Opinion
Civil 3:19-CV-02091
06-09-2021
DONALD MILES, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW KROWIAK, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction.
This case comes before the Court on four motions to dismiss. The plaintiff, Donald Miles (“Miles”), is a pretrial detainee currently housed in the Lackawanna County Prison where he is awaiting trial on various drug-related charges. Miles's complaint alleges a vast array of claims and names several individuals including prosecutors, judges, police officers, and Lackawanna County.
Miles refers to himself as a prisoner in his complaint. Doc. 1 at 2. Taking judicial notice of Miles's court docket from the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, CP-35-CR-0000078-2018, however, we observe that Miles's case is “awaiting disposition.” See Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice of the content of another Court's docket.”); see also Wilson v. McVey, 579 F.Supp.2d 685, 688 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of the state court docket). Thus, Miles appears to be a pretrial detainee rather than a prisoner.
For the reasons that follow, we recommend that the complaint should be dismissed against Judges Barrase and Corbett, and prosecutors Krowiak, Powell and Gallagher, because they enjoy absolute immunity from suit. In addition, the complaint should be dismissed against defense attorney Toczydlowski, as he is not a proper party under § 1983. Finally, we recommend that the complaint be stayed against and administratively closed against the remaining parties until the criminal charges against Miles are resolved in state court.
With this case at the motion to dismiss phase, we can determine whether absolute immunity applies, see Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008), and whether a defendant is a proper party under § 1983, see Antoine v. Star Ledger of New Jersey, 409 Fed.Appx. 492 (3d Cir. 2010).
II. Factual Background and Procedural History.
Miles, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this § 1983 action by filing a complaint on December 9, 2019. Doc. 1. Miles's complaint lists eleven counts under eleven separate headings: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) unreasonable seizure; (4) assault and battery, (5) violation of due process, notice; (6) violation of equal protection; (7) Monell; (8) malicious prosecution; (9) civil conspiracy; (10) Thirteenth Amendment; and (11) Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2-12. Miles names as defendants Judge Michael Barrasse (“Barrasse”), Judge Patricia Corbett (“Corbett”), prosecutors Andrew Krowiak (“Krowiak”), Mark Powell (“Powell”), and Brian Gallagher (“Gallagher”), defense attorney Joseph Toczydlowski (“Toczydlowski”), detectives Harold Zech (“Zech”) and John Munley (“Munley”), and Lackawanna County. Id. at 1.
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Miles's claims stem from his arrest for multiple drug-related offenses. Based on the criminal information attached to Miles's complaint, he is charged with Delivery of a Controlled Substance, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Delivery of a Controlled Substance, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Drug Paraphernalia. Id. at 17. Miles alleges that Zech and Munley arrested him on December 13, 2017, without probable cause. Id. at 2. Miles claims that Zech and Munley pulled Miles out of a vehicle at gunpoint and placed him in the patrol vehicle against his will in order to effectuate the unlawful arrest. Id. Additionally, Miles contends that Zech and Munley made false statements in the affidavit of probable cause supporting the arrest. Id. at 3.
Miles also opines that, in furtherance of a conspiracy, Zech and Munley are working together with Krowiak, Powell, and Gallagher to falsely accuse Miles of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance. Id. According to Miles, the efforts of the prosecutors and the detectives were for the sole purpose of effectuating an unlawful arrest and imprisonment and to maliciously prosecute and convict Miles. Id. Miles also alleges that Barrasse and Corbett were in on the conspiracy because they appointed Miles two defense attorneys that they knew would not bring the unlawfulness of the arrest and ongoing prosecution to the court's attention. Id. at 6.
Miles also claims that he is being deprived of liberty without due process. Id. Specifically, Miles alleges that the charge of criminal conspiracy was added by way of amended information in April and May of 2018. Id. at 3. Miles contends that he never had a preliminary hearing on this added charge of conspiracy and is being imprisoned on that charge without due process or probable cause. Id. Miles believes that neither the prosecutors nor the detectives ever intended to provide Miles with notice of the added conspiracy charge. Id.
Miles also alleges that he is being deprived of equal protection of the law because another inmate in the Lackawanna County Prison was provided with a preliminary hearing on his criminal conspiracy charge, whereas Miles was not. Id. at 7. Miles believes that the unequal treatment is to further the alleged conspiracy between the defendants. Id.
According to Miles, the unlawful conduct of the detectives and prosecutors was a result of inadequate training and supervision on the part of Lackawanna County and Barrasse and Corbett. Id. at 8. Such failure, Miles alleges, is a result of an unconstitutional policy adopted by Lackawanna County at the judges' request. Id.
Miles seeks to have the prosecution removed from Lackawanna County and transferred to the Federal Government for investigation and prosecution. Id. at 12.
He also seeks $4,000,000 in compensatory damages, $4,000,000 in punitive damages, costs incurred from this action, immediate release from incarceration, and any additional relief this Court deems appropriate. Id. All of the defendants' motions to dismiss are fully briefed and ripe for determination.
