Opinion
No. 75-825
Decided January 20, 1977.
Dispute between dog owners and racetrack operators was settled after temporary restraining orders were entered in action relative to a boycott, but trial court on its own motion ordered that petitions for contempt citations be prepared against each dog owner. From subsequent finding of contempt, dog owners appealed.
Reversed
1. CONTEMPT — Temporary Restraining Order — Must Contain — Specifically Defined Injury — And — Reason Injury Irreparable — Failure to State Either — — Renders Order Nullity. Every temporary restraining order granted without notice must specifically define the injury and must state why the injury is irreparable, and a failure to meet either one of these requirements is sufficient to render such an order a nullity; accordingly, where a trial court found parties in contempt of temporary restraining orders entered in an action relative to a boycott dispute, but the restraining orders neither specifically defined any injury nor stated why any injury was irreparable, such orders were void, and the parties had no duty to comply with them; therefore, the parties could not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to obey such orders.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Charles Goldberg, Judge.
Rothgerber, Appel Powers, James M. Lyons, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Forest E. Clark, Jr., Berger Rothstein, P.C., Herman Rothstein, Mason, Reuler Peek, P.C., H.F. Riebesell, Jr., for defendants-appellants.
Defendants appeal from a judgment holding them in contempt of court and imposing fines and jail sentences. We reverse
On June 12, 1975, plaintiffs sought temporary restraining orders to bar defendant dog owners from engaging in a boycott of the Mile High and Pueblo dog racing tracks by withholding their dogs from competition. Based on the complaint and testimony presented at an ex parte hearing, the court issued a temporary restraining order for each track, which prohibited defendants from breaching their racing contracts or participating in any way in a strike or boycott against that track. However, after the orders were issued and service was made on defendants or their agents, the boycott continued for several days until the track owners and dog owners negotiated a settlement. At a subsequent hearing on plaintiffs' motion for leave to withdraw their motion for a preliminary injunction, the court on its own motion ordered that plaintiffs prepare a petition for citation for contempt against each defendant. Contempt citations were issued, and after the case was transferred to another judge, the court found the appellants to be in contempt of court for violating the temporary restraining orders.
We hold that the temporary restraining orders were nullities, and therefore defendants could not be in contempt of such orders.
The temporary restraining orders stated in pertinent part:
"Defendant Dog Owners . . . continue to withhold greyhounds from racing at Plaintiff's racing establishment and Defendant Dog Owners have participated in and continue to participate in a strike or boycott against Plaintiff in violation of their greyhound racing contracts with Plaintiff and as more specifically set forth in the verified Complaint. The Court finds that unless restrained by order of this Court, immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage will result to Plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing had on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff is prepared to comply with the provisions of their greyhound racing contracts with the Dog Owners and is prepared to proceed with the 1975 racing season. An immediate and irreparable loss and damage will result to Plaintiff if Dog Owners are allowed to breach their greyhound racing contract and if the Defendant Association and its officers and directors are allowed to continue to participate in inducing said Dog Owners to breach their greyhound racing contracts." (emphasis supplied)
The trial court upheld the validity of the temporary restraining orders on the grounds that the record showed that the issuing court had sufficient facts before it, as required under C.R.C.P. 65(b)(1) and (2), to justify issuance of the orders. We assume the correctness of this portion of the court's decision. Nevertheless, the restraining orders themselves are defective because they fail to meet two of the basic requirements of C.R.C.P. 65(b) and (d).
C.R.C.P. 65(b) requires, in pertinent part, that:
" Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; [and] shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice . . . ." (emphasis supplied)
C.R.C.P. 65(d) further provides:
[E]very restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . ." (emphasis supplied)
[1] Here, the orders merely state that the defendants were engaged in a boycott, and conclude that the plaintiffs would be irreparably damaged if the boycott was not restrained. They do not specifically define the injury and do not state why the injury is irreparable. Either one of these deficiencies is sufficient to render the orders a nullity. Intermountain Rural Electric Association v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 414 P.2d 911; Renner v. Williams, 140 Colo. 432, 344 P.2d 966. Accordingly, we hold that these requirements are mandatory and must be complied with before a temporary restraining order issued without notice is valid.
Since the temporary restraining orders were void, defendants had no duty to comply with them, and they could not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to obey the orders. Renner, supra.
Inasmuch as our resolution of this issue is dispositive of the case, defendants' other allegations of error are not considered.
Judgment reversed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.