Opinion
E070773
12-10-2019
OSCAR MEYER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNA M. JEFFRIES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Law Office of Walter R. Huff and Walter R. Huff, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Reid & Hellyer and Michael G. Kerbs, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1609962) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David A. Williams, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Walter R. Huff and Walter R. Huff, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Reid & Hellyer and Michael G. Kerbs, for Defendants and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant, Oscar Meyer, and defendant and respondent, Una M. Jeffries, were in a dating relationship living together as cohabitants for nearly 30 years. Since 1995, they have lived together in a home located on Mandy Lane in San Bernardino (Mandy Lane Property). The Mandy Lane Property was originally purchased by defendant and title was in her name only. In 2016, defendant was diagnosed with severe dementia and moved out of the home to live with family members. Thereafter, plaintiff was evicted from the Mandy Lane Property and he initiated a civil suit claiming a 50 percent ownership interest in the property entitling him to damages or a variety of equitable remedies to protect his alleged interest.
The matter proceeded to trial and, after completion of plaintiff's presentation of evidence, the trial court granted a motion for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8, finding that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden to establish the existence of an agreement to share in the ownership of the Mandy Lane Property. Plaintiff challenges this decision on appeal asserting at least 11 different "arguments" against the trial court's factual findings and determination.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
We conclude the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof is supported by substantial evidence and that plaintiff has failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of equitable relief. We also conclude plaintiff forfeited any arguments not tailored to an appropriate standard of review, not accompanied by a fair summary of the evidence, or not fully developed in his briefs.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Plaintiff's Operative Complaint
On April 26, 2017, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint alleging various causes of action. Generally, plaintiff alleged the existence of a partnership or joint venture between plaintiff and defendant entitling him to a 50 percent ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. In order to protect his alleged interest, plaintiff sought to quiet title, establish a constructive or resulting trust, partition the property, obtain an accounting regarding an alleged partnership with defendant, and cancel a deed granting ownership of the Mandy Lane Property to defendant and respondent, the Una M. Jeffries Living Trust. The third amended complaint named defendant, both in her individual capacity and in her capacity as a trustee of the Una M. Jeffries Living Trust, as well as defendant's daughter, defendant and respondent, Natalie Debere, in her capacity as the successor trustee to the Una M. Jeffries Living Trust. B. Trial
Plaintiff's third amended complaint also alleged a cause of action for elder abuse pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30. However, the trial court sustained a demurrer to that cause of action, without leave to amend.
On April 2, 2018, the trial court held a bench trial in which plaintiff, Debere, and plaintiff's real estate expert were called to testify.
Defendant was initially called to testify, but was excused from the stand when it became apparent her condition did not allow her to provide any meaningful testimony. Plaintiff also called his physician to testify, but it is unclear from the record what issue this testimony was intended to address and neither party relies upon the physician's testimony in support of any of the arguments presented in their briefs on appeal.
1. Testimony of Plaintiff
Plaintiff and defendant began living together sometime in the early 1980's. After a few years, they moved to a home on Carmelina Lane in San Bernardino purchased by defendant. During this time, plaintiff, defendant, and defendant's mother lived together in the same residence, with each contributing approximately one-third towards the household expenses. After approximately seven years, the property on Carmelina Lane was sold and they moved to the Mandy Lane Property.
When the Mandy Lane Property was purchased, title was placed in defendant's name only. Plaintiff acknowledged that his name was not placed on the title to the Mandy Lane Property, but explained that this was done to avoid an ongoing dispute with the Internal Revenue Service.
