Id.
According to Miles, the unlawful conduct of the detectives and prosecutors was a result of inadequate training and supervision on the part of Lackawanna County and Judge Barrasse and Judge Corbett, who were previously dismissed as defendants. Id. at 8. Such failure, Miles alleges, is a result of an unconstitutional policy adopted by Lackawanna County at the judges' request. Id.
Miles seeks to have the prosecution removed from Lackawanna County and transferred to the Federal Government for investigation and prosecution. Id. at 12. He also seeks $4,000,000 in compensatory damages, $4,000,000 in punitive damages, costs incurred from this action, immediate release from incarceration,and any additional relief this court deems appropriate. Id.
Miles seeks as a remedy “immediate release from this unlawful detention,” but he cannot seek such relief in this § 1983 action. Doc. 1 at 11. Instead, such relief is available only via a habeas corpus action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”). Further, this request is now moot since he has been released.
Miles's complaint lists 11 counts, 10 of which remain. Miles brings claims against Zech and Munley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, unreasonable seizure, violation of due process, malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and violations of the Thirteenth and Eighth Amendments, as well as state claims for assault and battery. See generally doc 1. Miles brings claims against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Monell theory of liability for civil conspiracy, and violations of the Thirteenth and Eighth Amendments. See generally id.
As previously discussed, Zech and Munley jointly filed a motion to dismiss and brief in support, and the County did likewise. Docs. 7, 13, 15, 16. And Miles filed briefs in opposition. Docs. 17, 21. After this case was remanded to us, we ordered supplemental briefing about the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Doc. 34. The County and Zech and Munley accordingly filed supplementary briefs in support. Doc. 35, 36. Miles, however, did not file a supplementary brief in opposition, even when ordered to do so. Doc. 41.
III. Motion to Dismiss and Pleading Standards.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether [the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010).
In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F.Supp.2d 762, 769-70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. Of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
In their motion to dismiss and brief in support, Zech and Munley argue that Miles fails to plead “specific factual content” that is sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docs. 7, 13. Zech and Munley further argue that res judicata bars certain claims Miles asserts. Doc. 13 at 6. And Zech and Munley, in both their brief in support and their supplemental brief in support, argue that the favorable termination rule of Heck bars all claims asserted against them because they each “have the effect of impugning the underlying criminal charges against him.” Doc. 36 at 10; see also doc. 13 at 5. We address each of these arguments in turn.
Res judicata is an affirmative defense and as such “requires that the party asserting such a bar bear the burden of showing that it applies.” U.S. v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982)). In order to preclude Miles's claims, Zech and Munley must show that there was “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.” Id. (citing I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). They have failed to do so. The Third Circuit has noted the “difficult question of identity of causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion,” id., but Zech and Munley find no such difficulty and merely conclude that “[t]he claims set forth in [Miles's] earlier action are identical to the claims filed in the instant action.” Doc. 13 at 7. The earlier actions Zech and Munley identify are based on the same arrest; however, Miles's claims in the instant action are about the additional charge of conspiracy. Thus, we will not further address this argument.
In its motion to dismiss and brief in support, the County argues that, because Miles fails to allege those facts required for municipal liability, the complaint fails to state a claim against it. Docs. 15, 16. Miles counter-argues that he alleges custom through “tacit endorsement” of the other defendants' actions. Doc. 21. The County further argues in its supplemental brief in support that Miles's claims are barred by Heck “because the underlying criminal proceeding did not terminate in a manner reflecting Plaintiff's innocence of the charged offense.” Doc. 35 at 5. We do not reach the County's arguments about Heck because, upon further review, we conclude that the County is correct: Miles fails to allege a claim for municipal liability against it.
A. Zech and Munley.
Miles's complaint includes eight claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Zech and Munley: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) false arrest; (3) false imprisonment; (4) unreasonable seizure; (5) violation of due process; (6) civil conspiracy; (7) violations of the Thirteenth Amendment; and (8) violations of the Eighth Amendment. See generally doc. 1. Miles also brings two claims against Zech and Munley under state statutes: (1) assault and battery; and (2) false imprisonment. Id.
