Opinion
No. COA12–1357.
2013-05-7
Tawanda L. METTS, Plaintiff, v. Pamela PARKINSON, Defendant.
J. Michael Genest, attorney for plaintiff. Robert E. Ruegger, attorney for defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 27 July 2012 by Judge Henry Hight in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2013. J. Michael Genest, attorney for plaintiff. Robert E. Ruegger, attorney for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Tawanda Metts (plaintiff) appeals from an order entered 27 July 2012 granting attorney's fees in her favor. We reverse and remand.
On 24 October 2009 plaintiff and Pamela Parkinson (defendant) were involved in an automobile collision. Plaintiff suffered injuries and made a claim against defendant's insurer, GEICO. GEICO denied the claim and plaintiff then filed suit. The matter came on for trial on 29 May 2012, and a jury found that plaintiff was injured by the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 6–21.1. On 27 July 2012, the trial court issued an order granting $2,200.00 in attorney's fees in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff now appeals, challenging the amount of the award.
“The allowance of counsel fees ... [is] in the discretion of the presiding judge. Without a showing of any abuse of the trial judge's discretion, the trial judge's determination to award counsel fees will not be overturned.” Whitfield v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 86 N.C.App. 466, 469, 358 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1987) (citation omitted).
On appeal plaintiff argues that the order should be remanded because the trial court erred by determining the amount of attorney's fees without making proper findings of fact. We agree.
Plaintiff directs our attention to Parker v. Hensley, 175 N.C.App. 740, 625 S.E.2d 182 (2006) in support of her argument. In Parker, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees following a jury verdict in his favor for injuries resulting from an automobile collision. There, the trial court awarded a small amount of attorney's fees and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, we noted that the plaintiff's attorney “provided an affidavit and detailed worksheet outlining his fees to support an award in the amount[.]” Id. at 742, 625 S.E.2d at 184. Regardless, we remanded the order because the trial court “failed to make findings concerning: (1) the reasonable time and labor for Plaintiff's counsel to expend, (2) skill required by this case, (3) the customary fee for similar cases and (4) the experience and ability of the Plaintiff's attorney .” Id. at 742, 625 S.E.2d at 184–85 (citation omitted). We concluded that without such findings, we were unable “to determine whether the amount of the award of attorney fees [was] reasonable” and that “[t]he mere recitation that the fees are reasonable without further findings is inadequate.” Id.
Similarly, here the trial court's order contains no findings of facts addressing the relevant factors outlined in Parker. Like the order in Parker, the order here makes reference to “Exhibit B” which from the record appears to be an affidavit outlining a summary of the attorney's costs. However, as we held in Parker, such evidence alone is insufficient to support the award and the trial court was required to make specific findings of fact. As such, we reverse and remand the order to the trial court for findings.
Reversed and remanded. Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).