Plaintiff testified that after defendant's mother passed away in 1998, he had a conversation with defendant regarding the Mandy Lane Property. During this conversation, defendant stated: "[N]ow that mom is gone, passed away and stuff . . . I don't have any money coming in on a regular basis. I'm asking could you take care of all the bills, everything, pay everything. . . ." When asked to repeat the conversation, plaintiff described defendant's words as: "I don't have any income coming in . . . 'Mom is gone now, so you think you could carry on the load?'" According to plaintiff, defendant also stated: "'Don't worry, honey,' . . . 'As long as you live, you always have a home here. . . . This is your home.' . . . 'Not unless you decide you wanted to move out.'" Plaintiff testified that he agreed to defendant's request. He understood this conversation to be an agreement to share half of the ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. Plaintiff admitted that the conversation was not documented and, upon examination directly by the trial court, plaintiff admitted he never signed anything in writing with defendant regarding ownership of the Mandy Lane Property.
The Mandy Lane Property was refinanced in 2001 and the refinanced mortgage was paid off in 2009. Plaintiff admitted that with respect to each of the homes he cohabited with defendant, title, loan, and refinancing documents were all exclusively in defendant's name. However, plaintiff testified that he made payments toward the refinanced mortgage, as well as payments toward utilities and gardening services for the Mandy Lane Property during this time. He produced cancelled checks in support of this testimony and the parties stipulated that he made the payments in the amounts reflected by the cancelled checks.
Plaintiff testified that during their move to the Mandy Lane Property, he paid for moving expenses, interior paint, ceiling fans, phone jacks, garage openers, garage shelves, garage cabinets, door sets, key duplicates and labor for installation of some of these items. Plaintiff also paid for concrete and installation of a storage shed, but admitted the shed was used as part of his business. However, plaintiff admitted that he operated a painting business out of the Mandy Lane Property and that he did not pay rent or utility costs related to his business from his business accounts. While his business's payroll account made payments to defendant, plaintiff testified these payments were compensation for defendant's work employed as a bookkeeper for the business. Plaintiff could not recall if he took deductions for rent or utility expenses when filing tax returns for his business. The trial court sustained objections to the introduction of documents related to the expenses plaintiff claimed were related to these improvements, both because plaintiff failed to produce the documents in pretrial discovery and because plaintiff could not differentiate the expenses made for the benefit of his painting business from those made for residential purposes.
Plaintiff admitted that in 2001 he filed for bankruptcy, but did not list any interest in the Mandy Lane Property in that proceeding. Plaintiff also admitted that while living in the Mandy Lane Property, he individually purchased other residential properties to generate rental income. In the course of foreclosure proceedings related to these properties, plaintiff disclaimed any ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property, representing that he was a tenant.
In July 2016, plaintiff was evicted from the Mandy Lane Property.
2. Testimony of Debere
Debere testified that she is defendant's daughter. Defendant's granddaughter currently lives in the Mandy Lane Property and defendant spends about three days a week at the Mandy Lane Property and the remainder of the week living in Debere's home. Debere confirmed that plaintiff and defendant had a dating relationship and lived together since at least 1990. She recalled that defendant paid approximately $85,000 as a down payment to purchase a residential property on Carmelina Lane in San Bernardino where plaintiff, defendant, and defendant's mother lived together. She further recalled that the three shared living expenses while living together on Carmelina Lane.
In 1995, defendant sold the residence on Carmelina Lane and used the proceeds to purchase the Mandy Lane Property. At the time of purchase, plaintiff made some improvements to the home, including installation of a shed, installation of cabinetry, and conversion of a bedroom into an office. These improvements were used for plaintiff's painting business. Debere did not know whether plaintiff claimed these as business expenses for tax purposes.
Debere testified that plaintiff did not pay anything to live in the Mandy Lane Property until after defendant's mother passed away, at which point defendant asked plaintiff to begin paying rent. Sometime in 2015, Debere took over management of defendant's finances and during this time period, she noticed plaintiff would make rental payments in cash. She believed plaintiff dealt primarily in cash due to personal financial issues which made it difficult for him to deposit money into traditional bank accounts.