1. Malicious Prosecution.
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), certain § 1983 claims do not accrue until there has been a favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceedings. The plaintiff in Heck filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two county prosecutors and an Indiana State Police investigator challenging his manslaughter conviction. 512 U.S. at 478-79. He alleged that the defendants engaged in an unlawful unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation which led to his arrest; that the defendants knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence; and that the defendants caused an illegal identification procedure to be used at trial. Id. at 479. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action, the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such [a] determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87, 490 (footnote omitted). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id.
The “favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019). “The requirement likewise avoids allowing collateral attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation.” Id. Even if the plaintiff has exhausted available state remedies, he has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the criminal case terminates in the prospective plaintiff's favor. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. The Supreme Court has found that “in order to demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution[,]” “a plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction[,]” rather than needing to demonstrate “that the prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of his innocence[.]” Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022). And “to the extent [a plaintiff's] . . . claim was premised on . . . charges that were dismissed or otherwise not prosecuted as a part of his guilty plea, these charges were not ‘favorably terminated.'” Moore v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-1945, 2022 WL 7375509, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2022) (citing Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2016)).
The Heck favorable termination rule only applies to bar § 1983 actions that have not favorably terminated “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 -82 (2005). Not every § 1983 cause ofaction would “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.” See id. But success in a claim for malicious prosecution “would necessarily demonstrate” the invalidity of the underlying conviction. See id.; see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 90. Thus, in order to succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must “demonstrate a favorable termination of [the] criminal prosecution” by showing that “his prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson, 142 S.Ct. at 1335.
Miles's claim for malicious prosecution is no different. To proceed on a claim for malicious prosecution, Miles must demonstrate that the state proceedings resolved in his favor. He does not do so. Instead, these charges have resolved with his plea of guilty to one of the charges. We, therefore, recommend that the court dismiss Miles's claim for malicious prosecution because it is Heck barred.
The Supreme Court has held that “where [a] § 1983 action, ‘even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment . . ., the action should be allowed to proceed.'” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 74 at 80 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.) Accordingly, because it is less clear that Miles's success in other claims would “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment[,]” id., and because those claims would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on other bases, we will not conduct further Heck analysis.
2. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Unreasonable Seizure.
Though Miles attempts to raise three separate claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unreasonable seizure, the claims are not distinct. “False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). “False arrest is a term that describes the setting for false imprisonment when it is committed by an officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest.” Padilla v. Miller, 143 F.Supp.2d 479, 489 (quoting D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 67 (2001)). “Because false arrest is a type of false imprisonment, the claims may be treated together.” Ingram v. Lupas, NO. 3:07-CV-02259, 2009 WL 249788, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2009). Furthermore, “[a] claim under § 1983 for false arrest/false imprisonment is grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures.” Kokinda v. Breiner, F.Supp.2d 581, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (footnote added) (citing Garcia v. Cty. Of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); see Baskerville v. City of Harrisburg, 2020 WL 108421, at *4 (Pa. M.D. Jan. 9, 2020) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . [and t]his protection applies to false arrest and false imprisonment by state actors, constitutional torts that ‘overlap' and are often referred to together as false imprisonment.”) (citations omitted).
Such a claim requires the plaintiff to show “that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest.” Id. “Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent officer to believe that the party charged has committed an offense.” Id.; see Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 382 (3d Cir. 1995). But “where the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). If multiple offenses exist, however, a “false arrest claim will fail if there was probable cause to arrest for at least one of the offense involved.” Kokinda, 557 F.Supp.2d at 592 (citing Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, Miles alleges that Zech and Munley lacked probable cause to arrest him, which resulted in violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Doc. 1 at 2-5. More specifically, Miles asserts that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest him for the later-brought conspiracy charge. Id. at 2. However, based on the amended information that Miles attaches to his complaint, id. at 16-17, Miles was also charged with delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, as well as three other criminal charges. Though Miles alleges that a “Magistrate never made a probable cause determination” relating to his conspiracy charge, he does not mention his other criminal charges, id. at 3, and thus does not address the existence of probable cause to arrest him on the other five charges against him. Instead, Miles asserts that he never had a preliminary arraignment or hearing, never received a criminal complaint, and was not afforded bail on the conspiracy charge-all events occurring after his arrest. Id. at 2-3. Accordingly, we recommend that the court dismiss Miles's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unreasonable seizure.
3. Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part, “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. amend. XIII, § 1. Within the context of the Thirteenth Amendment, the term involuntary servitude
[m]eans a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or legal practice. This definition encompasses those cases in which the defendant holds the victim in servitude by placing the victim in fear of such physical restraint or injury or legal coercion.Dolla v. Unicast Co., 930 F.Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 26, 1996) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988)). Thus, “[a] claim under the Thirteenth Amendment must include allegations of forced labor.” Fennell v. Kostura, No. 19-669, 2019 WL 2615484, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2019) (citing Johnson v. Anhorn, 334 F.Supp.2d 802, 806 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
Here, Miles fails to allege any facts suggesting that he has been subjected to forced labor of any kind. He fails to provide any theory regarding how his Thirteenth Amendment rights have been violated. Instead, Miles's complaint focuses on his arrest and incidents subsequent to his arrest. Doc. 1. Accordingly, we recommend that Miles's Thirteenth Amendment claim be dismissed. See Fennell v. Horvath, No. 18-4870, 2019 WL 1981403, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2019) (dismissing a pretrial detainee's Thirteenth Amendment claim for failure to allege the defendants “compelling him to work against his will”).
4. Eighth Amendment.
Miles raises an Eighth Amendment violation in his complaint. Doc. 1 at 12. But any Eighth Amendment claim raised by Miles must fail because all of his allegations occurred when he was a pretrial detainee, not a prisoner. Pretrial detainees “‘are not within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment[' s]' prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987)). Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects state pretrial detainees. Id. at 158 n.13 (“Inasmuch as we are here concerned with state pre-trial detainees, any applicable constraints must arise from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Edwards v. Northampton Cty., 663 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that a pretrial detainee's claim “should be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979)). But “[a]bsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials . . . if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.'” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39 (footnote omitted).
Miles fails to allege any facts to support an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Miles offers nothing specific about his conditions of detention (doc. 1 at 12); instead, he focuses on the circumstances of his arrest and the charges against him for conspiracy. Further, Miles pleads no facts regarding any expressed intent to punish him in the prison-much less, any allegations that Zech and Munley acted with any intent to punish him in the prison. Thus, Miles's Eighth Amendment claim, even construed as a Fourteenth Amendment claim due to Miles's status as a pretrial detainee, must fail. Accordingly, we recommend that the court dismiss Miles's Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.
5. Due Process - Notice.
Miles alleges that Zech and Munley sought to prosecute him without providing him with an affidavit of probable cause. Doc. 1 at 5. Miles mentions the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in his claim and complains about a lack of notice, presumably because he claims that he was not given an affidavit of probable cause. Id. We generously construe Miles's claims as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim implicating the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
State criminal defendants must be tried in accordance with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Say v. Tennis, No. 3:06-CV-1970, 2007 WL 2461797, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2007) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1961)); see Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) (“The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment.”). The basic elements of a fair trial are, among other things, the accused's “right to a reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); see Crawford v. Pennsylvania, 714 Fed.Appx. 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the action.”) (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)).
Here, Miles attaches to the complaint an amended criminal information, doc. 1 at 16-17, which lays out the crimes of which he is accused. The fact that Miles has this amended criminal information to provide makes it evident that Miles does, in fact, have notice of these charges. And Miles filed this complaint prior to any trial or his eventual guilty plea. Id. It is thus clear that Miles had notice prior to the critical stage of a guilty plea. It simply is not so that Miles lacked notice of the crimes of which he was accused. Thus, Miles fails to state a due process notice claim upon which relief can be granted.
6. Civil Conspiracy Claim.
Miles also brings a claim against Munley and Zech for civil conspiracy under § 1983. See doc. 21 at 3. The crux of Miles's conspiracy claim is that his arrest and charges stem from an agreement between Zech and Munley, among others, to deprive Miles of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 10. Miles's argument is circular, however, in that he also claims that it was the various judges and prosecutors who employed Zech and Munley to violate his rights. Id. at 11.
The elements of a conspiracy to violate an individual's federal civil rights under § 1983 are:
(1) two or more persons conspire to deprive any person of [constitutional rights]; (2) one or more of the conspirators performs . . . any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that overt act injures the plaintiff in his person or property or deprives the
plaintiff of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, with the added gloss under § 1983 that “the conspirators act under the color of state law.”Jutrowski v. Twp. Of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Barnes Found. v. Twp. Of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2001)). In other words, the plaintiff must show that “persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding' to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)).
