Opinion
2001-07971
Argued June 10, 2002.
September 10, 2002.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant General Tire, Inc., appeals, and the defendant Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. separately appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Seidell, J.), entered August 27, 2001, as is in favor of the plaintiff and against each of them, respectively, on the issue of liability.
Fogarty Fogarty, P.C. (Martin, Clearwater Bell, New York, N.Y. [Nancy A. Breslow] of counsel), for appellant General Tire, Inc.
Strongin Rothman Abrams, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Howard F. Strongin and Annette G. Hasapidis of counsel), for appellant Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A.
Flomenhaft Cannata, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Benedene C. Cannata of counsel), for respondent.
Kelly, Rode Kelly, Mineola, N.Y. (John W. Hoefling of counsel), for defendant James E. Waters.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, SANDRA L. TOWNES, JJ.
ORDERED that the interlocutory judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
On September 8, 1990, the plaintiff was a passenger in her new 1990 Nissan Pathfinder when the vehicle suffered a tire blowout and collided with a truck. The plaintiff commenced this action sounding in strict products liability and breach of implied warranty against, inter alia, General Tire, Inc. (hereinafter General Tire), the manufacturer of the tire, and Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. (hereinafter Nissan), the distributer of the vehicle. After a trial, the jury found that the tire was defective, that the defect was a substantial factor in causing the accident, and that the defect existed before the tire's delivery to Nissan. The Supreme Court entered an interlocutory judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against, inter alia, General Tire and Nissan.
Contrary to Nissan's contention, the Supreme Court's interlocutory judgment conformed to the jury's verdict and had a sound basis in the law. Given that the jury found that the tire was defective before it was delivered to Nissan, it follows that Nissan distributed and sold a vehicle which had a defective tire. Accordingly, Nissan is liable under a theory of strict products liability for introducing a defective product into the stream of commerce (see Gebo v. Black Clawson Co., 92 N.Y.2d 387, 392; Bielicki v. T.J. Bentley, Inc., 248 A.D.2d 657, 659; Harrigan v. Super Prods. Corp., 237 A.D.2d 882, 883; Goldstein v. Brogan Cadillac Oldsmobile Corp., 90 A.D.2d 512, 514).
Contrary to General Tire's contention, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that the tire was defective at the time that it left General Tire's hands and that the defect was a substantial factor in causing the accident (see Winckel v. Atlantic Rentals Sales, 159 A.D.2d 124, 126). General Tire's arguments that the jury charge was confusing and misstated principles of law are either unpreserved for appellate review (see CPLR 4110-b; CPLR 4017; CPLR 5501; Surjnarine v. Brathwaite, 290 A.D.2d 436) or without merit. General Tire's remaining contentions are without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., S. MILLER, GOLDSTEIN and TOWNES, JJ., concur.