Debere acknowledged that there was a period of time in which plaintiff wrote checks directly towards mortgage and utility payments on the Mandy Lane Property. She did not know why defendant had plaintiff write checks directly towards the mortgage payments, but believed that plaintiff's payment of utilities was consistent with paying his share of household expenses as a tenant. Debere also testified that defendant had previously expressed the opinion plaintiff should make payments because "he lived there and he couldn't live there for free."
In 2011, defendant established the Una M. Jeffries Living Trust and transferred her interest in the Mandy Lane Property to the trust. Debere became the successor trustee of the trust after defendant was diagnosed with dementia.
On March 8, 2016, Debere caused a 60-day notice to quit to be served on plaintiff, evicting him from the Mandy Lane Property.
3. Testimony of Michael Mattson
Plaintiff offered Michael Mattson as an expert witness for the purpose of valuation, the reasonable rental value, and the actual market value of the Mandy Lane Property. Mattson testified that he has been a practicing realtor since 1972. In this profession he is involved with both the sale and management of real property. He testified that the reasonable rental value of the Mandy Lane Property in 2016 would have been about $1,650 per month and in 2018 would have been about $1,850 per month.
On cross-examination, Mattson admitted that the improvements which plaintiff made to the Mandy Lane Property would not necessarily have increased the property's value. He further testified that the purchase of a primary residence is an investment, but not in the same way that the purchase of a rental property would be considered an investment. He explained that the transactions were different because people purchasing primary residences do so with different motivations and are subject to different tax consequences. Plaintiff did not seek to further clarify these opinions on redirect examination. C. Motion for Judgment
On April 3, 2018, plaintiff completed his case-in-chief and submitted a memorandum of legal authorities in support of his closing argument, which included a request for a statement of decision. Immediately after plaintiff rested his case, defendant moved for judgment under section 631.8. The trial court entertained oral argument from both counsel on the matter. The trial court granted the motion and ordered defendant to prepare a proposed statement of decision. The record does not disclose objections to the proposed statement.
On April 24, 2018, the trial court issued its statement of decision. The trial court found: (1) defendant purchased the Mandy Lane Property in her own name; (2) defendant paid all the mortgage payments for the Mandy Lane Property from 1995 through 2002; (3) plaintiff paid mortgage payments for the Mandy Lane Property from 2002 through 2007; (4) plaintiff and defendant lived together as a couple for 30 years, but were never married; and (5) that at all times legal title to the Mandy Lane Property remained only in defendant's name. The trial court further found that defendant's statement that plaintiff "will always have a home" did not constitute an agreement to grant plaintiff an ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. Finally, the trial court found the Mandy Lane Property was not intended to be a for profit enterprise.
Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof because all of the claims alleged in the third amended complaint required plaintiff to establish the existence of an agreement between plaintiff and defendant with respect to the Mandy Lane Property. The statement of decision then attached the entire transcript of oral proceedings related to defendant's motion for judgment, stating: "[T]he Court's findings commence on page 27 of such Transcript." The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant the same day it issued its statement of decision.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Right to Recovery Stems from Contract Principles
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that all his claims stem from the question of whether plaintiff and defendant had an agreement to share ownership in the Mandy Lane Property. We disagree that the trial court erred, as it considered all of plaintiff's claims based on express or implied contract as well as equitable principles
"In Marvin v. Marvin . . . the California Supreme Court 'determined that the Family Law Act was not intended by the Legislature to delineate the property rights of nonmarital partners. However, the court also determined (a) that the courts should enforce contracts between nonmarital partners and (b) that in the absence of an express contract, the courts should look to the conduct of the parties to determine whether or not that conduct demonstrates "an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties."'" (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1175.) "'The Marvin court also held that, in the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of remedies to protect the parties' expectations. . . .'" (Ibid.; Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684.)