Miles seeks as a remedy “immediate release from this unlawful detention, ” but he cannot seek such relief in this § 1983 action. Doc. 1 at 11. Instead, such relief is available only via a habeas corpus action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”).
III. Motion to Dismiss and Pleading Standards.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing a motion to dismiss, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F.Supp.2d 762, 769-70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 & 679).
IV. Discussion.
A. Miles's Claims against Barrasse, Corbett, Krowiak, Powell and Gallagher Should be Dismissed.
“Although § 1983 purports to subject ‘[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to ‘abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'” Yarris v. Cty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Id. at 135. Although most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, public officials who perform “special functions” are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). “[A]bsolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process.” Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). “This immunity was and still is considered necessary ‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.'” McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
A functional approach is used to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). The inquiry focuses on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Id.
1. Barrasse and Corbett are Judicially Immune from Suit.
Barrasee and Corbett argue that the claims against them should be dismissed because they enjoy absolute immunity from suit. They are correct. “The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.” Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d. Cir. 2000). The Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have . . . this is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27 (citations omitted).
We engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, because immunity only applies to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, we must determine whether the challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The relevant factors “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 768 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). “Our task is to ‘draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts.” Id. (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. In this regard, “we must distinguish between acts in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in ‘excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection.” Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6). Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. Id. at 769. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. “In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such “specifics” as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision.” Id.
From the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that Barrasse and Corbett acted in a judicial capacity in their dealings with Miles, and that they were not acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Both Barrasse and Corbett acted in their capacity as common pleas judges, and performed acts routinely performed by common pleas judges-appointing defense counsel. Accordingly, the judicial defendants are entitled to judicial immunity from Miles's claims since their actions “fall squarely within the jurisdiction conferred upon them by state law as state judges.” Miles v. Zech, No. 3:18-CV-1061, 2018 WL 3214262, at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2018). We, therefore, recommend that Barrasse and Corbett's motion to dismiss, doc. 9, be granted.
2. Krowiak, Powell and Gallagher are Immune from Suit.
Korwiak, Powell and Gallagher similarly argue they are immune from suit. “[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for actions performed in a judicial or ‘quasi-judicial' capacity.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008). Absolute immunity, however, does not apply to administrative or investigative actions unrelated to initiating or conducting judicial proceedings. Id. Prosecutors are shielded by absolute immunity for actions which are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Such activities include activities undertaken while in court as well as selected out-of-court behavior intimately associated with the judicial phases of litigation. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1463. The decision to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor's judicial role, and a prosecutor is absolutely immune when making such a decision even if he or she acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred. Id. at 1463-64. A prosecutor is also entitled to absolute immunity for the preparation and filing of charging documents and arrest warrants. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.
Here, Miles bases his claims against Krowiak, Powell, and Gallagher on their act of having prosecuted his criminal case. As such, they are immune from liability for their actions in bringing a criminal case, and we recommend their motion to dismiss, doc. 7, be granted.
B. Toczydlowski was not Acting Under the Color of State Law as is Necessary for a § 1983 Action.
Miles raises claims against Joseph Toczydlowski (“Toczydlowski”) for conduct that allegedly occurred while Toczydlowski was Miles's defense attorney. As a public defender, however, Toczydlowski was not acting under color of state law, thus he cannot be held liable under § 1983.
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). The requirement that a defendant act under color of state law is essential in order to establish a claim under § 1983. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
“Action under color of state law ‘requires that one liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1998)). The Supreme Court has established a number of approaches to the question of when a private person acts under color of state law. Crissman v. Dover Downs Ent., Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 2002). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has “outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) “whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state;” (2) “whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials;” and (3) whether “the [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). “The inquiry is fact-specific, ” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995), and “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
With respect to the color-of-state-law requirement, any “actions of private citizens, without any showing of state action, do not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Gonzalez v. Feiner, 131 Fed.Appx. 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, Toczydlowski is not a state actor because he “is an attorney in private practice.” Doc. 23 at 8. Miles alleges no plausible facts to explain how a close nexus exists between Toczydlowski as a private party and the state. Further, the conduct of a defense attorney representing a client in a criminal case does not by itself rise to the level of state action entitling a state prisoner to bring a federal civil-rights action against his own prior counsel. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding). Toczydlowski, therefore, was not acting under color of state law in his representation of Miles, and Miles may not convert his dissatisfaction with Toczydlowski's representation into a federal civil-rights lawsuit. Thus, we recommend that Toczydlowski's motion to dismiss, doc. 22, be granted.
IV. The Complaint should not be dismissed against the remaining defendants.
Several of the defendants contend that Miles's claims are barred under Heck and thus ask us to dismiss his complaint. Doc. 13 at 5; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck, however, “did not address the favorable termination rule with respect to anticipated future convictions, and . . . subsequent cases have declined to extend Heck to the situation in this case.” Perrin v. Iuzzolino, No. CV 16-791, 2017 WL 487123, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Perrin v. Izzulino, No. CV 16-791, 2017 WL 478171 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2017). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis in original; footnotes 6, 7, 8 omitted).
