Opinion
No. 25406-9-II.
Filed: March 16, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County, No. 97-2-10136-6, Hon. Marywave Van Deren, January 14, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Thomas D. Dinwiddie, Dinwiddie Landry, 902 S 10th St, Tacoma, WA 98405.
Paul J. Landry, 902 S 10th St, Tacoma, WA 98405.
Counsel for Respondent(s), James M. Caraher, James Caraher Associates, 616 North M Street, Tacoma, WA 98403.
Clifford Harris appeals the denial of attorney fees. Harris successfully defended a lawsuit brought against him by Sidney Mickelson, but he did not prevail on his counterclaims. The trial court concluded that Harris was the prevailing party and awarded him reasonable attorney fees and costs for defending against Mickelson's unsuccessful alternative claim for damages only. The amount of fees awarded was to be set by later order of the court.
At oral argument, Harris' counsel asserted that he had prevailed on his claim for damages for loss of use, in the amount of $40. The record reflects that Harris received nothing as a principal judgment amount. The court awarded $40 to Harris as the cost of transporting the car from Mickelson's residence to Harris' residence.
The trial court directed Harris' counsel to allocate his fees between the successful and unsuccessful causes. Harris' counsel claimed he was unable to do so. Based on Harris' counsel's failure to allocate his fees between the successful and unsuccessful causes, the court amended its order and awarded no attorney fees to either party. Harris appeals. The facts of the underlying case are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal and we will not repeat them here.
A prevailing party may recover attorney fees for the cost of litigation only if permitted by statute, contract, or recognized equitable ground. Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 131 Wn.2d 133, 143, 930 P.2d 288 (1997). The award of attorney fees is proper in this case under RCW 4.84.250, which provides that attorney fees 'shall be . . . allowed to the prevailing party' where the amount pleaded is less than $10,000. See Kingston Lumber Supply Co. v. High Tech Development, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 864, 867, 765 P.2d 27 (1988).
'In addition to establishing entitlement to attorney fees, the party requesting them must also establish they are reasonable.' McGreevy v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 90 Wn. App. 283, 291, 951 P.2d 798 (1998) (citing Absher Constr. Co. v. Kent Sch. Dist., 79 Wn. App. 841, 847, 905 P.2d 1229, 917 P.2d 1086 (1995)). By failing to allocate the fees between the successful cause and the unsuccessful causes, Harris' counsel failed to establish the reasonableness of his fee request. The trial court did not err in finding that there was no legal basis to award attorney fees to Harris.
Both counsel seek attorney fees on appeal. RAP 18.1(b) requires a separate section of the appellate brief devoted to the fee issue. This requirement is mandatory. Phillips Bldg. Co. v. An, 81 Wn. App. 696, 705, 915 P.2d 1146 (1996). The rule requires more than a bald request for attorney fees on appeal. Thweatt v. Hommel, 67 Wn. App. 135, 148, 834 P.2d 1058 (1992). Mickelson's attorney devoted a separate section of his brief to attorney fees but merely cited RAP 18.9(a) and provided no supporting argument. Likewise, Harris' counsel provided no supporting argument for his claim that RCW 4.84.290 entitled him to recover attorney fees on appeal. Neither counsel satisfied the requirements of RAP 18.1(b). We therefore award no attorney fees for this appeal. The trial court's order is affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
WE CONCUR: MORGAN, J., ARMSTRONG, C.J.