The court may inquire "into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture [citation], or some other tacit understanding between the parties." (Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 684.) However, "'[p]roperty rights, if any, under a "Marvin agreement" derive from an express or implied contract or equitable principles.'" (Velez v. Smith, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) "'Whatever else they may be, Marvin causes of action are . . . civil actions based on contract theory.' '. . . [E]ven as the nonmarital cohabitation does not erode the parties' contract rights, neither does such cohabitation confer on them any special privilege over and above those of any other civil litigants.'" (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court found that plaintiff and defendant lived together as a couple for 30 years, but were never married. This fact was not contested below and plaintiff does not challenge this finding on appeal. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff bore the initial burden to prove the existence of an agreement, express or implied, giving him an ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. Irrespective of the requested remedy, it was plaintiff's burden to show the existence of an ownership interest to be protected before any relief could be granted. The trial court did not err when it concluded that all of plaintiff's requests for relief stemmed from a threshold showing that he had an ownership interest in the property. B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Determination that Plaintiff Failed to Meet His Burden of Proof
Plaintiff challenges multiple factual findings made by the trial court in issuing judgment pursuant to section 631.8, arguing that these findings are "not supported by the record." We disagree.
1. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
"A party may move for judgment in its favor under [section 631.8] after the opposing party has completed presentation of its evidence. [Citation.] The judge, sitting as trier of fact, may weigh the evidence and order judgment in favor of the moving party. [Citation.] '"'The purpose of . . . section 631.8 is . . . to dispense with the need for defendant to produce evidence . . .'"' where the court is persuaded that the plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proof. [Citation.] Because the trial court evaluates the evidence as a trier of fact, it may refuse to believe some witnesses while crediting the testimony of others." (Combs v. Skyriver Communications, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1262-1263, fn. omitted.) "'The substantial evidence standard of review applies to judgment given under . . . section 631.8 . . . .'" (Higgins v. Higgins (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 648, 658; Charles C. Chapman Building Co. v. California Mart (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 853.)
However, "where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. . . . [¶] . . . [W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.' [Citation.]" (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528; see also Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 733.)
"'Where . . . the judgment is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial court found the [party's] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.'" (Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.)
Here, the trial court specifically concluded that plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof to establish the existence of any agreement between plaintiff and defendant with respect to the Mandy Lane Property. As discussed below, based upon our review of the record and the facts, we do not believe the evidence compels a contrary finding in plaintiff's favor.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Existence of an Express Agreement
Plaintiff argues that we must conclude an oral agreement to share ownership in the Mandy Lane Property existed because he was the only witness to testify on the issue and defendant "failed to refute" his testimony. This contention is without merit.
First, plaintiff fails to appreciate the fact that he carried the burden of proof. Indeed, the very purpose of a motion for judgment under section 631.8 is to "'"'dispense with the need for the defendant to produce evidence'"'" where the trial court "is persuaded that the plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proof." (Combs v. Skyriver Communications, Inc., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1262-1263; Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 549.) Thus, defendant's "failure to refute" plaintiff's allegations is irrelevant.
Second, "'[w]here different inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidence, the conclusion of the jury or trial judge must be accepted by the appellate court' [citation] . . . . '"[I]f it appears that either one of two inferences may fairly and reasonably be deduced from those facts, there still remains in the case a question of fact to be determined by the . . . trial judge. . . ."'" (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 633.) Here, the only statements attributed to defendant forming the basis of the alleged oral agreement were: "'Mom is gone now, so you think you could carry on the load?'" and "'Don't worry, honey,' . . . 'As long as you live, you always have a home here.' . . . 'Not unless you decide you wanted to move out.'" Assuming these statements were sufficient to allow a trier of fact to infer the existence of an oral agreement, it was equally reasonable for the trial court to infer the statements were nothing more than a request for plaintiff to start contributing a fair share of expenses in the context of a cohabitation relationship.
While plaintiff also testified to his subjective understanding of these statements, such testimony is irrelevant to our analysis, as "[m]utual assent to contract is based upon objective and outward manifestations of the parties; a party's 'subjective intent, or subjective consent, therefore is irrelevant.'" (Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1587; Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.)