“The purpose of [Heck's] favorable termination requirement is to avoid ‘the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.'” Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified that the favorable termination rule in Heck simply does not apply “to an anticipated future conviction.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393.
Here, Miles has not yet been convicted - and, therefore, Heck's favorable termination requirement does not apply. Defendants are also patently incorrect in asserting that the Heck bar applies and requires dismissal even where there are pending criminal charges and no conviction. Rather, in a situation such as this, where the § 1983 plaintiff has yet to be convicted and his civil claims are closely related to his criminal proceedings, the Court should stay the civil action. As the Supreme Court stated in Wallace, “[i]f a plaintiff files a[ny] . . . claim before he has been convicted . . . related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial[ ], it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of the criminal case is ended. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94. “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” Id. at 394.
Defendants' citations to Marable v. Pottsgrove Twp., 176 F. App'x. 275 (3d Cir. 2006) and Clouser v. Johnson, 40 F.Supp.3d 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014) are misplaced and do not stand for the proposition that Heck applies despite a conviction. In Marable, Newstell Marable, Jr. plead nolo contendere and thus was convicted of resisting arrest. Marable, 176 Fed.Appx. at 280 (“[W]e also recognize that a plea of nolo contendere ‘is indisputably tantamount to a conviction.'”) (quoting United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004)). And Clouser involved, inter alia, a discussion of the distinction between Heck's substantive bar and its claims accrual rule. Clouser, 40 F.Supp.3d at 432-33. Moreover, Clouser was a convicted prisoner when he brought his complaint rather than a pretrial detainee as Miles is here. See supra at 1 n.1.
Accordingly, defendants' argument that Miles's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Heck is premature. Under the circumstances, the prudent course of action is to stay the entire suit and administratively close it until the criminal proceedings against Miles have concluded. See Wallace, 549 U.S. 393-94; McKinney v. Prosecutor Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 612 Fed.Appx. 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2015). As the entire suit should be stayed, it is unnecessary at this time to address the merits of defendants' remaining arguments that Miles did not sufficiently plead civil conspiracy claims or that Miles's state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity. We will permit defendants to reassert such arguments in the future at the appropriate time.
We note the clear case law, as above, that specifies that Heck's favorable termination rule does not apply to situations like this where a criminal defendant has not yet been convicted. Given these clear dictates, these defendants' choice to make this argument at this early juncture is curious.
To effectuate the stay of Miles' suit as outlined above, we employ one of the powers “[i]nherent in the district court's power to control the disposition of civil matters appearing on its docket”: “the power to stay proceedings when judicial economy or other interests so require.” Barker v. Kane, 149 F.Supp.3d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2016). “A stay is an extraordinary measure, and the decision to impose a stay rests within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. In exercising that discretion to determine whether to stay a case “pending resolution of a related criminal proceeding, courts consider the following factors”:
(1) the extent to which the issues in the civil and criminal cases overlap; (2) the status of the criminal proceedings, including whether any defendants have been indicted; (3) the plaintiff's interests in expeditious civil proceedings weighed against the prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the delay; (4) the burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the court; and (6) the public interest.Id. at 525-26.
Here, the above factors weigh in favor of staying this action until Miles's criminal case is concluded. There is likely significant overlap as to the issues in this case and the issues in Miles's criminal case, as Miles contends that the charges against him were not warranted but were issued in retaliation for his legal actions. Miles's criminal case has proceeded past the initial stages-per the case's docket sheets, the charges appear to have been pending since 2018, and multiple appeals have been filed with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. We further note that if this case were not stayed and proceeded to discovery, Miles may be forced to either waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or forfeit his defense on disputed issues in this case. Id. (recognizing that “proceeding with discovery will force Kane to either waive her Fifth Amendment privilege or forfeit her defense on key disputed issues in this civil suit”). Though a stay necessarily burdens the defendants here (as opposed to a dismissal), we also note that it serves the interest of the court and the public in allowing the state court to determine in the first instance the disputed issues relating to Miles's Fourth Amendment claims.
The docket sheets provide no clarity as to the issues animating these appeals.
Further, “the Third Circuit . . . [has] consistently held that a § 1983 damages claim for alleged Fourth Amendment violations should be stayed where the constitutional issues are likely to be litigated in a parallel pending state criminal prosecution.” Dalal v. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-1257 WJM, 2014 WL 2691698, at *11 (D.N.J. June 13, 2014) (citing cases). The Supreme Court has also recognized that “[i]f a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” Id. at 394.
We will thus recommend that this case be stayed pending the resolution of Miles's criminal charges.
V. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend the following:
The motions to dismiss, docs. 7, 9, & 22, be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Barrasse, Corbett, Krowiak, Powell, and Gallagher and Toczydlowski;
The motions to dismiss filed on behalf of Zech, Munley and Lackawanna County, docs. 7, 15, be DENIED, but that the Court stay and administratively close this action until the conclusion of Miles's criminal proceedings.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.