Opinion
1:19-cv-08206 (GBD) (SDA)
12-16-2022
Osama Metwally, Plaintiff, v. City of New York et al., Defendants.
TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE B. DANIELS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEWART D. AARON, United States Magistrate Judge.
Currently before the Court is a motion by Defendant, the City of New York (“Defendant” or “City”), pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action. (8/31/22 Notice of Mot., ECF No. 56.) For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion be GRANTED and this case be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff Osama Metwally (“Metwally” or “Plaintiff”), filed a lawsuit in Queens County Supreme Court, Index No. 705076/2017 (“Metwally I”), against the City and others alleging that his civil rights were violated in an incident that occurred on June 12, 2014. (See Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“Def.'s 56.1”), ECF No. 58, ¶ 1; Pl.'s Local Civil Rule 56.1 Response (“Pl.'s 56.1 Resp.”), ECF No. 65, ¶ 1.) On September 3, 2019, Metwally initiated the instant action by filing a Complaint alleging that the City and NYPD Police Officers Imran Zahoor (“Zahoor”) and Jonathan Massas (“Massas”) violated his constitutional civil rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments during an incident that occurred on September 4, 2016. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-2, 7, 68-73.) As against the City, Metwally asserted in this action a municipal liability claim, pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (See id. ¶¶ 40-51.)
On January 9, 2020, the parties settled Metwally I for the sum of $18,000.00. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3.) In connection therewith, Metwally executed settlement documents, including a General Release releasing all claims he may have against the “City of New York, and all past and present officers, directors, managers, administrators, employees, agents, assignees, lessees, and representatives of the City of New York” except for those claims listed by Metwally in the General Release. (Id.) In the form of release, Metwally did not list any actions or claims to be excluded from the General Release. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4.) Following receipt of the Metwally I settlement documents, the City remitted to Metwally the sum of $18,000.00 on or about April 29, 2020. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 5.)
On November 17, 2021, Metwally filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in this action that, like his initial Complaint, contained a Monell claim against the City. (FAC, ECF No. 40, ¶¶ 3344.) By letter dated November 26, 2021, Defendants stated their intention to file a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (11/26/21 Ltr., ECF No. 42.)
In December 2021, the City requested that Metwally voluntarily dismiss this action by reason of the General Release executed in connection with the Metwally I settlement, but Metwally refused. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 4-6; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) The basis for Metwally's refusal was his claim that he did exclude this action in the release form for the Metwally I settlement but that Rehan Nazrali, Esq. (“Attorney Nazrali”), the attorney who represented him in Metwally I, mistakenly submitted the wrong first page of the release form to the City that did not contain his intended list of excluded cases and that this action was intended to be excluded. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 7.)
By Order dated June 28, 2022, the claims against Zahoor and Massas were dismissed. (6/28/22 Order, ECF No. 52.) By Order dated July 13, 2022, the Court adopted the parties proposed briefing schedule regarding the City's anticipated dismissal motion. (7/13/22 Order, ECF No. 55.)
On August 31, 2022, the City moved for dismissal of this action on the grounds that Metwally has not stated a Monell claim against the City and that Metwally released his claims against the City based upon the General Release he executed in connection with the Metwally I settlement. (Def.'s Mem., ECF No. 59.) In opposition, Metwally contended that he pled a plausible Monell claim against the City and that the Metwally I release should not bar his claim against the City. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem., ECF No. 66.) Because, as set forth below, the Court finds that Metwally released his claims against the City, the Court need not and does not address the sufficiency of the Monell claim.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The branch of Defendant's motion seeking dismissal based upon the General Release executed by Plaintiff is made under Rule 56. Thus, the Court addresses herein the Legal Standards under Rule 56, and not under Rule 12(c), which was the Rule upon which the City sought dismissal of the Monell claim as pled.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1986). A dispute concerning material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In making its determination, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II. Law Regarding General Releases
“Settlement agreements and releases are construed according to the general principles of contract law.” Caines v. Oudkerk, No. 17-CV-00360 (PGG), 2018 WL 3059653, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (citing, inter alia, Collins v. Harris-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002)). A contract is unambiguous if it contains “a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [contract] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.” Drew v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-10714 (ER), 2019 WL 3714932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (citing Robert Littlejohn v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 18-CV-06336 (KPF), 2019 WL 3219454, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019)) (alteration in original). “The determination of whether the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, or, conversely, subject to more than one meaning and therefore ambiguous, is to be made by the trial judge from an examination of the four corners of the release.” Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E. Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Found., No. 04-CV-05332 (NRB), 2005 WL 2875327, at *4 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005) (quoting 29 Williston on Contracts, § 73.7 (4th ed. 2003)); see also GE Funding Capital Mkt. Servs. v. Neb. Inv. Fin. Auth., 767 Fed.Appx. 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Ambiguity is determined within the four corners of the document.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brad H. v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 180, 186 (2011)).
“Under New York law, a court must give full effect to unambiguous contract terms.” HOP Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 678 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002)). “Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the terms of a facially unambiguous contract.” Id. (citing Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 572 (1986)). “With unambiguous contracts, a party's subjective intent and understanding of the terms is irrelevant.” Id. Thus, “[u]nder New York law, a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced.” Cuffee v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-08916 (PGG) (DF), 2018 WL 1136923, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Tromp v. City of New York, 465 Fed.Appx. 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Where the language of [a] release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing cases).