Furthermore, "'"provided the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even though the witness is uncontradicted."'" (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 632.) It was for the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, to determine whether to give plaintiff's testimony credence and decide which inference to draw from the testimony, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on issues of fact. Given the competing inferences which could be drawn here, the fact that plaintiff's testimony was "unrefuted" does not compel a finding in his favor warranting reversal of the judgment.
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Existence of an Implied Agreement by Conduct
Plaintiff contends that even in the absence of an express agreement, the evidence of his conduct established an implied agreement to share ownership of the Mandy Lane Property. We find this argument unconvincing.
"[A]n implied-in-fact contract entails an actual contract, but one manifested in conduct rather than expressed in words." (Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 455.) However, "[t]he existence and scope of implied-in-fact contracts are determined by the totality of the circumstances . . . [and] '[t]he question whether such an implied-in-fact agreement exists is a factual question for the trier of fact unless the undisputed facts can support only one reasonable conclusion.'" (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1189.)
Here, the evidence was sharply in dispute. Plaintiff produced cancelled checks showing that he paid almost all the mortgage payments on the Mandy Lane Property for a period of about six years starting in 2002. However, he offered no evidence to show any payments made during the first seven years he lived on the property and did not explain who paid for the mortgage or expenses during that time. Plaintiff testified the oral agreement to share in the ownership of the Mandy Lane Property occurred sometime in 1998. However, plaintiff did not list any interest in the Mandy Lane Property when he subsequently filed for bankruptcy and defendant did not include plaintiff on the title or loan documents when she subsequently refinanced the mortgage on the property. Even after the mortgage on the Mandy Lane Property had been paid off, plaintiff continued to make rental payments to defendant and plaintiff represented to third persons that he was only a tenant—conduct which is inconsistent with a claim of equal ownership.
While plaintiff suggests in his opening brief that defendant failed to show she paid for the mortgage during this period, this argument again ignores the fact that plaintiff bears the burden of proof and "[i]f there is no evidence on an issue the finding must be against the party who has the burden of proof." (Walbergh v. Moudy (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 786, 790.)
Thus, the record contains evidence of conduct which supports and contradicts plaintiff's claim of an implied contract to share equal ownership in the Mandy Lane Property. It was for the trial court to weigh the evidence, consider the competing inferences, and resolve any conflicts. Given the disputed evidentiary record, we cannot conclude that plaintiff's interpretation of the evidence is the only reasonable one. The evidence does not compel a finding of an implied contract as a matter of law and we decline to reverse on this ground.
4. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Existence of a Joint Venture
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to establish the existence of a joint venture. We disagree.
While the third amended complaint alleged plaintiff's interest in the Mandy Lane Property arose out of both partnership and joint venture theories, we need not address the partnership theory, as plaintiff expressly abandoned that theory at the time of trial. "[C]ounsel may not abandon a theory of recovery during the trial and then seek to revive it on appeal . . . ." (Carmichael v. Reitz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 958, 969.)
"'. . . A joint venture exists where there is an "agreement between the parties under which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest, in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control."'" (Kaljian v. Menezes (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 573, 586.) "'A joint venture can be formed by a written or an oral agreement or by an agreement implied by the parties' conduct.'" (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1052.) While a joint venture "can be created with little formality" there must still be an agreement based upon a "meeting of the minds as to the essential structure and operation of the alleged joint venture." (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 215 [no joint venture where there was no agreement].)
Here, the trial court found that plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an agreement, whether express or implied, giving him any ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. As already discussed, this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. In the absence of some form of agreement, there can be no joint venture and the trial court did not err in rejecting this claim. C. Plaintiff Has Not Established a Right to Equitable Relief
As a result, we need not address plaintiff's argument that the trial court misinterpreted his real estate expert's testimony regarding whether a residential home should be considered a "for profit" investment. In any event, we would find this issue forfeited for failure to fairly summarize the evidence on this issue. Plaintiff did not summarize or even mention his expert's testimony in his statement of facts and presented only a short excerpt of testimony consisting of two questions and two, one-word answers in his briefing. A party is "'required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.'" (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 749.)
Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to equitable relief in the form of a resulting trust, constructive trust, or a declaration to quiet title even in the absence of an express or implied agreement. Plaintiff has forfeited these arguments by failing to present them in the context of the applicable standard of review and we would find the arguments without merit even in the absence of forfeiture.
1. Plaintiff Has Forfeited Any Argument by Failing to Address It in the Context of the Appropriate Standard of Review
"'"Arguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review." [Citation.] Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.'" (Ewald v. NationstarMortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) "When they are not so tailored, the appellant fails to show error in the judgment. '. . . [T]he judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.'" (People v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 113, 126.)
Resulting trusts, constructive trusts, and quite title actions seek equitable relief from a trial court. (Calistoga Civic Club v. City of Calistoga (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 111, 117-118 [constructive trusts and resulting trusts are equitable remedies]; Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109 ["A quiet title action is equitable in nature except when it takes on the character of an ejectment proceeding . . . ."].) "We review the trial court's exercise of its equitable powers under an abuse of discretion standard of review." (Ho v. Hsieh (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 337, 345.) "'"The appropriate test . . . is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. . . ." "The abuse of discretion standard . . . measures whether, given the established evidence, the act of the lower tribunal falls within the permissible range of options set by the legal criteria."'" (Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 482.) "The trial court's discretion to grant or deny equitable relief is broad, and [the appellate court] must indulge all inferences in favor of its decision." (Abers v. Rohrs (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1208.)
Here, plaintiff challenges the trial court's denial of equitable relief, yet fails to discuss these arguments in the context of any standard of review, let alone the correct standard of review. Plaintiff fails to even mention the abuse of discretion standard anywhere in his briefs. We view the failure to tailor arguments to an appropriate standard of review as a concession the arguments lack merit and deem them forfeited. Moreover, even if we were to consider plaintiff's argument under the appropriate standard of review, we would conclude that the arguments lack merit.
We note that this court granted plaintiff relief to file an amended brief to address the appropriate standard of review on March 19, 2019. Yet, plaintiff still failed to include any discussion of the appropriate standard on these issues.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Impose a Resulting or Constructive Trust
Constructive trusts and resulting trusts are "[b]oth . . . involuntary trusts implied by law . . . . [Citation.] However, '"[a] resulting trust arises from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest . . . . [¶] It has been termed an 'intention-enforcing' trust, to distinguish it from . . . the constructive or 'fraud-rectifying' trust. The resulting trust carries out the inferred intent of the parties; the constructive trust defeats or prevents the wrongful act of one of them."'" (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238; see also Calistoga Civic Club v. City of Calistoga, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 117 [the purpose of a resulting trust is "to enforce the inferred intent of the parties to a transaction."]; PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398 ["Before a constructive trust can be imposed, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's acquisition of the property was wrongful."].)
Here, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an agreement to give him an ownership interest in the Mandy Lane Property. Absent such, it is unclear what "inferred intent" the trial court could have enforced by way of a resulting trust and it was not an abuse of discretion to decline granting this form of equitable relief.
Likewise, the trial court made no finding of wrongdoing on the part of defendant to acquire her ownership in the Mandy Lane Property. Nor did plaintiff attempt to establish this necessary factual foundation for imposition of a constructive trust. Plaintiff did not allege any wrongdoing by defendant in support of this cause of action in the third amended complaint, did not brief the issue in her closing memorandum, and did not request any such finding in her request for a statement of decision. Absent such a finding, the trial court acted well within its discretion in declining to impose a constructive trust as a form of equitable relief.