Miles's conspiracy claim lacks factual substance. Miles alleges that Zech and Munley conspired together, but does not plead plausible facts to support this allegation. Rather, Miles concludes that Zech and Munley induced the entire judicial apparatus to charge and imprison him. Doc. 1 at 10. Additionally, Miles fails to plead any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, instead making broad assertions that the co-conspirators “employed” detectives, prosecutors, judges, and court-appointed attorneys “to unreasonably detain” him and deny him due process. Doc. 1 at 11-12. Thus, because Miles fails to plead sufficient factual support for his civil conspiracy claim, we recommend that the court dismiss this claim as well.
7. Supplemental State Law Claims.
Against Zech and Munley Miles also brings state law claims for assault and battery, and for false imprisonment. Such claims would fall within the court's supplemental jurisdiction. Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Third Circuit has held that “where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).
There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Miles's state-law claims. Accordingly, because we conclude that the complaint fails to state any federal claims upon which relief can be granted, we recommend that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Miles's state-law claims.
B. The County.
Though Miles purports to assert four claims against the County, he cites “Monell” as a separate claim when, in fact, Monell is the theory of liability which allows a § 1983 claim to be properly asserted against a municipality for violations of federally secured rights. See generally Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Miles thus brings three claims against the County, all under § 1983: (1) civil conspiracy; (2) violations of Thirteenth Amendment rights; and (3) violations of Eighth Amendment rights. Doc. 1.
A municipality, such as the County, cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Rather, “under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.'” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original)). “[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). One way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege “that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries.” Id. Another way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege that his or her injuries “were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'” Id. (quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)). “The latter avenue arose in the failure-to-train context, but applies to other failure and inadequacies by municipalities, including those related to supervision and discipline of its police officers.” Id.
To plead a claim against a municipality under the policy-or-custom strand of municipal liability, “a plaintiff must allege that ‘a [local] government's policy or custom . . . inflict[ed] the injury' in question.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.'” Id. (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘“Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.'” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)).
“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “Although a policy or custom is necessary to plead a municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. “A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause' of his injuries.” Id.
Here, Miles makes conclusory statements that the County had a policy or custom in effect that resulted in his mistreatment. Doc. 1 at 7, 8, 9. But he never identifies any policy or custom; instead, he asserts that the County had a policy of depriving him, specifically, of his liberty without due process. Id. Though Miles couches his allegations in the terminology of custom and policy, he instead repeats his allegations of a conspiracy to deprive him of certain federally protected rights. This is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the County under the policy-or-custom strand of municipal liability.
Miles also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the County under the failure-or-inadequacy strand of municipal liability. A plaintiff asserting a municipal liability claim based on a failure to or the inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline “need not allege an unconstitutional policy.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. Rather, he must allege that the municipality's failure to train, supervise, or discipline “its employees ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'” Id. (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)). In this regard, the plaintiff must show “a failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106. “This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.
Here, Miles again fails to allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that deliberate indifference by the County caused his injuries. Thus, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the County under the failure-or-inadequacy strand of municipal liability.
“[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). In this case, Miles has failed to allege facts that satisfies either the policy-or-custom strand of liability nor the failure-or-inadequacy strand of liability. Accordingly, we recommend that the court dismiss all of Miles's claims against the County.
V. Amendment.
“[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). In a civil rights action, the court “must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.” Id.
“Under Rule 15(a), futility of amendment is a sufficient basis to deny leave to amend.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). “Futility ‘means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'” Id. (quoting in re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, in determining whether an amendment would be futile, we apply the same standard as we apply in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Id. “In other words, ‘[t]he District Court determines futility by taking all pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Id. (quoting Winer Family Trustv. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Miles's complaint fails to state a single federal claim against Zech, Munley, or the County. The underlying criminal case against Miles has resolved with Miles's guilty plea. We thus recommend that the court not grant leave to amend the complaint.
VI. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that the court grant the remaining defendants' motions to dismiss (docs. 7, 15) because Miles fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. We further recommend that the court dismiss the complaint without leave to amend.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.