The parties cite only to New York law regarding the interpretation of the General Release. Thus, following other courts in this District, the Court applies New York law. See Mosley v. Jennings, No. 16-CV-00994 (RA), 2018 WL 583121, at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2018) (applying New York law to interpretation of General Release because “the entirety of the challenged conduct in this case took place in New York, the contract was signed in New York, and the parties resided or worked in New York at all relevant times”) (citing Lloyd v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-08539 (RJS), 2017 WL 2266876, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (“applying New York law when the General Release [did] not include a choice of law provision because the parties had impliedly manifested their acquiescence to New York law controlling the interpretation of the General Release by relying exclusively on New York law in their submissions”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Figueroa v. Prospect Billiards Corp., No. 18-CV-02144 (VEC) (KHP), 2019 WL 3415985, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) (applying New York law to interpretation of settlement agreement resolving federal claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3408867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019).
“Moreover, ‘[t]he proper interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, and a dispute on such an issue may be properly resolved by summary judgment.'” Caines, 2018 WL 3059653, at *3 (quoting Omni Quartz, Ltd. v. CVS Corp., 287 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Fischer & Mandell, LLP v. Citibank, N.A., 632 F.3d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if the terms of [a] contract are unambiguous”) (alteration in original).
“A defendant has the initial burden of establishing that a release bars the plaintiff's claims.” Muhammad v. Schriro, No. 13-CV-01962 (PKC), 2014 WL 4652564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276 (2011)). “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release.'” Id. (quoting Fleming v. Ponziani, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 111 (1969)).
III. Law Regarding Unilateral Mistake
Under New York law, reformation of a contract “may be appropriate where a writing does not set forth the actual agreement of the parties.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. CDL Hotels USA, Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 482, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). There is, however, “a heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifests the true intention of the parties, and a correspondingly high order of evidence is required to overcome that presumption.” Id. at 496 (quoting Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 574 (1986)). A claim for reformation “must be grounded upon either mutual mistake or fraudulently induced unilateral mistake.” Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., 36 A.D.3d 441, 443 (1st Dep't 2007).
“Also referred to as scrivener's error, mutual mistake occurs where the parties have reached a real and existing agreement on particular terms and subsequently find themselves bound to a writing which does not accurately express their agreement.” U.S. Russia Inv. Fund v. Neal & Co., No. 97-CV-01788 (DC), 1998 WL 557606, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998) (cleaned up) (citations omitted); see also In re Miami Metals I, Inc., 634 B.R. 249, 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“The contract law doctrine of scrivener's error, or mutual mistake, allows a court of equity to reform a contract where a written agreement does not reflect the clear intent of the parties due to a drafting error.” (quoting Young v. Verizon's Bell Atl. Cash Balance Plan, 667 F.Supp.2d 850, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff'd, 615 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010)).
“New York law does not permit reformation or rescission of a contract for unilateral mistake alone.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 322 F.Supp.2d at 498 (citing Collins v. Harrison-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2002)). “A unilateral mistake must be ‘coupled with some fraud.'” Id. (quoting Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
The City argues that the clear and unambiguous language of the General Release bars Plaintiff's claims in this action. (Def.'s Mem. at 9-12.) The City is correct. The General Release released all claims that Plaintiff had against the City except for those claims listed in the General Release, and no such claims were listed. (See Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 3-4.) The General Release language unambiguously precludes Plaintiff from bringing civil rights claims that accrued before January 9, 2020 (i.e., the date of the Release) against the City. Since the events giving rise to the civil rights claims in this case occurred on September 4, 2016, Plaintiff released those claims as part of the settlement in Metwally I, and he is barred from bringing them against the City here.
Plaintiff argues that, due to Attorney Nazrali's “scrivener's error” in failing to exclude this action from the General Release, the General Release should be reformed. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 14, 24-25.) However, the record makes plain that no mutual mistake occurred here. See ACA Galleries, Inc. v. Kinney, 928 F.Supp.2d 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he doctrine of mutual mistake ‘may not be invoked by a party to avoid the consequences of its own negligence.'”) (citation omitted). Rather, any mistake was made unilaterally by Attorney Nazrali by not listing this action as one to be excluded from the General Release. Thus, since no showing has been made, or could be made, that the City engaged in any fraud, the General Release cannot be reformed based upon Attorney Nazrali's mistake.
The Affirmation by Attorney Nazrali explaining his mistake (Nazrali Aff., ECF No. 65-4) is of no moment. Because the General Release is clear and unambiguous, “the Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent and must enforce the release according to its terms.” Mateo v. Carinha, No. 14-CV-09020 (LTS), 2019 WL 1409727, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff also argues that the City waived its defense of release because it failed to raise such defense in the Answer to Plaintiff's initial Complaint, which Answer was filed on October 26, 2021. (See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 25 (referring to Answer, ECF No. 37).) However, as Plaintiff himself notes, a district court has “discretion to entertain unpleaded affirmative defenses at the summary judgment stage in the absence of undue prejudice to the plaintiff, bad faith dilatory motive on the part of the defendant, futility or undue delay.” (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 25-26 (citing Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 762 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2014)).
In the present case, there is no cognizable prejudice to Plaintiff. With respect to prejudice, Plaintiff's counsel merely argues in his opposition memorandum that “[e]arlier awareness of this defense might have warranted discussion with the plaintiff regarding discontinuance[.]” (See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 26.) Moreover, there was no bad faith dilatory motive or undue delay by the City. The City alerted Plaintiff to its defense in December 2021, the month after Plaintiff filed his FAC. (See Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) Finally, the defense is not futile, since dismissal is appropriate based upon the defense.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the City met its burden to show that the General Release bars Plaintiff's claims. Indeed, “courts in this Circuit have consistently concluded that similarly phrased releases between federal civil rights claimants and the City of New York bar suit against the City and its employees for alleged conduct predating the release.” Lloyd, 2017 WL 2266876, at *3 (citing cases).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
* * *
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Daniels.
THE FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).