Even when considered in light of the appropriate standard of review, we find that plaintiff has not shown an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of his request for a resulting or constructive trust.
3. Plaintiff Has Not Established a Right to Quiet Title
"[T]he general rule is that the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the holder of legal title." (Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 62, 81.) In the absence of fraud or some other wrongdoing, a plaintiff's claim for equitable title cannot prevail against the holder of legal title. (Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 113-114.)
Here, the trial court found that legal title in the Mandy Lane Property was always held in defendant's name only. As already noted, the trial court made no findings of fraud or wrongdoing against defendant and plaintiff never requested any such findings. Since defendant held legal title to the Mandy Lane Property, plaintiff could not prevail in an action seeking to quiet title on equitable grounds absent a showing of fraud or some other wrongdoing. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant plaintiff's request to quiet title. D. To the Extent Plaintiff Believes Issues Related to Debere are Grounds for Reversal, Any Such Argument Is Forfeited
Finally, plaintiff discusses at length the role and motivations of Debere in extensive detail. To the extent this was intended to raise a ground for reversal, we deem any such argument forfeited.
"An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties." (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.) "We therefore need not consider undeveloped challenges." (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099.) "We are not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to challenge a trial court's action. . . . [W]hen a brief fails to contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made, we may 'treat any claimed error . . . as waived or abandoned.'" (Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 943, 948.)
Here, it is entirely unclear why plaintiff believes facts related to the motivations of Debere, even if true, are relevant to any issue on appeal. Plaintiff's discussion on these issues contain no reference to a standard of review and no citation to any legal authority. Neither the headings, subheadings, or substantive discussion suggest why plaintiff believes the involvement, motivations, or actions of Debere constitute grounds for reversal of the judgment. We therefore deem any argument which plaintiff attempted to make on this issue forfeited. E. Plaintiff Has Forfeited Any Challenge Based Upon Ambiguities in the Statement of Decision
Plaintiff repeatedly brings our attention to oral statements made by the trial court during argument on the motion for judgment, referring to such statements as "findings" and attacking them as such. We acknowledge that the statement of decision here includes a line purportedly incorporating the entire transcript of oral proceedings as the trial court's "findings." However, we decline to interpret such oral statements in a manner contrary to the judgment.
The fact that a document is labeled a statement of decision, does not make it so and where a statement of decision is noncompliant, reversal is normally required. (Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1126, 1129.) "[I]t is almost impossible to work with the reporter's transcript as the statement of decision . . . ." (Whittington v. McKinney (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 123, 127.) The use of such "short-hand method[s] designed to avoid the mandate of section 632 requiring a statement of decision fairly disclosing the court's determination of all material, factual issues involved in the action" is highly disfavored. (Id. at p. 129.) Thus, to the extent the statement of decision here purported to incorporate the entire transcript of oral proceedings as findings, it did not comply with the statutory intent or purpose of a statement of decision.
Nevertheless, the use of such a highly disfavored procedure does not require reversal in this case. The trial court's statement of decision "'is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court's determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.'" (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983.) Here, the trial court issued a written statement of decision which set forth findings of ultimate fact and reasons in support of the judgment. Thus, the use of a reporter's transcript to represent additional findings did not deprive the parties of a statement fairly disclosing the trial court's ultimate conclusions. Instead, the use of such a disfavored procedure here rendered ambiguous any additional findings which the attached transcript was intended to convey. To the extent plaintiff believed any ambiguities in these additional findings conflicted with a finding or conclusion set forth in the trial court's written statement, it was incumbent upon him to bring such ambiguities to the trial court's attention prior to entry of judgment. (Id. at p. 982; Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 59-60.) Plaintiff did not do so here.
Absent an objection to an omission or ambiguity, we interpret any ambiguous findings in the trial court's statement of decision in favor of the judgment. We therefore decline to entertain plaintiff's request that we reinterpret the meaning of oral statements made by the trial court in plaintiff's favor to support reversal.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.